795B.5/9–654: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
267. Repeated information Tokyo 170, Manila 17. Manila for Secretary; Tokyo pass General Hull. Regarding Deptel 176 repeated Tokyo 485.1 Following additional letter from Prime Minister Pyun to General Hull answering latter’s communication September 22 reached me this noon, original having been despatched to Hull by General Taylor:
“September 6, 1954. My dear General: I appreciate your letter of September 2 as an early response from such a responsible person as you, dear General, to letter I wrote to Mr. Dulles.
As my letter to Secretary State indicated, we are still hoping that some steps can be taken through cooperation between two governments to effect withdrawal of NNSC from Korea. But in view of daily worsening situation here, urgency counsels a quick action.
Is true that President Rhee, during his recent stay in US, agreed to withhold temporarily unilateral action then under contemplation on part of this government on understanding that Mr. Dulles would devise some means to bring an end to activities of NNSC, many of which are proved to be jeopardizing our security. But to be frank, I do not know, nor remember, that there was any understanding that could be construed as binding our President down to no action indefinitely pending working out of a solution which, unfortunately, has so far failed to show any intimation whatever after lapse of weeks since.
[Page 1872]I personally wish we could afford to be more patient. The situation here is daily deteriorating in direction of desperation. We expected Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea in advance of UN forces, but what is actually happening is reverse, US divisions departing from Korea and leaving huge gap hardly to be filled by ROK units to be newly activated, but which, in fact, do not exist even in paper-planning. While North Korea is bristling with airfields that did not either exist or operate during hostilities, are now in full trim with jet fighters and bombers ready on them, few airfields in South Korea will soon go to weeds if they fail to get proper attention now being promised. This grim picture, my dear General, but fact is that we have no other picture.
I earnestly hope that enemy attaches as much significance to ‘massive retaliation’ as we hopefully do, having nothing better to do. I fear, however, that there is nothing that blurs enemy’s insight into real situation as it exists. Here is aggression that justifies our fighting, but we are actually receding from scene. Naturally verbal interdiction that we will fight if there occurs further aggression cannot have much weight with enemy and consequently fail to deter his next immediate action.
Honestly I do not believe that there is much on ground to hold line long in case of an all-out enemy attack. We do not see much good in ‘massive retaliation’ if South Korea is swamped, due to deficiency in ground force.
Refuse to see why armistice terms, openly trampled under Communist feet, should be sanctified in our eyes. Nor are we convinced that we should gratuitously and one-sidedly bind ourselves with terms that do not bind Communists.
A less exasperating situation might have called for greater degree of forbearance but this is all too much even for most patient of all governments. We just do not see our way clear to avoid [garbled group] between insecurity and inconvenience, such as likely arise from unilateral action.
I am yet to hear from Secretary of State himself and earnestly hope that his answer will bring us a happy solution that will terminate our anxieties about presence of Communist members of NNSC in Korea.
I should like to thank you on this occasion for satisfactory reply you have given me regarding disposal of bodies of ‘civilians’ distinct from combat personnel.
With warm personal greetings, very sincerely yours, Y. T. Pyun.”