795.00/7–2153: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
niact
49. Repeated information Pusan 27, CINCUNC. Pass Defense. Reference: Embtels 461 and 47.2
Issues raised this morning by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister are probably in part caused by pique at certain statements by General Harrison at Panmunjom which they apparently think create impression ROK Government is more closely and explicitly bound by assurances re armistice than exchange of Robertson–Rhee letters might justify, and in part by sentence quoted in my telegram 47 from Saturday Washington broadcast.
I am convinced, however, that fundamentally Rhee and his advisers (Pyun in particular) have never relinquished conviction armistice and political conference will fail to achieve their primary objective of Korean national unification and they are consequently still unwilling to have hands tied re resumption of war if conference fails within 90 days to achieve political settlement satisfactory to Rhee. Importance Paik and Pyun placed on “moral and material support” of US if ROK tries in these circumstances to break armistice (and their sensitivity to Harrison’s statements indicating the contrary) suggest ROK Government [Page 1407] may now seek to use qualifying language of Rhee’s July 9 letter either to block armistice altogether, or if not, to extort maximum possible additional concessions from US on four points listed my telegram 46. Blackmail aspects of Paik references to appropriations based on Tasca recommendations seem all too evident.
I assume Department will instruct me to call on Rhee with reference to demands made by Paik and Pyun. I do not advocate for one moment acceding to threats such as Pyun’s but since we are in vulnerable position especially until armistice signed, I believe we should urgently examine points raised by ROK Government. Without sacrifice of principle or surrendering position, there may be some items to which we can respond. For example, I note that at July 19 plenary Panmunjom session UNC representative reserved right to comment on lengthy public Communist statement. Again, ROK questions concerning POWs in my opinion have either all been settled or else should be susceptible of satisfactory explanation. Perhaps there is also some statement that could be made regarding economic aid.
At same time I believe I should express to Rhee astonishment on Secretary’s and Robertson’s behalf over this apparent last minute ROK effort to block armistice in face of agreements made in good faith by Robertson, as President Eisenhower’s special representative. I assume you may also wish me to state that following the further consideration mentioned in Embtel 46, our government must reiterate that no assurances of US support, moral or material, can be made in event ROK unilaterally renews hostilities following withdrawal from political conference.
- Supra.↩
- In this telegram from Seoul, July 21, Briggs reported that Pyun took occasion during their conversation reported in telegram 46 “to make disparaging remarks concerning Secretary’s broadcast Saturday with Assistant Secretary Robertson.” For a text of relevant portions of the broadcast, delivered on July 17 over television and radio to the nation, see Department of State Bulletin, July 27, 1953, pp. 101–102.↩