Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/7–3054

United States Summary Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of United States Republic of Korea Talks, July 30, 1954, 3 p.m.¹

secret

Washington, [undated.]

Participants

• United States
• The Secretary of State
• Ambassador Briggs
• Mr. Drumright
• Mr. Young
• Mr. McClurkin
• The Secretary of Defense
• Admiral Radford
• General Hull
• Vice Admiral Davis
• General Rogers
• Mr. Sullivan
• Mr. Stassen
• Mr. Wood
• Mr. Moyer
• Republic of Korea
• President Rhee
• Ambassador Yang
• Ambassador Limb
• Admiral Sohn Won-il
• Paek-Tu-Chin
• Dr. Choe Sun-chu
• General Chong Il-kwon
• General Kim Chong-yol
• General Choe Tok-sin

1. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

Secretary Dulles referred to the statement made by General Won Yong Duk warning the Communist members of the NNSC to leave the Republic of Korea. He said that any action by the Republic of Korea to force the Czech and Polish members to leave South Korea created problems for us. The United States is trying to bring about an ending of the activities of the NNSC and we are planning to impose restrictions on the teams in the Republic of Korea comparable to those imposed in North Korea.

President Rhee said that these Communist members are moving relatively freely in South Korea, taking pictures and serving as a source of intelligence for the Communists. Meanwhile, the military buildup in North Korea continues despite the armistice. The armistice terms should be declared as ended, since the armistice was based on the proposition of the Political Conference, which has failed.

General Rogers pointed out the difficulty of achieving comparability between the situations in South Korea and North Korea, since the Communists have circumvented the port complex in the north by means of new rail lines which avoid the areas and by failure to make reports.

Secretary Dulles asked if President Rhee would agree not to take forceful action at the present time while we endeavor to bring an end to the activities of the NNSC through consultation with the Swiss and Swedes. In the meantime, we will try to see to it that the Czech and Polish members have no luxury facilities and are so far as possible under the same restrictions as they are in North Korea.

President Rhee agreed that he would give appropriate instructions to this effect.

2. Draft Agreed Minute

Most of this session was devoted to a detailed, paragraph-by-paragraph examination of a draft of an agreed minute which had been prepared by the United States side and given to the Koreans the preceding day. President Rhee remained only through the discussion of Paragraph 3(a) under the statement of the intentions and policy of the Republic of Korea. Thereafter, the burden of the discussion was carried for the Koreans by Ambassador Yang, Admiral Son Won-il and Mr. Paek Tu-Chin. Attached is a copy of this draft minute with deletions from the original United States draft bracketed and with additions to the original United States draft underlined.²

At the end of the meeting, there was agreement on the draft with additions and deletions as shown, but the Korean agreement was subject to President Rhee’s concurrence. President Rhee did not initial the draft before he left Washington on July 31. That afternoon, he sent word to Ambassador Briggs through Ambassador Yang that he needed further time to study the proposed minute and that he preferred to delay his initialing until he knew more specifically the details of what the United States proposes as its economic and military programs for the Republic of Korea.

3. Redeployment of United States Forces

Admiral Sohn said that he could not agree to the reduction to one United Nations corps. He could not convince the Korean people that they are safe, and their morale will be very badly affected unless the equipment is left behind and four more Korean divisions are created when United States forces are withdrawn.

Secretary Wilson said that we think the forces which remain will be adequate for the defense of Korea.

Admiral Radford said that we have no prospect of funds to support additional Korean divisions. We believe that the forces which will remain in Korea can contain any renewed Communist aggression. If the Communists attack, we will be fighting a different kind of war.

Dr. Choe said that the Korean people will be greatly worried but if Korean forces are strengthened, that will help. Withdrawal should be accomplished gradually.

Secretary Dulles said that it is necessary to make political preparation for withdrawal, of course. However, the same problem exists all over the world, including the United States. As new weapons are developed, not so much manpower is needed at the front. We can not afford both to develop new weapons and to maintain the old-fashioned forces.

Ambassador Yang asked for more firepower for the present Korean forces and asked also that the equipment of the United States divisions be left behind when they leave.

General Hull said that he needs to study further the problem of equipment before knowing what might profitably be left behind. Equipment has to be taken care of or it will deteriorate. Both General Taylor and he have studied the whole question of Korean defense and he believes that the risk being taken is acceptable, especially since he believes that it is possible to improve the efficiency of the Korean armed forces.

4. Mutual Defense Treaty

Ambassador Yang said that the Koreans wanted a mutual defense treaty like the one between the United States and Japan.

