795.00/7–2753
The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Secretary of State1
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I should like to reply in this one communication both to your message of 21 July2 and to Mr. Robertson’s of 22 July.3 I know that President Eisenhower and you must be disturbed by the fear that I may not be abiding strictly by the spirit and the letter of the pledge I have given to you not to obstruct an armistice. I want you to understand fully what has been in my mind and why I have found it necessary to make certain public statements about our problems and our situation. I am particularly desirous of insuring your fullest understanding of my position, for the full success of our mutual programs depends upon the maintenance of a high degree of trust.
As you know, the release by the Communists on 19 July of a summary statement of what had been agreed upon between them and General Harrison concerned me because in some important respects it contradicted understandings I had reached with Mr. Robertson. My concern, of course, was not deep, for it did not occur to me there could be any question of the validity of the agreements Mr. Robertson and I had attained. Still, on two or three important matters, Mr. Robertson had said further consideration would have to take place in Washington; whereas, the Communist summary of agreements made with them was precise and definite. The most natural course, in our view, was for our government to make direct inquiry of yours on this matter; consequently, Prime Minister Paik and Foreign Minister Pyun asked Ambassador Briggs to ascertain the status of the matters upon which the Communist summary had cast doubt.
[Page 1437]When your reply of 21 July was brought to me, I confess I was worried by the first paragraph. When you wrote that General Harrison “did not undertake to make political commitments binding governments,” I puzzled over the language for a long time but I could not imagine how the commitments he was alleged by the Communists to have made, and which your letter did not repudiate, could fail to be binding. Your further assurance that whatever he might agree to could not bind the United States “for an indefinite period of time” again does not seem to solve the problems that confront us, for the agreements generally relate to armistice procedures which in themselves will be completed within a limited time.
Try as I might, and I assure you that I tried very hard because of my earnest intention to fulfill in every iota my commitments made to President Eisenhower and to you, I could not discover any intimation that the statement issued by the Communists was repudiated either in whole or in any part by your government. The only solution I could devise was the issuance of my statement outlining the common points of agreement between your government and mine. I must say that I should certainly not have issued such a statement if I had been able to secure in private an assurance that General Harrison would not be permitted to make promises to the Communists in the name of the United Nations which ran contrary to my understandings with you.
As to your generous comments on the economic aid to be extended to us by the United States, we are most humbly and deeply grateful for this great humanitarian spirit of the American government and people. At the same time, I know you concur with my view that this question must be kept separate both governmentally and in the public mind from the political and military policies we are discussing. The chief point I wish to have clarified is that the aid program should be administered through the Combined Economic Board, without having to be handled by all the overlapping, duplicating and in some respects conflicting agencies. Only in this way can we avoid the confusions, delays and ineffectiveness which have marked the economic programs of the past. Our only desire is that the money appropriated should be used for the purpose for which it is intended.
I am rather disturbed by the view you express that the mutual defense pact may have to follow rather closely the draft you have previously submitted, with only the “possibility” that something akin to Article I of the Japanese treaty “may be considered”. As you know, a treaty similar to that you have signed with the Philippines will not suffice for us, in our exposed situation, with a large enemy force already on our soil; for what we must fear is another attack as sudden as that of 25 June, 1950, but backed next time by the far greater land force of the Chinese reds and by considerable air power based on the airfields the Communists are to be allowed, under the truce terms, to build. There [Page 1438] will be no time for consultation or for Senate debate, for the entire issue could be decided in a matter of hours. Moreover, we are deeply concerned about the eventual re-activation of Japan’s imperialistic designs against us, well-knowing that Japan has not abandoned the conviction that its own aggrandizement cannot be accomplished except by conquest of Korean resources and of the Korean avenue to Manchuria. A treaty which does not meet these manifest needs would not be of sufficient force to assure our national survival. All of these are very real considerations which were in my mind when I agreed to postpone our plans to deal as best we might with the aggressors before they have a chance to build airfields and reinforce their armies.
I welcome most cordially the suggestion that you and I may have a meeting at a mutually agreeable location for a talk in the near future in order to coordinate our policies for the political conference and on other matters. I may just as well tell you, however, that, as things stand now, I may find it hard to leave this country. If it can be arranged to your satisfaction, I would be glad to entertain you for this meeting at Seoul.
This letter is an attempt to convey to you both the friendly feelings which I entertain for you and to make clear to you why I am so uneasy about the lack of precision or confirmation of some parts of my agreement with Mr. Robertson. If I should comply strictly with every concession which I have made (and which, as you know, I feel have been so great as to endanger the security both of Korea and of the free world), while on the other hand the concessions made to meet our needs should somehow be interpreted in a way detrimental to our minimum security, I should be subject to very heavy blame both from myself and from my people. I am, accordingly, extremely hopeful of hearing from you with assurances which will eradicate the fears conjured up by the Communist statement of 19 July and by the first and third sections of your letter of 21 July.
With personal good wishes, I am,
Yours sincerely,
- Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 93 from Seoul, July 27, 1953. In reference telegram 91 from Seoul, July 27, 1953, Briggs suggested that a copy of this and Rhee’s other letters of July 24–27 be made available to Clark. (795.00/7–2753)↩
- Transmitted in telegram 50 to Seoul, July 21, p. 1407.↩
- The reference was to Robertson’s letter of July 21 to Rhee, received by Rhee at midnight, July 22; for text, see p. 1411.↩