Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

secret

Subject:

  • First Meeting Between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles.

Participants:

  • ROK
  • President Syngman Rhee
  • Prime Minister Paik
  • Foreign Minister Pyun
  • Defense Minister Sohn
  • Minister Kim 1
  • United States
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Ambassador Lodge, United States Representative to the United Nations
  • Ambassador Briggs, American Embassy Seoul
  • Assistant Secretary Robertson, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
  • Assistant Secretary McCardle, Public Affairs
  • Mr. Arthur Dean, Consultant
  • Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
  • Mr. Niles Bond, Counselor of Embassy

The Secretary stated that he was very glad to return to Korea and that his coming with his associates was an important new event since it was the first time that the United States had consulted with the Republic of Korea before consulting with other nations involved in important Korean matters. The Secretary also pointed out the significance of the fact that his mission had overflown Japan. President Rhee replied that he and his people would be most grateful for the Secretary’s visit to consult with him and his Ministers. As to the Secretary overflying Japan, President Rhee remarked that “The Korean people will love you for it. It will mean a great deal to them.”

The Secretary conveyed to President Rhee the best regards of President Eisenhower, and stated that the President not only had great regard but also affection and admiration for President Rhee and the Korean people. President Rhee thanked the Secretary and asked him to convey to President Eisenhower his great respect for him. President Rhee then discussed his desire for all people in Asia to know that the United States stands for the liberty and freedom for all countries in Asia, including the smallest. He said that 100 years of Western imperialism and communist propaganda against the West had done much to hurt the standing of white man in Asia. However, the United States was not seeking territory or special concessions. He felt that it was necessary for him and Korea to correct the false impression of America which the communists were spreading through Asia. He hoped to set up a powerful radio transmitter to spread this message in Chinese, Russian, Japanese and other languages.

The Secretary asked President Rhee how he wished to proceed with their talks and whether he had any suggestions to make on the listed topics which had been sent up this morning by Ambassador Briggs.2 President Rhee replied that he had no set ideas as to procedure. He thought the suggested agenda was well conceived and he had nothing to add. He thought it would be advisable to try to complete the list before the Secretary left Seoul.

The Secretary stated that he wished to concert our ideas with President Rhee’s in order to have the foundation of our joint ideas for discussion with other interested governments. We cannot disregard their [Page 1468] ideas about the political conference, nor world opinion. For this reason, it was not correct to think that the United States and the Republic of Korea had the final say about this conference.

Political Conference

After accepting the outline of topics to be discussed, President Rhee and the Secretary then talked about the five points regarding the political conference, as follows.

