Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/2–154: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

secret
niact

Munsan-ni, February 1, 1954.¹

242. Pass for action to the Secretary Berlin. Sent niact Berlin for the Secretary of State unnumbered; Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC unnumbered. Reference Berlin Secto 59.² Our reactions to reference telegram follow:

1. Molotov statement and dovetailed Communist tactics Panmunjom and Peiping radio output do seem indicate Communists backing away from Korean political conference idea and from talks here, at least temporarily (mytel 232 to Department³). Since Communists apparently believe Panmunjom talks allowed us circumvent UNGA session on Korea in December and February, they may think resumption of talks and PC would provide us same basis hold out against Big Five conference.⁴

2. We believe Chinese Communist objectives are (a) to seek important internationally-accepted status on their terms and (b) make political conference on Korea in effect Far Eastern conference designed promote objective “(a)” and advance Peipings’s influence and leadership in Asia rather than solve Korean problems.

3. In view our rejection their 30 November proposals for such conference,⁵ they apparently now concentrating efforts on obtaining five-power conference and on representation at Korean session UNGA, as means seeking their objectives. Chinese Communists apparently under no pressure convene political conference restricted to Korean problems, since they can seek attainment their broader objectives elsewhere.

4. Believe Communist tactical decision on resuming or dropping Panmunjom talks determined by their estimate best channels seek basic objectives. Even if we decided overlook perfidy charge and agree immediate resumption discussions here (which we are not suggesting), seems doubtful Communists at Panmunjom would compromise on substance their 30 November proposal, as long as their objectives can be sought through other channels. Even were these channels blocked off, still possible Communists would prefer no Korean PC at all than agree to one on lines UNGA Resolution and our proposals.

Young

1. No time of transmission was indicated on the source text, which was received at the Department of State at 7:51 a.m., Feb. 1.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 6, supra.
3. Dated Jan. 23, p. 1730.
4. Presumably the reference was to the Soviet Union’s proposal made at Berlin for a five-power conference, including the People’s Republic of China, to discuss solely Far East matters.
5. On Nov. 30, Ki Sok Pok had submitted a plan for the Korean Political Conference to begin at New Delhi on Dec. 28 which included five “neutrals”: the Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia. Neutrals would have the right to take part in the discussion, but decisions at the conference would be by unanimous agreement of the signatories of the armistice. (Telegram 119 from Munsan-ni, Nov. 30, 1953; 795.00/11–3054)