795.00/8–1053
Draft Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
eyes only
Subject:
- Private Conversation between President Rhee and the Secretary of State, August 5, 1953, on the Unification of Korea
Following the general conversation at President Rhee’s home, I retired into another room and talked with him privately.
I said that if the political conference was to achieve the unification of Korea we would have to use tactics that would be concerted between us. The principal obstacle to unification of Korea was that the northern area was close to Port Arthur and Vladivostok and was economically pertinent to Manchuria. For this reason I doubted that it would be possible either by war or by peace to achieve a unification which would expose this area to attack by the Republic of Korea, possibly in alliance with the United States, and thus carry a grave threat to vital portions of Russia and China. I felt that some demilitarization would be essential to unification. President Rhee said that he recognized this fact but suggested that any buffer zone should include also some portion of China.
I said that in order to achieve unification there must be a trading position. That one element was the legal possibility that the Republic of Korea might resume the war with possible United States moral support. I said that the United States, and I assumed Rhee, did not, in fact, want this but that the possibility was one which might be kept alive so long as we understood each other. Also I said that the economic rehabilitation of South Korea would set up an attraction and that the possibility of the United States cooperating with the Republic of Korea to make South Korea a very powerful military and propaganda base might give a trading position.
President Rhee said that he was very much in agreement with my point of view, that he would want his delegation to keep in close touch with ours and to make moves which we felt were useful to achieve the goal of unification. He said that the Communists’ delegations always worked in unity in this way, but that the non-Communist delegations seldom had well thought out tactics.
I asked President Rhee whether he expected personally to attend the conference. He said he thought not. I said I thought it of the utmost importance that he should have a delegate who had Rhee’s complete confidence and in whom the United States could also have confidence. President Rhee made no response other than to ask whether I thought [Page 1475] it would be objectionable if their delegation were headed by a military man. I said I saw no objection.
President Rhee later said that he had hopes that Mr. Oliver would attend as an adviser to their delegation and he asked me to ask Dr. Milton Eisenhower to grant him leave of absence from Penn State for this purpose.
President Rhee expressed great appreciation over the fact that I had come to talk first with him and said that this would be symbolic of a change in attitude which he thought would greatly enhance the influence of the United States in Asia.
This memorandum was drafted by Dulles, Aug. 10, in Denver on his return trip to the United States from Korea.
According to an attached note by O’Connor, Aug. 11, 1953, both Smith and Robertson saw this memorandum, which was then returned for the Secretary’s personal file.
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