1.
Date. The Secretary suggested October 15 as the possible opening date for the conference. He pointed out that that would be approximately 80 days from the date of the armistice and would allow an additional 10 days in case of delays before the expiration of the three-month period. President Rhee said that he thought we should try to get the conference opened earlier than 80 days. He said that the communists would try to delay the conference and therefore we, on our side, should try to advance the date. Ambassador Lodge suggested October 1st, which President Rhee said would be all right. The Secretary told the President that we would aim for October 1st, but that other governments might have different plans which could delay the actual opening of the conference until October 15. President Rhee indicated approval.
2.
Place. The Secretary inquired of President Rhee as to whether he had any views on the place for the conference to be held. President Rhee replied that he would like to have it in the United States, and suggested Honolulu. The Secretary said that the communists would probably object to Honolulu, any place in the United States, or the Philippines, since the communists would prefer some more neutral location. Ambassador Lodge suggested the possibility of some place in Latin America, such as Rio de Janeiro, which President Rhee said would also be all right. He also suggested Manila or the Danish hospital ship, the Jutlandia. He then stated that Ceylon would not be acceptable to him because he wanted to keep British and Indian influence entirely out of the conference. He explained that his strong objection to Ceylon was not because he opposed the government or the people of Ceylon but because he wanted to avoid any British influence at the conference. He also mentioned Singapore as a place unacceptable to him for the same reason. The Secretary remarked that Ceylon was not entirely favorable but that it was also not a bad place to consider. He pointed out that the Ceylonese delegation at the Japanese peace conference had been the strongest Asian anti-communist delegation there. He also said that Ceylon had split with India regarding communism. While Ceylon might not be desirable, the Secretary felt it should not be excluded from consideration. President Rhee then asked if we had considered Bangkok and whether it was “quiet enough there”. The Secretary replied that the situation would be pretty precarious in Thailand, particularly [Page 1469] if the communists launched a major offensive during the dry season in Indo-China. In that event, he felt that Bangkok would not be a safe place for such a conference. He informed President Rhee that we had thought of Bandung, Java, but had decided that would not be a suitable place, in view of the strong communist influence in the present Indonesian government. President Rhee suggested that we first propose San Francisco, and if that is not acceptable, any place in South America. The Secretary and Ambassador Lodge generally indicated that we could proceed on some such basis. Finally, President Rhee said that his government would not yield on its opposition to holding it in Peiping.
3.
Agenda. The Secretary suggested that the agenda should be confined to Korean questions. He pointed out that the French might wish to introduce the question of Indo-China, but that would require a new group of participants. If it appeared useful to take up other than Korean questions, then it might be necessary to have a separate conference. But the Secretary said he did not wish to mix the two together. President Rhee implied that since the Korean war had been localized, we should also localize the political problems. He felt that it was only fair to limit the conference to Korean questions.
4.

Participants. President Rhee’s first suggestion was to limit the participants to the United States, the Republic of Korea, Communist China, and North Korea. Then he said that on the United Nations side there might be included the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the other fifteen nations with forces in Korea. But he felt that it would be impossible to include all fifteen, because it would make too large a group. He said that everyone would want to join the conference, including India and possibly Czechoslovakia, which he strongly opposed.3 The Secretary agreed that we should try to keep the number of participants down to as few as possible. He pointed out, however, that the United States cannot control the number on the communist side, since that is entirely up to them. On our side, the Secretary suggested that the conference be limited to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and some of the fifteen nations with forces in Korea. If the communists invite the Soviet Union, we cannot prevent it.

President Rhee said that the United States should “control” the delegation from the United Nations side just as the Soviet Union controls its side. However, he said that that does not mean that the United States control will be contrary to democratic principles. He felt that there should be a single command at the conference table just as there had been on the battlefield. Since the communists will have absolute control of their three delegates, they will succeed at the conference if [Page 1470] there is lack of control on the United Nations side. He felt very strongly that the “democratic side” must speak with a single voice. And he particularly opposed having any “pro-communist or satellite countries” such as India on the United Nations side.

The Secretary said that he had to disagree with the President on this question of United States control and some of President Rhee’s remarks about India. The United States cannot control other sovereign governments because that would be contrary to all our principles as President Rhee had just described them at the beginning of this meeting. He did agree that there should be unity of purpose and as much of a single front on the United Nations side as possible. As to India, the Secretary stated that the government of India was anti-communist and faced a very serious internal threat of communism. The difference between the United States and the Republic of Korea on the one hand and India on the other with regard to communistic imperialism was one of tactics and not objectives. The Indians believe that methods of appeasement rather than strength would weaken the communist world. President Rhee replied that what Nehru says is one thing but what he does is another, and that the Koreans can judge him only by what he does. In the view of President Rhee, the Indians are pro-communist, pro-Russian and anti-American. The Secretary pointed out that there would undoubtedly be strong pressure in the United Nations to include India. He thought that we might try to limit the participants on the United Nations side to those who were fighting in Korea.

Ambassador Lodge suggested that the resolution to be taken up at the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly should only set forth the participants on our side. Any neutrals should be included in another resolution. He also pointed out that the United Nations cannot determine communist participation in the political conference. The Secretary said that President Rhee was absolutely right in wanting to keep the participants small in number and well organized in their handling of the conference because it would be a mistake to speak with too many voices. The nearer to one voice we can reach, the better it will be. He said that there is a tendency in the United Nations to turn to the United States for leadership, which would be in our favor. Ambassador Lodge noted that the United States could not be bound by a caucus or a majority vote within the United Nations delegation.

