795B.5/3–954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

secret

Subject:

  • Strengthening the Republic of Korea’s Defense Forces

Participants:

  • His Excellency You Chan Yang, Ambassador of Korea
  • Mr. Pyo Wook Han, Counselor of Korean Embassy
  • Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
  • Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director of NA
  • Mr. Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director of NA

Ambassador Yang came in at his request to discuss the Republic of Korea’s request for strengthening of its defense forces. He began by stating his understanding that the Secretary and Mr. Robertson had indicated, when they were in Korea last August, that the United States would go ahead with building up the Republic of Korea’s forces. Mr. Robertson pointed out that all of these discussions had centered around an increase to approximately twenty divisions. He stressed the fact that the economic implications of any further increase would have to be very carefully considered.

Ambassador Yang said that there continues to be talk about further withdrawal of United States forces from Korea. There is no objection to this so long as the Koreans are in a position to defend themselves, but he does not think that twenty divisions are sufficient for that purpose if United States forces are withdrawn. General Van Fleet has written that for the cost of one American division twenty-five Korean divisions can be maintained. Certainly it costs a good deal less to maintain a Korean division. Ambassador Yang believes, therefore, that it makes good sense for the United States to train further Korean divisions and then withdraw the American forces.

Mr. Robertson said that there is a limit not only to what the economies of the Asian States can support in the way of armed forces, but to what the United States can do. The United States has cut its military budget because the development of nuclear weapons has changed the strategy of war. Essentially there are problems which the military have to decide; however, despite any talk about withdrawal from the Far East of United States forces, Mr. Robertson said that he knows of no withdrawal of American naval or air strength from the Pacific area.

Ambassador Yang said that not much is being done for the Korean navy and air force, whereas destroyers are going to Formosa and Japan, and it seems as though United States policy regards Japan as the future leader in a military way in the Far East. Mr. Robertson said that we have not loaned any destroyers to Japan,1 and then went on to say [Page 1764] that we resent the continued Republic of Korea statements about our favoring Japan as a leader in the Far East because they are not fair and not true. Such statements are particularly distasteful to us because Korea has no better friend than the United States. However, the United States needs all of its friends in the global fight with international communism. Japan has been standing virtually defenseless against any Communist aggression, and has been only with great difficulty brought along to undertake defense measures, whereas Korea has willingly and eagerly developed much larger forces.

Ambassador Yang said that pamphlets are being circulated in Japan urging the destruction of the Republic of Korea, and that the Japanese are sending in boatloads of Communists to infiltrate Korea. (He subsequently modified this statement as a result of a question from Mr. Robertson to say that the Communists were coming from Japan, and not that they were being sent by the Japanese Government.) He said that there is an organized propaganda campaign in the Japanese and American press to belittle Korea and President Rhee, and that it all emanated from Tokyo. Mr. Robertson commented that he was much more concerned about what is being said in Korea and is being written in the Korean press about the United States.

Ambassador Yang reiterated his belief that it would be desirable to increase Republic of Korea forces. Mr. Robertson replied that while this is a military question, he personally believed first things must come first. He was reluctant even to consider the request at a point at which the Republic of Korea is not cooperating with us, especially with respect to the Korean Political Conference at Geneva.

  1. For documentation on this subject, see volume xiv.