795.00/10–253
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Subject:
- Korea’s Unification and Assurances Against External Aggression.
Participants:
- Foreign Minister Pyun, Republic of Korea2
- Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State
- Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson, Far Eastern Bureau
- Mr. Arthur Dean
- Mr. Philip Han, Counselor of Korean Embassy
- Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Northeast Asian Affairs
At the beginning and end of this meeting, the Secretary emphasized to Foreign Minister Pyun that, first, the United States had not reached any final decisions or conclusions regarding proposals to make at the Political Conference and, second, had not officially discussed or even “whispered” anything about any proposals with other governments. The Secretary took this occasion again to remind Dr. Pyun and Mr. Han that they need not put any stock in newspaper stories about neutralization, such as the recent story in the New York Times, since they do not speak for or reflect official attitudes of the United States Government. Of course, there would be articles on this subject and even statements by various persons, such as Senator Knowland’s, since there is so much interest in the United States and in the United Nations in obtaining the unification of Korea. However, up to the present, most of this had all been a matter of speculation, particularly since the United States Government had not completed its various studies. In any event, the Secretary wished Dr. Pyun to know that lack of adequate consultation in the past was a thing of the past, and that this Administration would continue firm in its policy of consulting fully ahead of time with the Republic of Korea Government in any proposals regarding Korea. Dr. Pyun expressed his appreciation for these assurances and for those which he had received on September 25 from the Secretary through Mr. Dean.
The Secretary said he wished today to talk over informally with Dr. Pyun some possible ideas for unification of Korea which might be suggested at the Political Conference that the United States strongly hoped would be convened soon. In particular, he said he wished to explore with Dr. Pyun the possibility of finding some form of international guarantee for a unified Korea, or what has been described, perhaps not altogether accurately by some, as the “neutralization” of Korea. The Secretary told the Foreign Minister that the latter’s letter to him of September 263 appeared to be based on a complete misapprehension regarding the so-called “neutralization”. In any case, the idea clearly did not involve the sort of “neutrality” to which Dr. Pyun had so strongly objected in his letter of September 26, nor did it contemplate a complete disarmament of Korea. The Secretary asked Dr. Pyun if he would object to a Soviet guarantee of Korea, and made it clear that acceptance of such a guarantee would not mean that either the United States or the Republic of Korea thereby would take for granted the reliability of any Soviet pledge. The United States had a non-aggression pledge from the U.S.S.R., but did not suppose that it alone protected the United States or might not be violated by the U.S.S.R. at any time.
Dr. Pyun at first insisted that any such guarantee would be completely worthless because the Communists could not be trusted to keep their [Page 1517] word and because Korea could not put its security in the hands of such powerful and untrustworthy enemies who had shown in many instances their willingness to break solemn international undertakings. After the Secretary pressed him as to whether he would object to such a guarantee, since it was not a question of assuming Communist reliability, Dr. Pyun finally indicated that he might not oppose a guarantee signed by the United States, the United Nations, Communist China, and the U.S.S.R.
The Secretary then turned to the question of a demilitarized zone along Korea’s land frontier. He said that, in his discussions with President Rhee last August, President Rhee had favored a demilitarized zone on both sides of Korea’s international boundary. Dr. Pyun insisted that President Rhee could never have agreed to having part of the zone in Korea. On the contrary, President Rhee and the Republic of Korea Government desired a demilitarized area along the Chinese side of the border since aggression had always come from that direction and since Korea in its history had never attacked Manchuria. According to Dr. Pyun, a demilitarized zone such as the Secretary had mentioned would take away Korea’s natural boundary which should be fortified, and most [move] it to the south. At first, Dr. Pyun stated that would be unacceptable.
