Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795B.5/9–554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Seoul, September 5, 1954—11 p.m.

266. Repeated information Tokyo 169, Manila 16. Limit distribution. Tokyo pass General Hull. Manila for Secretary in reply his telegram 9, September 4.¹

Surveying Korean scene after my US visit I find it highly unsatisfactory and disquieting in following particulars (in addition to report mentioned Secretary’s telegram 9, September 4 from Manila of details of which I already informed.) Since President Rhee’s return from Washington he has embarked on four public campaigns, all contrary our interests. That these derive exclusively from Rhee is beyond question.

1. Our military and air redeployment program, disclosed in Washington because of Seoul publicity contrary Washington understanding, is misrepresented as abandonment, as reckless duplication of situation of ROK military nakedness prevailing in 1950, and as indication US does not intend face up to its Korean responsibilities. This has already created public uneasiness that could readily develop into widespread alarm. It has been primarily responsible for further sharp depreciation Korean hwan.

2. Our military aid program is belittled as insufficient even while Admiral Sohn and associates are still negotiating details in Washington.

3. Our economic aid program is under renewed attack as incompetently handled. Effort is in progress force out Economic Coordinator Tyler Wood and his replacement by some one “like General Coulter (UNKRA Agent General) or General Van Fleet.”

(Further details this matter in Embtel 265² this date.) In meantime effectiveness program very greatly impaired by ROK obstructionism, for example exchange rate altercation and attempted boycott. Present situation is manifestly unsatisfactory and dangerous and if continued may well become more so. Generals Hull, Taylor and I, and our associates in other branches are following all these matters as closely and intently as we can.

I believe it is of utmost importance to present Rhee without further delay with memorandum of Washington understanding accompanied by clear indication “this is it”. There is little at hand justify optimism Rhee will readily accept our terms of reference. Nevertheless there is no evidence to indicate ROK people would welcome resumption of hostilities. In past Rhee has shown understanding of political realities, and if he now recognizes we mean business and do not propose to be moved by his threats, he may eventually come around. Situation in event he rejects memorandum of understanding, or seeks to emasculate it, may admittedly be difficult but we shall at least know where we stand. On positive side present turbulent air should be cleared and situation created where we can consider such further steps as developments indicate.

Briggs

1. In telegram Dulte 8 from Manila, which was a repeat of telegram 9 from Manila to Seoul, Sept. 4, Dulles wrote Briggs as follows:

   • “1. Assume you aware contents of CIA outgoing from Seoul (PD 79, 1 September) reporting plans for possible ROK action to create incident with view to renewing hostilities.
   • “2. Please advise what action contemplated to forestall any such ROK plan.” (795B.5/9–554)

2. Not printed. (795B.5/9–554)