Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 208th Meeting of the National Security Council Thursday, July 29, 19541
eyes only
Present at the 208th meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); the Secretary of Labor (for Item 2); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 1); Hugh M. Milton for the Secretary of the Army; the Acting Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles (for Item 1); Assistant Secretary of Defense Hannah (for Item 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air [Page 1851] Force; the Acting Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; Mr. Sprague, NSC Consultant (for Item 1); the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 1); Ralph T. Walters, NSC Special Staff (for Item 1); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; Major John S. D. Eisenhower, USA; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Assistant to the Executive Secretary, NSC (for Items 2–6).
Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
[Here follows discussion on items 1. “Continental Defense” and 2. “Reserve Mobilization Requirements”.]
3. Redeployment of Forces From the Far East-Western Pacific Area (NSC Action No. 1087–d;2 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Redeployment of Forces from the Far East-Western Pacific Area; Forces and Manning Levels for FY 1956”, dated July 28, 19543)
Mr. Cutler opened the discussion on this subject by referring to the previous Council action (NSC Action No. 1087–d) by which the Council had deferred decision on further redeployment of U.S. forces from Korea. He then asked Secretary Wilson to outline in detail the Defense Department proposal contained in the first enclosure to the memorandum of July 28 distributed at the meeting.
Secretary Wilson said that what was proposed here was substantially in line with what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to some time ago. Decision on the JCS recommendations had been held up until the completion of the Geneva discussions on Korea. We did not want to deprive ourselves of a bargaining counter there in the event that the Chinese Communists proposed that they would get out of North Korea if we got out of South Korea. Secretary Wilson pointed out that the Defense proposal stated what forces we had now in the Pacific, what we would have if the proposed redeployment were effected, and where the men who were deployed would go. He said that there were two reasons for finalizing a decision now. First, we needed to tell our UN allies, and second, the Army found it difficult to plan for the rest of FY 1955 and for FY 1956 without a decision on redeployment.
Secretary Humphrey asked how the present proposal compared with the previous program.
The President said that he thought that three divisions were to be left in Korea. Admiral Radford pointed out that there were to be two U.S. [Page 1852] and one UN division left there. The President inquired whether provision had been made for incorporating the one U.S. regimental combat team into the UN division. Admiral Radford said that the Defense Department had this problem in mind. Secretary Wilson suggested that this RCT should be assigned to the British.
The President thought it important that a big UN headquarters be established in Korea. He suggested that since the British would now be getting approximately 40,000 of their combat troops out of Egypt, they might be able to keep in Korea the forces that they have there at present.
Mr. Cutler inquired how soon the proposed redeployment would be effected. Secretary Wilson said that it could be done by the end of the year, depending on the amount of effort put into it. He said that it was agreed that the 3rd Marine Division should for the present be moved to Okinawa under field conditons for training. This would give us more time to decide what forces we were going to leave on Okinawa.
Mr. Cutler inquired whether anyone had talked to President Rhee about these proposals. Secretary Wilson said that we had talked to Korean officials, and that our proposed redeployment of four divisions had come as quite a shock to them. The Koreans had asked, he said, whether we proposed to leave the equipment for these four divisions in Korea. The President inquired whether it was the general thought to leave this equipment. Admiral Radford said it was, but Secretary Wilson stated that we didn’t want to commit ourselves to leaving it all. He said that General Van Fleet had proposed four additional somewhat skeletonized reserve divisions for the ROK, and that these would need equipment.
The President asked whether it was still planned to have 20 fully equipped ROK divisions. Admiral Radford stated that it was, and in response to a further question from the President, said that the four new ROK divisions would not need all of the artillery that our four divisions being redeployed have. The President then turned to Secretary Dulles for his views on the proposed redeployment.
