795.00/7–2253: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
52. Repeated information priority Pusan 39, priority Tokyo (for CINCUNC) 23. State pass Defense. For the Secretary and Robertson.
Message contained Deptel 502 delivered this morning to President Rhee in presence Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Upshot of meeting was expression by President of disappointment at message, followed by statement that communication would receive immediate careful study, and that Rhee would be in touch with me later concerning it.
After reading text of Dulles–Robertson message Rhee embarked on a rambling but generally accurate account of his discussions with Robertson during which Rhee said he had “retreated” from initial stand demanding expulsion of Chinese Communists at time of armistice, to agreement to withdraw with us from an unfruitful political conference. He mentioned his subsequent demand for renewal of hostilities by US and ROK if Korea still divided, and his “reluctant acceptance” of US thesis that our Government cannot commit itself in advance to what we said would in effect be declaration of war (Rhee said at this point that it would not be declaration of war but solely resumption of existing interrupted war). Finally said Rhee he had considered, albeit with great reluctance, accepting in lieu of US commitment to resume fighting, US “assurances of moral and material support” when Korea unilaterally should resume fighting. Robertson, however, had declared his inability [Page 1417] to provide “even this minimum commitment” but had agreed to take up question with Secretary and President and if necessary with Congressional leaders immediately on return to Washington. President then asked if statement paragraph 1, of today’s message met his “minimum requirement” to which Prime Minister replied that the sentence “US Government commitment with reference to political conference and consultation stands” clearly implied Robertson failed in Washington to obtain assurances of moral and material support for Korea if Korea resumes fighting.
Rhee nevertheless indicated that in other respects communication helpful and encouraging and he inquired whether information contained therein could be used in “pacifying” Korean people allegedly aroused by rumors that in Robertson discussions President Rhee had “surrendered too much”.
I pointed out that Dulles–Robertson communication is labelled “confidential” and that it should not be released without specific agreement of American Government. I also pointed out that there would be immediate publicity concerning any message President Eisenhower might send Congress on implementation on Tasca recommendations. With reference to treaty, announcement of initiation of negotiations could be made at any time agreement had been reached to start such negotiations. Concerning proposed meeting with Secretary Dulles, an announcement in that connection also could be made following armistice, as soon as specific arrangements for meeting made. In other words, I said, there is a great deal in Department’s communication directly responsive to Prime Minister’s questions yesterday, and that message likewise demonstrates that since his return to Washington last week, Robertson has worked sincerely and wholeheartedly to solve questions that were still outstanding on his departure from Korea.
Rhee conceded that might be so but again referred to alleged eagerness of Korean people for additional news and his duty to supply it. I infer therefrom that public statement mentioned by Paik and Pyun yesterday may now be imminent unless Rhee decides whether to seek further US concessions or that present situation is after all very far from so unfavorable to ROK Government as he is trying to give impression.
Having in mind Pyun’s propensity for publicity I told President that I proposed to inform correspondents inquiring about today’s meeting that I had discussed with Rhee Korean-American collaboration in the armistice and post-armistice period. Rhee made no comment. Our meeting lasted approximately 30 minutes and was conducted by Rhee with restraint, and without participation by Pyun or except as mentioned above by Paik. President’s attention wandered on several occasions and he seemed tired and old. He is suffering from ear infection and said it bothered him greatly. Rhee is nevertheless the one still making Korea’s final decisions.
[Page 1418]Since dictating foregoing I learned that within minutes of my departure from Rhee’s house, Pyun was busy informing correspondents that ROK still required “clarification” and that his Government is “surprised and disappointed” at difference between what Robertson told Rhee and what Harrison told Communists. Pyun reportedly added that unless ROK gets “satisfaction” it will no longer be bound by promise not to obstruct armistice. In other words, Pyun is still doing everything in his power to torpedo armistice.
It is also reported (without confirmation) that ROK public statement may be issued late this afternoon.