Secretary Dulles said that we would be perfectly willing to give the Republic of Korea a treaty like the Japanese treaty. The Japanese treaty imposes no obligations upon the United States. We have no obligation under the treaty to come to the defense of Japan if it is attacked. On the other hand, it gives us perpetual rights to station our forces in Japan. It was a treaty which we made with a defeated enemy before the peace treaty came into effect. The Republic of Korea can have that kind of treaty if it wants, but it would be crazy to take it.

Ambassador Yang said that he would have to study the question further.

5. Public Statement

Agreement was reached on a joint public statement to be released from the White House as soon as possible. Attached is the United States draft of this statement, bracketed to show the only change made in it.³

[Attachment]

Draft Agreed Minute of Conferences Between President Rhee and President Eisenhower and Their Advisers

confidential

Washington, July 31, 1954.

It is in the mutual interests of the United States and the Republic of Korea to continue the close cooperation which has proved mutually beneficial and has played such an important part in the Free World’s struggle against communism.

Accordingly,

It is the intention and policy of the Republic of Korea to:

1. Cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea [by all appropriate measures short of war],⁴ including possible efforts through the United Nations to secure this objective;

2. Retain Republic of Korea forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, unless after consultation it is agreed that our basic policies diverge and an opportunity is given to the United Nations Command to withdraw;

3. Take the necessary measures to make the economic program effective, including:

(a) with respect to exchange rates, the official rate of the Republic of Korea Government and the counterpart rate being 180 to 1, agreement to procedures as proposed by the United States for the conversion of dollars at a different and realistic exchange rate to cover hwan drawings of United States forces by sales of dollars through the Bank of Korea, and an undertaking to sell its own foreign exchange at realistic rates of exchange, and generally to price aid goods into the Korean economy at similar rates, thereby providing for the maximum contribution to the Korean economy and to the Korean budget from the use of these resources (it is estimated by the United States that during FY 1955 hwan will be purchased to the extent of $54 million);

(b) agreement that [a reasonable proportion of the] purchases anticipated in the aid program will be procured wherever in non-Communist countries [in Japan, provided Japan can furnish items of] goods of the required quality can be obtained at the best price (it being the objective to perform the maximum possible procurement in Korea at competitive prices);

(c) encouragement of private ownership of investment projects;

(d) cooperation in procedures for administration of United States aid funds consistent with United States legislation and the practices applied generally in such programs;

(e) [consultation with] “appropriate information” to the appropriate United States representatives concerning Korean plans for the use of their own foreign exchange; and

(f) a realistic effort to balance their budget and resist inflation (it will be the objective of both Governments to manage the budget of the Republic of Korea in a manner that will not result in serious inflation); and

4. Normalize relations with Japan and in the near future enter into negotiations with it to resolve the outstanding issues and for that purpose request the United States to [designate a mediator to] assist in bringing about a just solution.

Based upon the conditions which the Republic of Korea declares it will create, it is the intention and policy of the United States to:

1. Continue its program of helping to strengthen the Republic of Korea politically, economically and militarily;

2. Retain in Korea [for the present] the equivalent of one United Nations corps with necessary supporting units, reduction to this level to be gradual;

3. In the event of an unprovoked attack upon the Republic of Korea in violation of the armistice, to employ, in accordance with its constitutional processes, its retaliatory striking power against the aggressor;

4. Support the unification of Korea [by all appropriate measures short of war];

5. Support a strengthened Republic of Korea military establishment including the development of a reserve system in accordance with arrangements to be worked out by appropriate military representatives of the two Governments;

6. Provide some additional direct support to the Republic of Korea military forces in this U.S. fiscal year, the precise amount to be the subject of further detailed study and joint Republic of Korea-United States examination of the Republic of Korea military budget and to be negotiated [in Seoul] promptly after the United States Congress has acted on appropriations and the United States Government has reviewed its world-wide commitments.

7. Subject to the necessary Congressional authorizations, continue to press forward with the economic program for the rehabilitation of Korea.

1. These minutes were drafted by McClurkin.
2. Additions to the U.S. draft in the attachment are printed as italics.
3. For text of this statement as it was released, see the attachment to the Hagerty diary, July 30, infra. The change made was to omit the following clause from the last sentence of the third paragraph: “in accordance with the Declaration of the sixteen nations at Geneva on June 15, 1954.”
4. All brackets in this attachment are in the source text and indicate deletions from the original U.S. draft; all words printed as italics were additions to the original U.S. draft.