Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

695A.0024/12–653: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations¹

confidential
niact

Washington, December 6, 1953—1:49 p.m.

Gadel 117. We realize difficulties confronting you in preventing deterioration of tactical situation because of Menon’s activities.² Naturally we do not relish public display of differences with Menon, and you should of course attempt avoid them by reasonable efforts looking toward accommodation to any well-founded Indian interest. At same time, Menon must not be permitted use his personal prestige or prestige of India with Arab-Asians and Commonwealth to press for GA action serving Communist interest and harmful to objectives of UNC in Korea. To yield in any substantial way to such pressure would be disservice to US national interest.

It is obvious from Ambassador Allen’s telegram 887³ repeated to you that GOI does not share Menon’s extreme attitude with special reference to Menon’s suggestions to Arabs that opposition to his resolution would be considered a “hostile act” by GOI. It is our belief that firm support of Brazilian resolution is safest course not only regarding present question but also as precedent for future. It is hoped that USUN will informally convey to other delegations that we have been in consultation with New Delhi and also clarify US position to effect that we are not opposing resumption of session at appropriate time. We assume of course clarification US position will be provided by Ambassador Lodge in his statement supporting resolution before Committee.

Concretely applied, foregoing seems to us to dictate following guide lines:

(1) Nothing should be done to hamper or complicate Dean’s efforts at this critical moment in his talks through injection of GA into negotiating situation re political conference. Menon’s speech indicates that, at least ostensibly, he would agree on this.

(2) While we are perfectly clear in our own minds as to meaning and consequences of paragraph 11 of prisoner of war agreement in event of failure of political conference to meet, we should so far as consistent with point one meet Indian desire for GA expression of view or interpretation of that paragraph, as basis for India action subsequent to January 22. As indicated above, this can be done in Lodge statement.

(3) We want to avoid so far as possible establishment of precedents in GA harmful to orderly conduct of business in future cases. In particular, we do not wish to give a minority the power to force the GA to meet; we do not wish to give the Secretary-General the function of making political decisions; we do not wish to broaden the powers of the GA president in this respect beyond those already established by past practice.

In light of foregoing:

1. As basic negotiating position you should stand firm on principles of Brazilian resolution; that is, President to initiate reconvening of General Assembly Session; majority concurrence to be necessary for such reconvening; no fixed date to be set for reconvocation at this time. You should not accept fourth formula listed Delga 372.⁴

2. For purposes negotiating flexibility with Menon and Jebb, you may if you think necessary modify resolution through inclusion of phrase indicating President may initiate request for resumed session on basis developments in Korea, particularly as regards status of Indian troops in Korea after January 22, 1954. We would strongly prefer this point be covered in Lodge statement rather than resolution but will follow your judgment if, but only if, you think this will make substantial contribution to rapid passage of General Assembly Resolution.

3. Menon formula quoted Delga 376⁵ absolutely out of question for reasons you state.

Smith

1. This telegram, repeated to Munsan-ni as 133, Seoul as 480, New Delhi as 638, and Tokyo repeat CINCUNC as 1350, was drafted by Popper and Murphy and cleared in draft with McClurkin.
2. The First Committee of the Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly considered the Korean question Dec. 5–7, 1953. Two draft resolutions were before it. One submitted and strongly supported by Menon (UN document A/C.1/L.91 Rev.1) called for a recess of the Assembly from Dec. 8, 1953 to Feb. 4, 1954, with the President of the Assembly being able to convene the Assembly during the recess for further consideration of the Korean question. Menon stated in debate that India’s presence in Korea in the custodial forces and as chairman of the NNRC required that his government be able to present the Assembly with problems encountered in carrying out its duties. The other draft (UN document A/C.1/L.95) was introduced by Brazil and called for deferring consideration of the Korean issue with the Assembly President being able to reconvene the session whenever, in the opinion of the majority of members, Korean developments required its consideration. The Brazilian Representative argued that deferring consideration would facilitate the preliminary negotiations for a political conference at Panmunjom.
3. Not printed. (695A.0024/12–653)
4. The formula referred to called for a recess with the Secretary-General of the United Nations to reconvene, unless there was a majority of members opposed to it. (795.00/12453)
5. In the Menon formula referred to in Delga 376, the Assembly session would be reconvened at the request of any member unless a majority of the Assembly opposed the reconvening; furthermore, if one-third of the Assembly desired a session, it would be held. (795.00/12–553)