795.00/7–2153: Telegram
The Secretary of State to
the Embassy in Korea1
secret
niact
Washington, July 21, 1953—1:14
p.m.
50. Reference your conversation with Paek and Pyun
(your 462) deliver soonest
personally to Rhee following
personal message from the Secretary and Robertson:
- “1. Harrison was
speaking on behalf of the United Nations Military Command
making an armistice. He did not undertake to make political
commitments binding governments and his remarks should not
be construed in that sense. As the UN military commander in
the field signing an armistice, CINCUNC has a duty to try to live up to the
armistice. Obviously, no military officer in the field can
bind the United States as
[Page 1408]
to policy for an indefinite period of
time. Notably, he has no power to make what is in effect a
treaty which would preclude Congress from exercising its
constitutional power to declare war. The U.S. Government’s
commitment with reference to the political conference and
consultation stands. Of course, the United States is bound
by the provisions of the United Nations Charter with
particular reference to Article 2 and the fact that it
cannot make war except through its constitutional
processes.
- 2. The Planning Board of the NSC has completed its study of the Tasca report and it is
expected to receive the approval of the NSC in the next few days, and
the President will request necessary legislation for its
implementation from this session of the Congress. This
envisages greatly increased expenditures for economic
assistance to Korea following an armistice. It contemplates
a program of approximately $1 billion over a four- or
five-year period not including payments to the ROK for military local currency
requirements or the costs of military civil construction. It
also contemplates an enlargement of the program if a unified
Korea is achieved.
- 3. With reference to the treaty, Robertson has fully
discussed this with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
His impression is that it will be necessary to adhere rather
closely to the draft previously discussed with Senate
leaders and submitted to Rhee on July 4, although some modifications
of language such as inclusion of an article along the line
of Article 1 of the Japanese Treaty can be considered. We
are prepared to begin promptly negotiation of the treaty and
we would expect to invite to the negotiations two
Senators—for example, H. Alexander
Smith and John Sparkman,
both of whom are sympathetic to a strong anti-Communist
position in Asia.
- 4. In line with Robertson’s suggestion, Secretary Dulles is prepared,
promptly upon conclusion of the armistice and preferably
prior to any United Nations Assembly to meet with President
Rhee to decide on
the policy and tactics to be pursued jointly by our
governments at the political conference. Secretary suggests
intermediate point so as to avoid complications in relation
to Formosa and Japan, which places he is committed visit on
his next trip to Orient. He cannot combine those visits with
this trip as purpose is to have quick exchange of views with
President Rhee and
then get back in time to present agreed program to UN
Assembly which will be convening.”
