795.00/1–1454: Telegram
The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State
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218. Exclusive for Dean from Young. Re paragraph 6 of Deptel 1922 and Deptel 1963 concerning your return to Korea.
After today’s liaison meeting with Communists may I suggest from the vantage point here it might be worth considering whether it really would be advisable for you to leave the US on January 17, before we know the outcome of the liaison talks at Panmunjom. In fact, I wonder whether it is advisable for you to come out until we have some concrete indications Communists’ intentions are conductive [conducive?] to constructive results. In any resumed talks, their use of them primarily as another sounding board for PW propaganda which may be their main purpose in reopening talks, their continued insistence on November 30 proposal, their refusal to negotiate or alter their views, and the increasingly tense atmosphere at Panmunjom are some of the factors.
With this prospect and possibility liaison talks may last several days and not succeed, your remaining in the US might be better so as (a) not [Page 1722] to give impression we are anxious to get into the talks before knowing what we are getting in for, (b) to appear hard to get in order not to relax Communist initiative seek talks and thus detract from our bargaining power regarding difficult problem of conditions for resuming talks, and (c) not put you immediately again in an impasse on substance.
Therefore, might be worth your considering using formula Department recommended on December 12 in paragraph 3 Deptel 1484 that I continue talks for short time to determine whether any change likely in Communist’s position. Also, if deadlock on present substance is to be reached again, there may be some advantage in your maintaining freedom of action for evolving some different approach, assuming we still want political conference.
Problem of USSR and type of conference (mytel 608 from Seoul5) particularly any new approach, may be impossible solve with Chinese and North Korean Communists at Panmunjom. Rather, some other forum or avenue might be more practical, which may not be saying much. Perhaps the Soviet problem and question of conference can only be handled directly with the Russians in appropriate place—perhaps at UNGA, perhaps on side at Berlin, or through diplomatic channels. Can Peiping authorities—let alone Chinese Communist representatives at Panmunjom—negotiate in public issue of the USSR as a full participant, as a neutral, or as not at the conference at all?
Assuming talks are resumed during next two weeks, will you let me know what staff might be coming out and whether you want me see if Embassy could temporarily assign secretarial or other assistance in Seoul or in Munsan-ni as may be available and appropriate.
I have informed General Lacey of substance of this telegram.
- The time of transmission was not indicated on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 10:40 a.m., Jan. 14.↩
- Dated Jan. 12, p. 1717.↩
- In this telegram, Jan. 13, Dean reminded Young that he should bear in mind that there would be a sharp reaction from the American public and from the Congress if the United States did not obtain from the Communist side satisfactory response to demands for retraction or expunging of “perfidy” charges, (795.00/1–1354)↩
- Not printed. (795.00/1–1254)↩
- In this telegram, Dec. 31, 1953, Young submitted comments which he had discussed with Briggs and his staff on the advantages and disadvantages of holding a political conference as well as his views on participation by the Soviet Union. (795.00/12–3153)↩