Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

FE files, lot 55 D 338, “Korean Political Conference, July 16–31, 1953”: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, July 22, 1953—2:52 a.m.

CX 63870. Refs: A. AmEmb Seoul msg 8 Jul sent Dept 31 rptd info Tokyo 17.² B. AmEmb Seoul IN 24, 21 Jul (Clark from Briggs) (passed to Def via State).³ C. CX 63556 (GX 6799).⁴ D. SecState msg 9 Jul sent Tokyo 90.⁵ E. ZX 37213 (HNU 7–4).⁶

1. I assume you have seen the msg (ref B) in which Briggs reports on his conference today with Prime Minister Paik and Foreign Minister Pyun.

2. In addition to numerous press stories of yesterday and today which speculate that Rhee may issue a statement “disputing some of the assurances of South Korean cooperation which the Communists said they had recd from the UN truce delegation,” I have info (as yet unconfirmed) that INS and possibly other agencies have embargoed story from Rhee commenting on the extent of his assurances and time limit he places on ROK cooperation with armistice. It is reported that these stories are embargoed for release tomorrow.

3. Any statement released by Rhee which in any way undermines the assurances given the Communists at Panmunjom might well delay or even wreck the armistice, give the Communists an enormous propaganda victory, and cause acute embarrassment to my government, since it has been widely reported in the United States press that Mr. Robertson reported to Congressional Committee that he had Rhee’s assurances “in black and white.”

4. Briggs report, ref B, indicates that Rhee will probably stress 4 major pnts. These are:

(1) Maintenance of the armistice by the United Nations command if violated by ROK. Rhee may indicate that he has assurances from the United States that we will support aggressive action by ROK armed forces to repel aggressors from Korea in event the political conference, after 90 days of deliberation, has not produced a peaceful unification of Korea.

(2) That he desires assurances from the United States that his draft of the Mutual Def Treaty is acceptable. He may well make statement that he will not observe an armistice until such time as he recs positive info from Washington indicating favorable action of the proposed treaty.

(3) That the United States is not fulfilling its commitments as pertain to economic aids to Korea.

(4) That South Korea will forcibly oppose entry of Indian trps or Communists pers into South Korea.

5. I consider that the first 3 pnts must be ansd by Washington as they are beyond the scope of my authority as a mil comd. The fourth pnt, however, which I am quoting below is of dir concern to me and I will discuss it in some detail:

“Activities of NNRC and objection to entry of Indian trps into ROK. According to aforesaid Commie Jul 19 statement, Gen Harrison was quoted as stating that NNRC would function in accordance with armistice agreement and that ‘any pers thereof authorized to enter ROK in conformity with armistice agreement will be protected.’ Two ministers desire clarification by Gen Harrison to make clear NNRC will not enter ROK, but that prisoners will be sent to DZ. They also complained that ltr from Gen Clark (referred to in para nr 4 of Robertsons ltr of Jul 8⁷) has not been recd with ref to Korean and Chinese anti-Commie pris.”

6. As indicated in above quote, Paik and Pyun are now telling Briggs that Rhee never agreed to the mvmt of non-repatriated Korean and Chinese PWs to an area immediately south of the demilitarized zone in the event the Communists would not agree to our proposal that these PWs be moved into the southern half of the demilitarized zone. It is true that Rhee has never agreed in writing to this proposal, however, as reported in ref C, a joint msg to State and Def from Robertson and myself fol our conversation with Rhee, at which Murphy and Briggs were present, he gave all of us the impression that the solution of moving the non-repatriates to an area just south of the demilitarized zone was reasonable and that he would cooperate in this subject. I further discussed this matter with him on the 16, indicating that this ques had been raised with the Communists that we hoped to move the PWs into the demilitarized zone; however, failing to secure Communist concurrence they would go into an area north of the Imjin where Indian trps could be landed by helicopter or small boats without passing through South Korea. I asked Rhee if he understood, and he said “yes” categorically, and he understood that the PWs might be moved into that area.

