Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/1–954: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Munsan-Ni, January 9, 1954—11 p.m.

206. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC, New Delhi unnumbered.

I. I had four hours discussion at dinner in Panmunjom Saturday evening, 9 January, with Haksar, Singh, Kaul, and several others of Indian delegation. Three Indian correspondents also present before supper. Indians who had visited Peiping had spent Friday evening at Kaesong with … Chinese and Korean political delegations, which formed background our conversations on many topics, but particularly political conference, US–Chinese Communist relations, and situation in Asia.

About their conversations Friday evening, Singh and Haksar conveyed the following information in strict confidence, on a personal basis, and notwithstanding their annoyance and embarrassment over the “intermediary” stories out of Washington.

1. Huang and Ki were both angry and disturbed over press reports of “secret negotiations” between Americans and themselves, and press reports of Indians acting as “intermediaries”.… The Communists denied anything was happening.

2. All the Indians here, and Singh in particular, are unhappy over the “intermediary” stories. Singh cited a long article of 27 December in the Washington Post naming him, a 1 January story from Washington in Times of India reporting US Government dealing with Communists through intermediary in Indian delegation Panmunjom, and Washington comment last Monday. Because of combined effect these stories, Singh said he had to rectify his and Indian position with the Communists at Kaesong who suspected the Indians were perhaps acting in some capacity which they and the Americans had worked out without telling the Chinese. Singh and Haksar both felt sure they had clarified the matter and reassured both Huang and Ki. However, this episode has now made the Indians here shy away self-consciously from appearing in the slightest way as acting as intermediary. At the same time they continue interested in finding out what both sides think, and are continuing convey, but only as they see fit, information from one side to the other. They just don’t like to be tagged. I tried to impress them it was a passing flurry nearly over.

3. They apparently were also guarded Friday evening about what they said to the Communists about their talks with Americans and what they tell us about the Communist views. But they did tell me they have made it a point, and again on Friday, to confirm … my continued presence here and my intention remain on. It became clear to me as evening passed that they have conveyed to … gist of what I tell them.

4. Haksar and Singh again emphasized that … all the Chinese Communists they meet consider the Americans “the trickiest,” most difficult people in the world to deal with. I asked, “More so than the Russians?” and all the Indians answered “Yes, indeed”.…

5. The Communists again on Friday night appeared ready for a resumption of political talks and holding the political conference, but then seemed in no hurry, nor anxious to make first move. Since the Americans walked out and suspended the talks, the Communists say it is up to the Americans to walk back in and resume them. Until they do, the Communists will continue to wait. Communist attitude Kaesong seems parallel that reported in New Delhi’s 1075 to Department.¹ The entire Chinese delegation including interpreters is still in Kaesong. The other day I noticed that their two flags are still on the table in the conference building at Panmunjom; the UN flag is not.

6. The Communists believe we do not really want the talks nor the political conference. From conversations with various Chinese and Korean Communists Singh concludes they have these three theories to explain why they think we are preventing a political conference:

(a) It would interfere with the administration’s budget request for defense funds and foreign aid by relaxing tensions and therefore congressional support.

(b) There should be no political conference until the PW problem is disposed of to American satisfaction.

(c) A political conference would not serve purpose intensifying world tensions, particularly in Asia, which is basic US policy. Indians thought there was some plausibility in Communists analysis. I, of course, said not a grain of truth in it.

7. According to Indians here, Communists do not believe we will make any real move for political conference until US Government decides arms budget is safe and PWs gone, if then. In the meantime, Communists interpret and denounce Washington announcement 4 January² re resumption as another American trick to confuse the world and conceal our “true end” purpose above, by now appearing to want the talks. The Communists told the Indians we have to go through the motions now because of pressure from our Allies to resume talks and because we want to head off the reconvening of the GA on 9 February. The Communists suspect, I am informed, that we will appear more and more interested in convening the talks as 9 February approaches. If that stalls off the GA, or if the talks actually get going and the GA is not convened, then we will let the political talks fade out or break off again after 9 February.

8. Apparently Huang … and Ki … showed no concern or interest in the problem of retraction of charges. They again indicated the perfidy charge is really not a serious one, and, since it was just a “pretext” for our suspension, it is no obstruction to resumption if we wish to start the talks again. They are making no move to try out any formula. I did not explore question of charges with Indians since it might have crossed wires with Ambassador Allen’s conversations with R. K. Nehru.

9. We discussed and argued in great detail attitudes toward, and of, Communist China. This apparently had also been part of Kaesong conversation Friday night. They again vigorously presented and, I believe, with sincerity, viewpoint reported in paragraph 2 part II mytel 203³ that Chinese Communists would welcome normalization relations with United States which, Indians declared, would produce a new and better relationship between China and America never before matched between those two countries and which would profoundly change course of events in Asia, particularly in South Asia. They brushed aside all my questions and objections paragraph 10. In this context Indians again urged we look carefully at our position on insisting USSR be full participant at political conference. They tried to make sure I fully understood not just that Chinese Communists resent we consider them untrustworthy secondary adjunct Soviet Union, but that they will not accept this “derogation” of their “integrity,” “sovereignty,” and “independence.” I asked: “Do you here really think Peiping is so independent of Moscow?” They answered “Yes” without qualification on the basis of their own observations and experiences here or in Peiping.

II. Comment:

I hope that Indian attitude expressed above will remain classified and protected. Otherwise my relationships at Panmunjom will suffer. Whatever their views are or are not worth, I believe the Indians are talking to me on all these matters and the PW problem in a spirit of mutual confidence, most complete and detailed candidness, and real friendliness. Therefore, I have been reporting, as accurately as I can but not without some misgivings, those Indian views that seem fixed, pre-considered, and based on some real evidence of theirs.

Young

1. Dated Jan. 8, p. 1710.
2. Not further identified.
3. Not printed. (795.00/1–654)