Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

104. Memorandum of Discussion at the 244th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 7, 1955¹

Washington, April 7, 1955

The President presided at this meeting. Also present were the Vice President; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Others present were Mr. H. Chapman Rose for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Items 1 and 2); the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 7); the Director, U.S. Information Agency (for Items 4-8); the Acting Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (for Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, and General B. G. Barksdale Hamlett, USA (for Item 3); the President, Board of Commissioners, District of Columbia (for Item 1); the Director, Office of Civil Defense, District of Columbia (for Item 1); Mr. Ralph E. Spear, FCDA (for Items 1 and 2); the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President (for Item 2); Special Assistants to the President Anderson, Dodge, and Rockefeller; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Items 1 and 2); Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Naval Aide to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of items 1. “Presentation on D.C. Civil Defense Plans”, 2. “Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1954: The Civil Defense Program”, 3. “Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1954: The Military Program”, 4. “U.S. Policy Towards Japan”, and 5. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”.]

6. United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia (Progress Report, dated March 25, 1955, by the OCB on NSC 5405²)

At the conclusion of General Cabell’s remarks on the Saigon situation,³ Mr. Dillon Anderson inquired if the Secretary of State would care to report on these developments.

Secretary Dulles described the situation as extremely critical. The French, with the notable exception of General Ely, were obviously eager to see the Diem Government fail and be replaced by a pro-French regime. Indeed, the French had gone so far as to propose that Bao Dai summon Diem and the leaders of the sects to Cannes or Paris and there arbitrate the conflict. While the French had now dropped this proposal, it was quite clear that because of the very close tie which existed between Bao Dai and the Binh Xuyen gangster group, Bao Dai’s arbitration would have gone against Prime Minister Diem. The real problem, of course, was that Bao Dai in a sense represented the principle of legitimacy. It would be awfully helpful if someone could “take care” of Bao Dai. Unfortunately, his proceeds from the Binh Xuyen, who controlled the brothels and gambling houses in Saigon, were so vast that nobody had enough money to bribe him successfully.

Secretary Dulles explained that he felt that Prime Minister Diem should have been permitted by the French to pit his National Army against the sect forces and subdue them. The French, however, had refused to go along with this proposed course of action. The French refusal was the more exasperating inasmuch as the Vientnamese National Army had been developed and designed precisely for the purpose of maintaining internal security and public order, as opposed to resisting overt aggression. If the French refused to permit the National Army to carry out its mission, said Secretary Dulles, it will be necessary for the United States to reconsider its whole policy toward Free Vietnam. Unfortunately for such a reconsideration, there were no very good alternative policies in sight.

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Noted an oral report by the Secretary of State on his appraisal of the situation created by the conflict between Premier Diem and the sects in Saigon.

b. Noted the reference Progress Report on the subject, together with the Supplement thereto entitled “Summary of Developments in Indochina”, by the Operations Coordinating Board.

[Here follows discussion of items 7. “The Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy” and 8. “U.S. Aid to France”.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on April 8.
2. Not printed. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Southeast Asia)

3. The report of these remarks, made in the course of the discussion of “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, reads as follows:

   “General Cabell then said he wished to make a few comments on the crisis in Saigon. The seven-day extension of the truce between Premier Diem and the sects had postponed for a time the showdown between these opposing forces. The French were obviously not strongly supporting Prime Minister Diem. General Cabell concluded with an analysis of the relative strength of the National Army and the armies of the three sects.”

4. The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1376, a record copy of which is in Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95.