A long discussion followed regarding various aspects of a demilitarized zone. The Secretary and Mr. Robertson repeatedly pointed out that the security situation regarding Korea would be entirely different from that of the past, because the Republic of Korea would have a mutual defense treaty with the United States which would permit United States forces to be disposed in Korea. If the Republic of Korea insisted on keeping its historic border area militarized, United States air and other forces could be stationed right next to Communist territory. This would be extremely provocative for the Communists. The Secretary said it could stir up their lingering suspicions and make them feel that vital installations, such as Port Arthur and Vladivostok, would be seriously endangered. The Secretary, Mr. Robertson, and Mr. Dean all emphasized to Dr. Pyun that it was necessary to consider the Communists’ suspicions and fears of us as a real factor.
The Secretary told Dr. Pyun frankly that, if the Koreans insisted on having the right to have bases and fortifications with United States elements along the Yalu, it would be impossible ever to negotiate with the Communists on a unified Korea and that it would never come about on such terms. A deneutralized zone, with proper safeguards and assurances, might, however, be one proposal that could be used to negotiate Korea’s unification. The only way of possibly getting the Communists to agree to a unified Korea would be to make a reasonable proposal which we all could accept and which world public opinion could support. If the Communists nevertheless turned that down, it would be [Page 1518] clear that they had no intention of sincerely seeking a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.
The Secretary said he had this in mind in his speech at the United Nations when he had suggested that the big powers should renounce any future interest in using Korea as a jumping off place. Since the Koreans complain so bitterly over the way the great powers have treated them in the past, the Secretary assumed that the Koreans would welcome any such renouncement and he had not heard any objections yet to his remarks from the Korean side.
Dr. Pyun kept arguing that no part of the demilitarized zone should be established in Korea. Mr. Robertson pointed out several practical advantages to having a demilitarized area, such as a shorter defensive line. Mr. Robertson also pointed out that the Koreans could have fortifications if they desired in the area just south of the demilitarized zone, though he cautioned against the development of a “Maginot-line” psychology in today’s world.
The Secretary told Dr. Pyun that we were having military studies made of the various aspects of some kind of demilitarized zone. Since these studies had not been completed, the remarks made here today were entirely of a preliminary and tentative character. He himself wondered whether or not the natural frontier was defensible and had the impression that United States military authorities had considered it too long and difficult to defend. They had gained a great deal of experience and knowledge in the defense of the Korean peninsula in the last three years which would be of great assistance in determining the most suitable location for a demilitarized zone.
After the Secretary, Mr. Robertson and Mr. Dean had pointed out several advantages of the demilitarized zone on both sides of the Yalu River, Dr. Pyun said that the Republic of Korea might be willing to give assurances to the other side, that it would not build up its air bases in North Korea and might agree to some form of a demilitarized zone. He appeared to concede that it might be possible to set it up on both sides of the Yalu. As to his concern over the political effects, Mr. Dean indicated that civil administration within the zone would be the responsibility of the Korean Government. Mr. Young mentioned the need to work out some international agreement on the distribution of hydroelectric power across both sides of the Yalu as part of any arrangements for establishing a demilitarized zone in the area.
Dr. Pyun suggested several times that if the U.S.S.R would consent to the demilitarization of Vladivostok and Port Arthur, the Republic of Korea would consent to a demilitarized zone along the Yalu. The Secretary commented that he did not believe such a proposal would be at all practical, since it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would ever agree to the dismantling of important military facilities in these areas. The Secretary also pointed out that it would also be impractical to [Page 1519] make any such proposal because of the great physical difficulties, if not impossibility, of moving or the closing up of such a large number of air, naval and military installations.
Finally, the Secretary said that the term “neutralization” was a vague expression which would have different meanings for different people. What he had in mind was indicated in his New York speech. Dr. Pyun stated that he wished to have his remarks considered as personal and not as any indication of his Government’s views or any commitment. The Secretary assured him that the talk was entirely of an exploratory and informal nature, and that there would be subsequent conversations with the Republic of Korea authorities as our ideas developed.
- This memorandum was drafted by Young.↩
- Foreign Minister Pyun arrived in Washington on Sept. 30 to sign on Oct. 1 the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea. For the texts of statements made by Dulles and Pyun at the signing ceremony, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 12, 1953, pp. 484–486.↩
- No copy of this letter has been found in Department of State files.↩