7. In ref A, Robertson obligated me to write a separate ltr confirming my plans to secure Communist concurrence to mvmt of anti-Communist PWs to the demilitarized zone. On 9 Jul, as reported in ref C, I, in company with Robertson, Murphy and Briggs, called on Rhee and discussed this subject. Following receipt of ref D from Sec of State Dulles in which it was suggested that the exchange of further correspondence be discontinued, I reviewed the actions I had taken on this subject and concluded that my explanation to Rhee as reported in ref C was sufficient and that a separate ltr confirming my plans on this subject was not essential.

8. On 16 July, I had another discussion with Rhee covering this and other subjects. In order to make my conversation on this subject a matter of record and to insure timely arrangements for the cooperation he had pledged in moving these PWs, I delivered to Rhee the following day, 17 Jul, a ltr pertinent extracts of which fol:

a. “In recent conversations, you indicated that you would support a proposal of the United Nations Command to the Communists that all Korean and Chinese prisoners of war, not repatriated directly, be transferred to the southern half of the demilitarized zone. As I informed you at the time, such arrangements would require concurrence of the Communists, and, if for some reason, they refuse to agree, it would be possible to select an area adjacent to the southern boundary, as indicated to you on the map, to which such prisoners of war could be moved. You indicated no objection to this alternate solution.

b. “I am sure you realize that an opn of this kind, involving the construction of an extensive installation and the mvmt of over 23,000 prisoners of war imposes a tremendous logistic burden on this command. However, in order to relieve your mind of the anxiety which you have expressed over the temporary location of the NNRC within South Korea, I am willing to expend these efforts.”

9. It should be noted that this ltr covered the requirements of the ltr Robertson referred to in ref A and also that it had been in Rhee’s possession for 4 days prior to the discussion reported in Briggs msg, ref B. It is crystal clear that Rhee has been informed many times of our alternate plans for moving the non-repatriates to an area adjacent to the demilitarized zone in event the Communists fail to agree to utilization of the demilitarized zone for this purpose. The staff officers meetings at Panmunjom, in an effort to secure Communist concurrence to an amendment to the armistice agreement which would permit us to use the southern portion of the demilitarized zone for the non-repatriates, have not as yet resolved this ques. I have directed Harrison to cont efforts towards securing Communist concurrence at earliest possible time.

10. During recent weeks we have been constantly on the defensive in our dealings with Rhee. A great portion of our time has been spent anticipating what the UNC counter-action could be to his efforts to interfere with an armistice. I believe it is time we paid less attn to saving Rhee’s face and more time in protecting our own interests.

11. In the event the statement referred to in para 2 above is released by Rhee and proves to be an abrogation of his written assurances then I am firmly convinced that the time has come when somebody must challenge Rhee’s unscrupulous misrepresentations. As indicated previously in my msgs, I am convinced that we are not using the ammunition we have in the form of written assurances from Rhee. I consider it imperative that my government make a strong statement which will clarify the sit and refute any further misleading statements made by Rhee or his spokesmen. This can be done effectively only at governmental level as I am sure that you realize that if I categorically refute these statements, with the evidence aval to me, I will have seriously impaired my usefulness as UNC commander which includes the ROK forces. In this connection, I have prepared a full and factual release on what has transpired during executive sessions of the armistice delegations. I have refrained from issuing any portion as a response to the Communist release (ref E) in which they took extracts from the executive record. I will cont to hold this release until I am no longer under the obligation of respecting the executive nature of these sessions.

1. This telegram was repeated to Briggs and Harrison for their exclusive information.
2. Dated July 8, p. 1352.
3. The reference was to telegram 46 from Seoul, July 21, p. 1404.
4. Dated July 9, p. 1356.
5. Printed as telegram 31 to Seoul, July 9, p. 1362.
6. Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1404.
7. Robertson’s letter was transmitted in telegram 31 from Seoul, July 8, p. 1352.