Secretary Dulles stated that he had checked with his people in the field on their general reaction to a further redeployment of U.S. forces, although not to the specific proposals of the Department of Defense. He said that he would have to report that it was the unanimous feeling that a reduction now would have bad political consequences. It was felt that this would be taken as further evidence of the intention of Western countries to cut their commitments in Asia. Furthermore, most of his own advisers in the Department of State shared this view. However, he was personally inclined to support the program of the Secretary of Defense, for the reality of the changed disposition was that it represented an increase in our strength on an over-all basis. He pointed out that our strength in Korea was now relatively greater than it had been, because [Page 1853] half of the Chinese Communist armies had been pulled out of North Korea and because of the further build-up of South Korean forces. Moreover, Japan had finally agreed to build up its own military strength, and we were building indigenous strength in Formosa and Indochina. However, the Defense proposal had an important psychological aspect. When the U.S. puts troops in a country they tend to become frozen there; the country gets the jitters when we attempt to pull them out. Nonetheless, we can’t build indigenous forces and keep our own forces pinned down too. Secretary Dulles concluded, therefore, that while we would have some bad moments, if the reality is more strength, the problem is to get that idea across.
The President said that he had talked to President Rhee about this proposal, and that it was all right with Rhee as long as the overall military strength in Korea was left approximately as it is now, Rhee had pointed out that the Chinese Communists could come back into Korea quickly. The President thought that Rhee could be sold this program.
The President inquired whether there was any particular reason for returning the 2nd and 3rd Divisions to the U.S. and leaving the 24th and 25th Divisions in the Pacific. He said that while there was no thought now of deactivating any additional Army divisions, in 18 months or two years we might possibly want to consider further deactivation. Since the 2nd and 3rd Divisions had long and honorable combat histories, it would be undesirable, he felt, to deactivate them. He therefore wondered whether it wouldn’t be better instead to bring back the 24th and 25th to the U.S., where they could be readily deactivated if a future decision were made to do so.
In response, General Ridgway pointed out that the 42nd and 4th Divisions were the next ones scheduled for deactivation. He expressed some concern about stripping the four divisions to be redeployed from Korea in order to give their equipment to the ROK divisions. He stated that we had a limited capability for reequipping these divisions, and would have to take away from our already limited mobilization reserves in order to supply them.
[Here follows discussion on item 4. “Force and Manning Levels for FY ‘56”.]
5. Republic of Korea Reserve Forces (NSC Action No. 10924)
The President inquired whether some increase in the strength of the Korean Air Force was not contemplated. Secretary Wilson said that they were to get 85 F–86–F’s—the planes that had been so effective at the end of the Korean war. The pilots would be brought over here for training. The Koreans believed that this could all be accomplished by the end of FY 1955, but the Secretary doubted it. The ROK wanted [Page 1854] four additional wings, but Secretary Wilson felt that would be too much of a load for them to carry. The President inquired whether, if they got four wings, four of ours might be taken out. Admiral Radford said that the Koreans would not get what they wanted. We don’t want that many wings, he said, on the front lines where they would be vulnerable to attack. Secretary Wilson said that we wished to redeploy some of our Air Forces to Okinawa and Japan, partly because of their vulnerability in Korea and partly because we wished to modernize them.
Secretary Dulles said that he had grave reservations about providing mobile instruments of war where we are not sure how they are going to be used. He pointed out that when we had given jet planes to Chiang we had got an agreement that they would not be used against the Chinese mainland without our permission. The Koreans were hostile to the Japanese and wished additional naval craft to drive Japanese fishing vessels away from areas that the Koreans claim as theirs. If we gave them jet planes they might use them to drop bombs across the Yalu. In general, the Secretary felt that we should not give mobile forces to countries whose objectives are not the same as our own, who are hostile to their neighbors, and who have a vested interest in starting a third world war. He wondered why it was necessary to provide the Koreans with jets. Admiral Radford said that we planned very little increase in the Korean Navy—they were to get two additonal destroyer escorts. He also felt that an agreement between Korea and Japan on fishing rights was possible. The President suggested that destroyer escorts could sink fishing boats as easily as any other sort of naval vessel. Secretary Dulles suggested that we not give the South Koreans additional forces until there is an agreement on fishing rights. He thought that this would increase the possiblility of an agreement. Admiral Radford agreed that that would be all right. He felt, however, that the Koreans had earned consideration for some additional air strength by the excellent work their air force had done. He suggested that propeller-driven aircraft were as much mobile instruments of war as jets.
