95. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1

3510. Embassy Paris telephoned Department morning 4th reporting receipt Department telegram 3506 repeated Saigon 43092 and that Embassy had just conveyed substance to French. They prepared consider our position.

However in interim French wished U.S. agree today on Ely’s recommendation that we and French jointly request Bao Dai to immediately instruct Diem and Sects that truce should be extended 48 hours beyond present limit.

After fullest consideration Department and on Secretary’s instructions decided we would not go along with request to Bao Dai. Instead Collins instructed see Diem soonest alone and inform him U.S. convinced any restraint against Diem taking action against Binh Xuyen should be dependent only upon proper conditions to ensure success of such an act.

Accordingly we have informed French we feel strongly that Diem should be permitted exercise this right and that U.S. and French should support him in such an act both morally and logistically. Also Binh Xuyen should understand U.S. and France completely backing Diem and withhold any support Binh Xuyen including logistical [Page 195] support. This position of U.S. and French should be widely published and understood.

We have not yet been able secure French approval to position outlined above and during interim pending French reply we strongly recommend to Diem that he agree to an extension of 48 hours, so U.S. can have time work out details with French along above lines. Think in his interest well as ours gain this time for coordinated position.

This delay from point view U.S. would not in any way detract from fact of Diem’s legal right to take action against Binh Xuyen and to assume control of National Police.

We sincerely hope such a démarche will cause Diem agree to an extension of the truce.

General Collins should after making such statement to Diem inform Ely fully, explaining time extension asked for on two grounds:

1.
To allow French time to consider reply Department telegram 3506 and to U.S. position as outlined above.
2.
To allow General Collins and Ely to determine definitely whether or not Diem has capability to win an action, now if such called for, against Binh Xuyen under conditions of full U.S. French support of Diem and of withholding any support from Binh Xuyen. If not now, by when should Diem be able move?

In telephone call to Achilles afternoon 4th he was instructed inform French:

1.
We oppose use of Bao Dai.
2.
We have instructed Collins to see Diem privately and to request in strongest terms U.S. desire for 48 hour extension truce.
3.
That Collins will keep Ely fully informed U.S. position.
4.
We hope French reply to reference telegram will be provided soonest since we are dubious about further truce extensions.
5.
In reply Achilles’ question if we should not ask for longer truce extension to work out matters with French, we replied feasibility this must await Collins’ recommendation.
6.
Embassy London should inform Eden.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–455. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hoey and cleared with Dulles (in substance) and by Young, Sebald, Merchant, Murphy, and MacArthur. Sent also niact to Saigon as 4318 and to London as 5059.
  2. Document 93.