Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/9–1054

Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Tokyo, September 10, 1954.

Subject:

• Matters of Concern to the Far East Command with Respect to Korea

1. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. I have noted with appreciation your efforts to persuade the Swiss and the Swedes to declare publicly that Communist obstructionist tactics have rendered the NNSC completely ineffective as a neutral organization under the Armistice Agreement and to announce their withdrawal from that body.¹ I share your concern that if the present situation is permitted to persist too long, the US may be confronted with the adverse effects which would inevitably follow unilateral ROK action against the NNSC or which would result if the Communists were successful in obtaining a resolution during the 9th General Assembly of the UN to the effect that the NNSC is functioning satisfactorily. We should not wait too long for evidences of cooperation in this matter on the part of the Swiss and Swedes, who may be motivated by an over-anxiety to preserve neutral appearances. The most positive solution, and thus perhaps the best one available to us, may be the unilateral action on the part of the United Nations Command which I have proposed on several occasions. I would have my representative in the Military Armistice Commission announce to the Communist side that they have by their actions is the north confronted the UN side with a de facto abrogation of this portion of the Armistice Agreement and, while reluctant to do so, we have no alternative but to consider those provisions of the Armistice Agreement which pertain to the NNSC as null and void.

2. Prevention of Unilateral Action by Korea As you know, there have been reports of ROK preparations for unilateral military action intended to embroil US forces with the Communists. If such an action is attempted it is most likely to be attempted within the next month, before the departure of major US forces from Korea. As US forces depart, or prepare for departure, more and more control over their own logistic support must be given to the ROK forces. They then become more capable of offensive action. When President Rhee was considering a ROK offensive some time ago, the senior ROK generals convinced him that the offensive could end only in failure and Rhee gave it up. That plan was for an all out offensive. We believe that the plan now most likely to be attempted would only create an incident or start hostilities in an effort to get us involved. In the hope that the senior ROK generals can again influence Rhee, General Taylor and I have both made it clear to them that the reopening of hostilities by the ROK will not be supported by the US nor will we be deceived by any faked incident designed to cast blame on the Communists.

3. Signature on Memorandum of Understanding. I was delighted with the strong position which you took in insisting on signature on the part of President Rhee of the Memorandum of Understanding developed as a result of the Washington conference. Indications being received by me and by General Taylor in Korea point to the probability that President Rhee will display a reluctance to sign the Memorandum or will attempt to force the United States to agree to major modification of that instrument. It is my hope that you will adhere to the position you have taken. Over the past months, cooperation and conciliation have only produced opposition or even outright antagonism. Firmness on our part not only gives promise of success, because it has long been effective with Orientals, but it may well serve to stiffen the resolution of those who are in opposition to President Rhee on matters vitally affecting the United States interest.

J. E. Hull

General, United States Army

1. In telegram 316 to Bern and 166 to Stockholm, Sept. 3, the Department of State instructed the respective Embassies to approach the Swiss and Swedish Foreign Ministries and state that the United States was strongly in favor of their withdrawal from the NNSC before the opening of the UN General Assembly. (795.00/8–2545)