Secretary Wilson described the planned increase in the South Korean Air Force, consisting of three squadrons of jets, one transport squadron, and two squadrons of reequipped P–51’s. This would provide the Koreans with 200 additional planes and six additional squadrons. General Hull was willing, in addition, to give them three more squadrons of jets and another of transports, for a total of ten squadrons. However, Secretary Wilson felt that there was no hurry about this. He thought that it was necessary that a decision with respect to the forces to be provided South Korea should be finalized at this Council meeting.
Mr. Cutler inquired whether there was general concurrence to the proposed increases in ROK force levels. Secretary Dulles said that the final session with Rhee was scheduled for this afternoon, and that the [Page 1855] advice of the NSC was needed on this matter. He was concerned about agreeing to an increase of forces now, prior to an agreement between Korea and Japan. Secretary Wilson felt that we should play the role of mediator between Japan and South Korea on the matter of fishing rights. He stated that in the discussions with Korean officials he had said that until everything had been worked out with Secretary Dulles there would be no deal. He noted that the South Koreans had just sprung on the Defense Department a proposal for the construction of a small arms plant in South Korea costing $8 million. He thought the proposal not too bad. Governor Stassen stated that we ought to study this proposal quite carefully. The President felt that the U.S. could not be responsible for furnishing everyone with small arms and ammunition from the United States, and that therefore construction of such plants was generally desirable.
Secretary Wilson said that it was proposed to create ten additional ROK reserve divisions. Four of these, as had been noted, would be supplied from equipment left by the four U.S. divisions being redeployed from Korea. With respect to the other six divisions, the U.S. would provide 20% support on the small arms side. The President asked whether we could depend on these six divisions, in time of war. Would there be time to equip them? General Ridgway felt that there would be time, but suggested that we needed to look again at the proposal for providing equipment for four divisions. It would take 12 to 18 months to provide equipment replacement for our four divisions, and there were no funds available for this purpose.
Mr. Cutler noted that the Council had previously agreed that the ROK should have 20 active divisions, and had also agreed to the supplying of the additional destroyer escorts. The proposal with respect to reserve divisions, therefore, appeared to be the only problem on which the Council had to take action now. General Ridgway was uncertain whether the Council could approve this proposal now. He felt that it would be possible to present a paper on the subject by next week.
Secretary Wilson expressed concern that the Koreans might go away with the wrong impression of what had been agreed. In response, the President stated that it should all be got into a paper. The Koreans should be told that we want more local defense, forces so that we can redeploy our own troops, and that we therefore look sympathetically upon their proposals. However, they should also be told that we will let them know the exact details of what we are prepared to do at a later date.
Secretary Wilson said that he had told the Koreans that there were three things that might be done in Korea, but that we couldn’t do them all. We couldn’t leave all our own troops there. There was the problem of training and equipping Korean reserve forces, and the problem of rehabilitating South Korea. He had told the Koreans first, that we felt [Page 1856] that we had a sound plan for redeployment; second, that we would look into what equipment could be left behind; and third, that we would look into how much aid we could provide for rehabilitation. Secretary Wilson stated that General Van Fleet believed that $300 million would be required for rehabilitation. The Secretary did not favor spending so much.
The National Security Council:
Noted that the Secretary of Defense would submit for early Council consideration a report on a program for Republic of Korea reserve forces, prepared in the light of recommendations by General Van Fleet and current discussions with Korean representatives.5
- Drafted by Robert H. Johnson of the NSC on July 30.↩
- For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 192d meeting of the NSC, Apr. 6, p. 1775.↩
- A copy of this memorandum, which was a detailed program for redeployment in the Far East-Western Pacific area, is attached to a memorandum from Lay to Dulles and Wilson, Aug. 2, 1954, not printed. (795.00/8–254)↩
- For text of NSC Action No. 1092, see the memorandum of discussion at the 193d meeting of the NSC, Apr. 13, p. 1785.↩
- This paragraph constituted NSC Action No. 1191.↩