President Rhee remarked that the United Nations is always weak because it brings in the neutral side and compromises its objectives. He said that we are fighting communism, not democracy. Since we are confronting our enemies, he inquired how could we seek neutral nations to join the United Nations side. That could only be done if we and the enemy agreed to have the neutral countries participate in the discussion. Otherwise, we are only defeating ourselves, he said. He thought we should keep that constantly in mind. The test, in his view, [Page 1471] is who is standing “out and out for democracy.” That nation will stick to principle. In our sentiments and principles, we have to stick together, he believed. For these reasons, he felt that the selection of participants was very important and requested that any neutrals not be included. Ambassador Lodge asked President Rhee what he would say when India points to the fact that it has had a medical unit in Korea for three years, which will be a convincing argument in the United Nations favoring India’s participation in the political conference. President Rhee suggested that India be told to take its medical unit out of Korea.4 He said that some governments are fighting in Korea just for show and often follow practices contrary to our principles. On the other hand, the individual soldiers of these countries are fighting in Korea for freedom and democracy against communism. President Rhee appealed to us to appreciate “our spirit”. He said that he and his people had gone far to accept our proposals but that the people “are boiling” and want only to live and maintain their independence. While the people of Korea are fighting communism everywhere, Indian troops would be coming in to force anti-communist prisoners to go back to communism. President Rhee stated that this was unimaginable. The Secretary replied that the situation regarding the prisoners was not quite so bad as President Rhee alleged, since there would be no brainwashing, nothing could be done in secret, and the ROK would have its representatives to watch over the whole process.

5.
Duration. The Secretary suggested that the conference would last at least 90 days. President Rhee nodded approval and made no comment.

Mutual Defense Treaty

The Secretary asked President Rhee if he wished to proceed with a draft treaty during the present talks. President Rhee responded that “our whole life and hope depend on it”. He said he regretted the Senators had not come. The Secretary pointed out that he was not in a position to move ahead conclusively with the treaty in the absence of the Senators. He suggested that it might be possible to initial a treaty during his visit to Korea and in order to get ahead with the drafting of a treaty, he suggested that President Rhee and himself set up a working party representing both sides. The Secretary selected Mr. Dean and Mr. Young for the United States side. President Rhee selected Foreign Minister Pyun and Minister Kim as the ROK representatives of the working party.

President Rhee said that “the whole thing” depends on the treaty. He noted that he had given a draft to Mr. Robertson which he and his [Page 1472] Ministers thought was pretty good. He wanted to make the treaty as strong as possible. The Secretary replied in some detail that the strength of a treaty depends on the spirit behind it, since fine words alone can not bind governments if the spirit disappears and is lacking. He asked President Rhee to bear in mind when suggesting stronger language that the strength of a treaty between the United States and the ROK will not lie in the written word but in the spirit of the two countries. We should make this treaty depend on what would happen anyway, since a treaty should say only what is true, the Secretary said. A treaty puts the enemy on notice that we will not stand idly by. We have already treaties with Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. There will be nothing different in a treaty with the ROK. The world will know that if the Soviets attack any of these countries we will be in it. The treaty will record the fact that Korea will not stand alone and give clear notice to the enemy that we will do what we expect to do anyway. The purpose of a treaty is to announce to the world that fact—as long as we are working together in cooperation, for Korea is the forefront of liberty in this part of the world. At the same time, the Secretary emphasized that we must draft a treaty that can get ratified, since it would make no sense to draft a treaty which the Senate would reject. Any such rejection would be tragic for it would appear to the world as a repudiation by the American people of the ROK. The Secretary asked President Rhee to realize the great importance of having the kind of a treaty which could receive the overwhelming consent of the Senate. The Secretary asked President Rhee not to press the United States to add language which would not really add to the security of Korea but which would cause trouble with the Senate.5

