Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

secret
operational immediate

Washington, July 15, 1953—3:51 p.m.

JCS 943913. From JCS for CINCUNC re CX 63715.¹ This is jt State–Defense msg.

Desire you have Gen Harrison use folg statement in lieu of that contained in para 2 ur CX 63715:

Ur side has requested assurances that ROK Govt and forces will abide by all provisions of armistice agreement for entire period when armistice will be effective and not for temporary period until certain time limit. I want to point out again that we are discussing mil armistice between opposing cdrs. I also want to reiterate what I said on July 11, that is, what measures each side will take to discharge its responsibilities under armistice agreement, once it is signed, are matters for that side to determine. The UNC has clearly and unequivocally stated to you that it is prepared to enter into and abide by all provisions of that armistice agreement including Art 62. UNC would not enter into such an agreement unless it was satisfied that it was able to carry it out. This should be sufficient assurance for ur side and there is no valid reason for you further to obstruct and delay conclusion of this armistice. On July 12 I stated: “You are assured that UNC which includes ROK forces is prepared to carry out terms of armistice.” Although it is entirely internal matter for our side, I told you that we had received suitable assurances from ROK that will enable us to carry out this obligation. Form and contents of such assurances as have been received from ROK Govt are not properly matters for concern by ur side. However, I again assure you we have received from ROK Govt necessary assurances that it will not obstruct in any manner the implementation of terms of draft armistice agreement. I will have nothing further to say on this. If you sincerely desire armistice, there is no reason why you should not, here and now, accept these assurances from UNC commander instead of attempting further to delay armistice upon basis of misinterpreted press accounts which have no official standing whatever and prolong needlessly fighting and dying. Unless you are prepared proceed immediately, UNC proposes two-day recess to permit you fully to study contents and meaning of this statement.²

1. Supra.
2. In fact, the Communist side was first to ask for a recess of 2 days at the July 16 session at Panmunjom. (Telegram CX 63731, Clark to JCS, July 16, 1953; Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)