Office of the Historian

795.00/1–2754: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young)1

secret
Washington, January 29, 1954—8 p.m.

214. 1. Your 2372 and 238.3 Without foreclosing possibility eventual change of venue, or form of negotiations we wish for present avoid definite break-off Panmunjom talks. This posture not dictated by false or optimistic evaluation prospects at Panmunjom, but by desire continue holding off resumption of GA and to support Western position at Berlin.

[Page 1741]

2. Re your 2394 you will note from our 2135 we maintain view some positive act other side required to dispose of issue posed by their charge, although we flexible as to method. Our draft reply intended also reduce area disagreement on substantive issue and thus encourage Communist meet conditions for resuming talks. If delivered, our reply should leave us in stronger position with our Allies and world opinion. Delivery of course depends on Secretary’s judgment in light Berlin situation.6

Smith
  1. This telegram, drafted by De Palma and cleared by McClurkin, Drumright, Key, and with Murphy in draft, was repeated to Seoul as 627 and Tokyo as 1751 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.↩
  2. Dated Jan. 26, p. 1735.↩
  3. In this telegram, Jan. 27, Young reported on a conversation with Singh, the sole remaining political adviser to Thimayya, in which the Indian described his personal impression of possible Chinese attitudes, following their walkout from the liaison meetings. (795.00/1–2754)↩
  4. In this telegram, Jan. 29, Young suggested that it would be unrealistic to expect the Communists to accept any implication that they were withdrawing their perfidy charge. Young also believed that any basis for subsequent meetings with the Communists would have to be agreed to before the meetings began. Finally, he observed that a change of venue from Panmunjom and a move to open new talks on the political conference rather than resuming the present ones might be worth considering. (795.00/1–2954)↩
  5. Printed as telegram Tosec 48, Jan. 28, supra.↩

  6. In telegram Secto 58 from Berlin, Jan. 31, the U.S. Delegation at the Berlin Conference sent the Department of State a statement made by Molotov in the third quadripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers on Jan. 27 to the effect that the cause of the failure of the discussions at Panmunjom for a political conference lay in the fact that the decision to hold a conference was adopted in spite of the objections put forth by the Soviet Union and without the participation of the People’s Republic of China or the Korean People’s Democratic Republic. In telegram Secto 59, the U.S. Delegation considered this statement to mean that the Communist side had decided to avoid further discussions at Panmunjom. (795.00/1–3154)

    According to a memorandum of conversation by Elizabeth Brown of IO, Feb. 19, Dulles had held the draft letter contained in telegram Tosec 48 (supra) during the negotiations at Berlin, but the understanding reached at Berlin to hold the Geneva Conference made sending this letter unnecessary. (795.00/2–1954)

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