Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

611.95B/10–754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State¹

confidential

Seoul, October 7, 1954—6 p.m.

408. Repeated information Tokyo 272. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Before taking action with President Rhee pursuant Deptel 256 repeated Tokyo 742² there are several aspects which seem to us counsel against such action at this particular time and which I submit for Department’s consideration.

1. Having in mind the strong and earnest representations made to Rhee on September 27 in presence not only of General Hull and Economic Coordinator Wood but also Rhee’s principal advisors, for me to return now with reiterated complaint of same character seems unlikely impress Rhee as strength on our part. Repetition of representations might inevitably have character of anti-climax, certainly of having been said before. If Rhee was insufficiently impressed by very strong September 27 representations, made directly in name of US Government, there seems scant reason to expect repetition would be more successful.

2. To approach Rhee on subject of misleading ROK official statements while minute of Washington understanding still before ROK Government likewise seems to us somewhat contrary to “formula of uneagerness” which Embassy, Hull and Wood have agreed is desirable as present tactic.

3. Most urgent irritant in US-ROK relations as of this moment is not ROK misrepresentations (reprehensible though they are) but problem of hwan advances to US Army. We would thus be making representations to chief of state on other than most pressing issue.

4. While admittedly misrepresentations are closely connected with Rhee’s views on realignment of US armed forces and aid programs (and hence also on minute of understanding) there have been several inconclusive but interesting indications in last few days that notwithstanding all his agitation, Rhee and his government may decide after all not to shoot Santa Claus. Toward this end we need show of effective firmness and strength rather than further discussion.

5. As we have sought to indicate in various previous messages, what seems to us likely to influence Rhee’s behavior, or to restrain him from further bad behavior, is not so much official admonitions, privately administered, as indications from government sources Washington and also in US press that American Government and people are disgusted with sort of behavior in which Rhee has indulged ever since return from American visit. Although Department may have good reason for reluctance to act on this suggestion, I am constrained to repeat that from point of view of our interpretation of events in Seoul, Washington initiative along lines suggested would have vastly more effect on Rhee than shaking another finger at him.³

1. This message was unsigned.
2. In this telegram, Oct. 5, the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Seoul to call to Rhee’s attention the fact that his contrary and/or misleading statements on redeployment, U.S. concern for Korea, and the supposed pro-Japanese bias in the U.S. Government were not conducive to good ROK-U.S. relations. (611.95B/10–554)

3. In telegram 263 to Seoul, Oct. 8, the Department of State replied to this telegram as follows:

   “In line your recommendation while here Department had felt cumulative effect continuing official representations would help convince Rhee we follow propaganda carefully and regard current campaign as having serious and bad effect ROK-U.S. relationships but willing defer to judgment expressed your 408.” (611.95B/10–754)