President Rhee said he fully knew how strong the sentiment was in the United States to help Korea. He had several points he wished to tell the Secretary. First, he said, it was necessary for him as their President to tell the Korean people that the stand of the United States is strong and just for the Korean people to follow. Second, before the communist invasion in 1950 some “distinguished gentlemen in Washington” said Korea was of no strategic value and that they were not interested in Korea. These statements had a great influence in the mind of the war-makers. Third, the Korean people are worried more about Japan than the Soviet Union. The American people know little about the masked face of Japan. At the moment, Japan is unmasked and says that it is democratic, which means a good deal. Korean fears are that Japan is aiming at its old colonial ideas. He noted that the Japanese [Page 1473] wanted to participate in the political conference because of its “special interest” in Korea. If the United States says that Korea will be defended against any attack, it will mean much to the Korean people. Therefore, President Rhee said, he would insist on teeth in the treaty. At the same time, he said that he was not asking the United States to protect Korea “if the ROK starts aggressive war”. However, some people are so friendly to Japan, he went on, that Japan must have many things and receive large aid. He felt that it was not wise to build up Japan militarily and economically and that Japan should be forced to abandon the idea of re-occupying Korea.

To all these points, the Secretary replied that the treaty has the advantage of protecting the ROK against Japan as well as the Soviet Union. As for Japan, the Secretary pointed out that the maximum military program contemplated for its internal security is 10 divisions and that it will be a long time before Japan’s forces reach that strength. At the present time, Japan has only 4 divisions partially equipped and organized. He assured President Rhee that the United States does not want Japan again to become a dominant power any more than the Koreans do. On the other hand, the Secretary emphasized that it was necessary for the safety of the Western Pacific to have a close and cooperative relationship between Korea and Japan. He pointed to the United States position on Okinawa, our relationship with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and our concern over Indo-China. If Southeast Asia fell to the communists, the effect on Japan would be serious. The Secretary warned President Rhee that the communists could cause great trouble by coming through the back door. Therefore, the Secretary stressed the importance of holding solid the two peninsular positions of Korea and Indo-China, and the island group in between. As assurance to Korea, the United States is not building up Japan as a dominant power, Japan will have no sea or air power, Japan will be allied to the United States, which will have bases in Japan, and the United States will have a treaty with the Republic of Korea. For all these reasons, Korea should be able to cooperate with Japan without too much fear. Rhee replied that he was not against aid to Japan as such, but he felt that the Japanese were extremely clever in handling western psychology. The Japanese would persuade the Americans that Japan needs Korea back, which would build up sympathy in America for Japan.6

  1. Presumably Kim Bop Rim, Minister of Education, Republic of Korea.
  2. In telegram Dulte 7 from Seoul, Aug. 5, 1953, not printed, this agenda was transmitted to the Department of State; it was divided into four topics: “Political Conference’, “Unification of Korea”, “US-ROK Security Treaty”, and “Economic Rehabilitation of Korea” which were further broken down into subtopics. (795.00/8–553)
  3. The following addition was written in at this point in an unidentified handwriting: “He very forcefully expressed his objections to India and strongly criticized Prime Minister Nehru as too sympathetic to Communism.”
  4. The following addition was written in at this point in an unidentified handwriting: “He thought it would be wrong for India and the United Kingdom to be at the conference.”
  5. The following addition was written in at this point in an unidentified handwriting: “The Secretary and Ambassador Lodge pointed out that an acceptable treaty and Senate consideration of it even over a period of several weeks would be useful in creating the solid backing of the American people on which the spirit and purpose of the treaty would depend.”
  6. The following addition was written in at this point in an unidentified handwriting: “The Secretary said that the American people were not that simple or so easily taken in. President Rhee and the Secretary agreed to meet again at 10:00 AM August 6.”