Office of the Historian

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate
Munsan-ni, July 17, 1953—10:57 p.m.

C 63749. HNC 1828. Ref: JCS 943913.1

1.
This is being sent from Munsan-Ni where I am in conference with Harrison.
2.
There are 2 possible courses of action which the Communists may take when the meetings are reconvened tomorrow 18 July:
a.
The Communists may accept the assurances given in reference message and proceed to the signing of an armistice. If they do, we have no problem. On the other hand, they are just as likely not to accept the assurances in view of the successes they are having on the battlefield and for other reasons, and it is for this contingency that we must be prepared.
b.
When the delegation reconvenes, the Communists’ concrete views which they have stated will be presented at that time may include, among others, the following demands:
(1)
Recapture and return of the 27,000 POW escapees.
(2)
A written statement from Rhee to the effect he will abide by the terms of the armistice.
(3)
Assurances that the UNC will use force if necessary to make the ROK Government conform to the terms of the armistice.
(4)
A renegotiation of the military demarcation line. If this occurs, I have authorized Harrison to categorically reject any questions related to the first 3 demands as having been adequately answered in my letter of 29 June and/or Harrison’s statement of 18 June2 and previous thereto. We would, of course, agree to renegotiation of the military demarcation line. Harrison would then propose and take unilaterally, if necessary, a 4-day recess.
3.
The 4-day recess which Harrison will take unilaterally, if necessary, under the second course of action, is necessary in order that you will have sufficient time to study and make decisions on the next course of action which I propose be taken to bring things to a head with a minimum delay and which I feel should prove decisive. This course of action will be in your hands within 24 hours.
4.
If you have contrary views, I must be informed immediately as it is essential that Harrison have sufficient time to prepare his presentations which must be translated into both Korean and Chinese.
5.
I am returning to Tokyo this afternoon.3
  1. Supra.↩
  2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, p. 905.↩
  3. In telegram JCS 944074 to Clark, July 17, 1953, a joint State–Defense message, the course of action Clark proposed in paragraph 2b was approved, provided the UNC made it clear that it would agree to renegotiate the demarcation line only after the Communists committed themselves to a specific date for signature of the armistice, and then if the Communists proposed and insisted on renegotiation. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 431)↩