795.00/1–954: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State
830. As indicated Deptel 4441 central point in consideration shift of attitude re Soviet participation depends on estimate of possible agreement on conference on Korea’s future. I am fully in agreement with Department’s view that it is unlikely that any major agreements will be achieved and that in all probability present line of demarcation will become in fact frontier between north and south Korea and therefore Soviet attendance not essential.
As to Soviet-Chinese relations, as Department is aware there is virtually no information available on that subject here in Moscow. We have of course, no contact with Chinese Communist Embassy, and publicity material is generally confined to generalized propaganda statements concerning “eternal” friendship Soviet-Chinese people, et cetera. However, I believe as matter vague speculation there is very probably a good deal of oriental maneuvering between Chinese Communist and Soviets, especially in regard to Korea. Most firm evidence to that effect is fact that last Spring Soviets invited North Koreans to Moscow for conference without Chinese participation and subsequently Chinese returned Korea and matched or possibly exceeded Soviet contribution to North Korean recovery. In addition there have been two purges in North Korea which we are of course, unable to evaluate from here but may well have some relationship to question of Chinese versus Soviet influence.
In circumstances I would think it would be very useful move to indicate our willingness to have conference without any Soviet participation. As matter of tactics it might be preferable to offer Communists choice of either Soviet full voting participation, or non-attendance. This would have additional advantage from general propaganda point of view of offering two alternatives and in event both refused by Communists would help to educate public opinion as to who was blocking possibility conference and would also avoid possible unfavorable reaction on eve Berlin conference of single proposal to exclude Soviet Union.