Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

100. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 5, 1955—midnight.

4348. Reference Deptel 4309 rptd info Paris 3506,² Deptel 4330,³ Deptel 4318.⁴

1. Because of transmission difficulties full text your 4309 did not reach me until 0900 local 5 April. Other references came in later hours same date.

2. I shall answer pertinent points in all above reftels in this message.

3. Despite fact that para 6 Deptel 4309 indicates tentative refusal of French proposal contained mytel 4292,⁵ remainder of 4309 and other reftels clearly indicate Department disapproval of Ely’s proposal. This I accept.

4. I must point out dangers of position stated in para 7 Deptel 4309 “We cannot envisage any person, aside from Diem, who could justify U.S. financial and other support on scale large enough have even reasonable chance of success.” I fear if this position is finalized, we will have adopted a rigid position which will allow no room for maneuver in the event that Diem either resigns or, despite our support, is relieved by Bao Dai or otherwise forced out of the govt. Aside from our security interests, in South Vietnam, we do have a considerable moral obligation to the more than one-half million refugees who have come out of the north, in large part through our aid and encouragement.

5. We apparently have failed to make clear certain points which I will seek now to clarify.

(a) Possibilities of Diem broadening his cabinet.

(1) One of greatest threats to Diem’s govt now is fact that he is today very nearly running a one-man show with his two brothers Luyen and Nhu, and a few obscure ministers acting as his only Cabinet advisers through our intervention. Do and his associates remain figuratively in the govt, but they are not consulted with respect to policy, and Do has stated categorically that he has no influence on the President. It is significant that neither Do nor any of his Tinh Than associates attended important Cabinet meeting this afternoon (see paragraph 12, following message.⁶).

(2) Both Do and [title deleted], with whom I have just talked concerning strengthening govt, state that no new men can be persuaded to enter govt now. Reasons they give for this condition differ, but fact remains that, in my judgment, it will not be possible to induce any able men to join govt unless they can be convinced that President will change his methods of operation, will in truth consult them with respect to policy and will decentralize to them in the execution of details of their offices.

(3) At the moment an even stronger reason which will prevent participation of men such as Quat and Minh is that they thoroughly disagree with President’s insistence upon use of force in arriving at solution of sect problems. They may be wrong in this reasoning, but fact of their disagreement cannot be challenged.

(b) Capabilities of Diem to overthrow Binh Xuyen.

This question covered in detail in message to Robertson (Saig 6273) 4 April 1955.⁷ There is no question in my mind but that VN Army could drive organized forces of Binh Xuyen from city and forcibly take over Saigon–Cholon Sûreté and Police Headquarters. However, I agree with General Ely’s firm conviction that this would not prevent attempts of assassination and other sporadic acts of terrorism, nor could the army wipe out Binh Xuyen if they went underground, as they have in the past, or joined in guerilla action with Hoa Hao.

(c) Possibilities of treating Binh Xuyen separately from Bao Dai and Hoa Hao.

Average Vietnamese citizen has no love for Binh Xuyen, and recognizes them for what they are. Binh Xuyen provides toughest and most ruthless leadership in so-called United Front. It is believed here that Bao Dai has been closely affiliated with Bay Vien and probably still is. Unless this relationship could be genuinely broken, through pressure on Bao Dai, I doubt that Binh Xuyen can be separated from United Front by negotiation. I do not believe that unity of sect front is genuine or lasting, and it may well be that Cao Dai would not enter civil war against army if latter took vigorous action against Binh Xuyen, particularly if Binh Xuyen leaders could be captured or eliminated. However, Ely firmly believes destruction of Binh Xuyen leaders will not result in break up of either Binh Xuyen or United Front. I have not been here long enough to challenge this assessment.

(d) Question of French assistance to Binh Xuyen.

French had equipped Binh Xuyen forces during war to fight against Viet Minh, but I know of no matériel or ammunition assistance, certainly since the beginning of the present tension. It is possible that through individuals in French or Vietnamese Army, Binh Xuyen may have been able to get gasoline but best estimates here are that their supply is quite limited. (For details on weapons see Embtel 4343.⁸) I am confident Ely would not knowingly tolerate any assistance to Binh Xuyen under any circumstances now.

(e) Possibilities of French military or logistical support of VN Army action against Binh Xuyen.

(1) These questions were discussed this morning 5 April with General Ely. He again clearly indicated FEC would not actively participate against Binh Xuyen or other sects. On other hand he informed me VN Army controls number of ammo dumps now and four or five days ago he offered to turn over to army an ammo depot in Saigon if they would assume responsibility for its security. VN Army, according to Ely, replied orally that it did not wish to take over this depot. (President probably knows nothing about this.) Ely insists that in no sense has he or the FEC been attempting to curb operations of VN Army. New gasoline forms were required because many old ones had been reported sold to Binh Xuyen by VN Army officers. Ely says army has ample ammunition to initiate any action they may desire against Binh Xuyen, and if they assume control of the Phu Tho Depot they should be able to take care of their own ammo supply.

(2) Reference “basic issue” in para 3 Deptel 4309. I am convinced Ely has no sympathy whatever for Binh Xuyen. He has agreed that Diem must replace Police Chief Sang and assume control of National Police and Sûreté at time or under conditions which would be unlikely to lead to civil disorders. He does strongly feel that timing of this must be carefully weighed, and that Diem’s present intentions will lead to civil war in which FEC is determined not to become involved. I feel sure that Ely has instructions to this effect from his government.

6. It appears to me the essential thing now is to secure further extension of truce, if possible. To this end, I took action as reported in next following message.

[

Collins

]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–555. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated for information priority to Paris.
2. Document 93.
3. Document 96.
4. Printed as telegram 3510 to Paris, Document 95.
5. The reference may be in error. Telegram 4301 from Saigon, Document 92, has a clearer exposition of the French proposal than the reference telegram, Document 91.
6. In telegram 4349 from Saigon, April 6, Collins reported in great detail on his efforts to bring about a further extension of the truce. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–655)
7. Apparently a reference to the message from Collins contained in the memorandum from Wisner to Robertson, supra.
8. In this telegram, April 5, the Embassy reported frequent rumors in Saigon that French officials were supplying sub rosa the Binh Xuyen and other sects with arms. The Embassy knew for a fact that the French had just broken a black market ring of arms sales by Foreign Legionnaires and others. In both cases, the quantity of arms could not be verified. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–555)