Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/10–253

Memorandum by the Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] October 2, 1953.

Subject:

• Conversation with Dr. Pyun

Following the meetings in your respective offices this morning,² I went to the Shoreham and had lunch with Dr. Pyun. He told me that:

1. Dr. Rhee was terribly concerned over whether there was or was not going to be a political conference, and as to what he could do to bring about a unified Korea on the assumption there was not going to be any political conference.

2. I reminded him again of the language in the joint communiqué that “Between now and the date when the Mutual Defense Treaty can be expected to come into force and effect, our Armed Forces in Korea will be subject to the United Nations Command which will comply with the armistice terms.”

3. He replied yes, but that Dr. Rhee felt that if the political conference were not held on time there would be great unrest in Korea and that he might be forced to take some action. I called his attention specifically to the fact that neither we nor the nations signing the Sixteen Power Agreement were under any obligations to resume fighting unless in their unilateral judgement there should occur unprovoked armed attack by the Communist forces against the Republic of Korea in violation of the Armistice and that it was most important that neither the UN Command nor Dr. Rhee take the slightest action to either (a) bring about such unprovoked attack or (b) take any action which might be deemed in world opinion to warrant such “unprovoked armed attack”.

4. I said that we were dealing with his government and Dr. Rhee as full partners under all circumstances and that we fully expected them to live up to both the spirit and the letter of the Armistice Agreement, and that even in the face of very considerable provocation we must keep our powder dry and remain unexcited. He said that this would be very difficult for Dr. Rhee to do, and that even if we and the other 16 nations did not come to his aid, he might have to take some action.

5. I said I could not be too emphatic that if Dr. Rhee did proceed north of the 38th parallel, or start any armed attack without our full assent, he would lose the force of world opinion and of American public opinion and that it would be exceptionally difficult to help him; and that if the Communists over-ran him, he would have done his country irreparable harm and that there ought not to be any nonsense about it. I said further that all of the 16 nations were worried and concerned about this matter and we had assured them that we had every confidence that Dr. Rhee would live up to the letter and the spirit of the agreements he had entered into with us. I said that if the political conference were not held, a most difficult period would ensue and we had to be sure we could count on Dr. Rhee’s complete cooperation.

6. Dr. Pyun said that public opinion in his country was running very high because of the Indian troops shooting prisoners,³ and that he felt Dr. Rhee might have to take some action which would bring about the freedom of the prisoners. I said that he would be taking a major responsibility in his own hands and in my judgement he would be making a disastrous error if he attempted unilaterally to release prisoners entrusted under the Armistice Agreement to the Indians by armed action initiated by Dr. Rhee; that it was a time for very calm and deliberate judgement and that I was very sure that we and the other nations would support his government in any reasonable action but that there must not be military action.

7. He then proceeded to elaborate a long thesis that the next attack of the Soviets would be beyond the territory of the United States; that the Soviets would tell Japan and the European nations that they would not harm them if they did not attempt to help us and that he felt we were wasting a great deal of our time and effort in attempting to cultivate the European nations and the British Commonwealth of Nations when we might better be collaborating with Korea and going it alone as far as our foreign policy is concerned. I told him that be that as it may, it was our definite policy to cooperate with all of our allies and that we believed we could accomplish a great deal by the economic rehabilitation of Europe, Japan and Korea and that they must, under all circumstances, be not too hasty about jumping into armed action again, as I was very sure American public opinion would not support any extended military action in support of armed action initiated by Dr. Rhee. He was inclined to argue the point, but I told him I did not consider this matter debatable and he finally assured me that he believed we could count on Rhee’s full support and cooperation.

If Dr. Pyun is to see the President, I believe it would be wise for the President to reiterate this.

1. A marginal notation by O’Connor indicated that this memorandum, also addressed to Robertson and Murphy, was seen by the Secretary of State.

   As of Sept. 15, 1953, Dean had been appointed Deputy to the Secretary of State in preparation for the prospective Korean Political Conference with the rank of Ambassador. Dean was to meet with the Communist side for preliminary discussions at Panmunjom. For clarity, he will be referred to as the Representative for the Korean Political Conference.

2. Presumably meetings with Foreign Minister Pyun.
3. The reference was to the fatal shooting of three prisoners in the UN camps by Indian guards in order to prevent what the Indians considered a potential breakout.