Office of the Historian

795B.5/3–1854

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of State

top secret
Washington, 17 March 1954.
1.
Last evening I requested General Hull’s comments on President Rhee’s letter of 16 March to President Eisenhower.1 The reply has just been received and is enclosed herewith.2
2.
While I have not had the opportunity to analyze General Hull’s remarks in detail, my initial reaction is that they are sound except in one major matter—that is the extent to and manner in which we reject Rhee’s alternative proposal.
3.

Rhee’s alternative proposal has three parts which, as stated by him, are for the purpose of “protection of free Korea and its allies”.

The first involves adequate air, naval and logistic support for 20 divisions of the ROK army to prevent a surprise enemy break through. I believe that Rhee is entitled to such an assurance with the understanding that U.S. Naval and Air Forces will quickly and in strength come to the assistance of ROK if attacked by the Communists.

The second involves building up the ROK army to a strength of 35 to 40 divisions. I agree with Hull that this is beyond prospective capabilities except under conditions prevailing under full mobilization. However, we can well endorse the concept of building up the trained mobilizable reserve in South Korea. This matter will require further study to determine the exact scale which can be underwritten.

The third involves the assignment of General Van Fleet the task of training the ground forces of South Korea and our other Asian allies. This is certainly a matter that can be considered to determine whether the psychological, as well as the practicable, benefits to be attained would merit persuading General Van Fleet to accept such a task.

4.
I feel that President Rhee is honestly striving to find military and political solutions for his problems, and therefore they should not be arbitrarily rejected.
Arthur Radford

  1. At the direction of Secretary Dulles, Executive Secretary Scott, on Mar. 16 sent to Admiral Radford a copy of telegram 896 from Seoul, Mar. 16, not printed, transmitting the text of Rhee’s letter of Mar. 11 to President Eisenhower. Rhee stated that, as agreed upon with Nixon in Seoul in November 1953, he was informing the U.S. Government of his possible intention to take unilateral action to unify Korea. If the United States was unprepared to support a military offensive to take the north, Rhee proposed that the U.S. Government undertake the alternative program as described in this memorandum.

    Admiral Radford requested Hull’s comments on telegram 896 in telegram JCS 958438 to CINCFE, Mar. 16, not printed. (JCS files)

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  2. Reference was to CINCFE telegram C 67435, printed infra, which suggested points to include in the President’s reply to Rhee.↩