Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

CX 63997. Refs: A. CX 63963.1 B. CX 63969.2

[Page 1439]
1.
Important developments in today’s meeting were:
a.
At an early afternoon meeting of the Liaison Offs the Communists stated that Vice Marshal Choe Yong Kum, Deputy Comd of the Supreme Hq of the Korean People’s Army (understood to be Min of Def), representing Marshal Kim Il Sung, Comd of the Supreme Hq of the Korean People’s Army, would attend the armistice signing ceremony and sign the armistice agreement, together with Gen Peng Teh Huai, Comd of the Chinese People’s Vol.
b.
The Communists proposed that the signing ceremony be held at 1000 hours, 27 Jul, Korean time.
c.
Harrison, in conformity with ref B, pressed for admission of the press, including ROK and Chinese to the signing ceremony. As result, the Communists apparently acceded to allowing press pers other than ROK and Chinese to obsr the signing ceremony.
2.
Although the record of the meeting shows that the Communists were at times quite adamant in their insistence that no press would be permitted to obsr the signing if any ROK and Chinese were included, Gen Harrison feels that the Communists are on a time scd and are committed to a signing of the armistice by their comds (Choe for Kim Il Sung), and that at tomorrows meeting there is a possibility that they may accede and permit ROK and Chinese press representatives to be included within the “pooled” group to obsr the signing and be present in the conf site area.
3.
In view of the foregoing, Harrison at tomorrows meeting will cont to press for our course C (ref A), with demands for press pers, including ROK and Chinese, to obsr the signing ceremony. I have instr him, however, to resolve the matter tomorrow, going to course B, if nec.
4.
Signing procedure is apparently the only unresolved issue.
  1. Dated July 25, p. 1432.
  2. In this telegram, July 25, 1953, Clark informed the JCS that he had no intention of banning ROK and Chinese Nationalist correspondents from the conference site as the Communists demanded. If the Communist side refused to allow the ROK and Nationalist newsmen to be present, Clark would settle for senior delegates signing first at Panmunjom, with the commanders countersigning later. (Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 488)