795.00/7–853: Telegram
The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State
priority
29. Repeated information priority Tokyo 15 for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark, Pusan 16. For the Secretary and Alexis Johnson from Robertson.
I am transmitting below text of Rhee’s aide-mémoire of July 7. We are convinced entire document drafted by Foreign Minister Pyun who apparently has been making every effort to block agreement between US and Rhee.
Text follows:
As this is to clarify this Government’s position on points involved in present talks on basis of the proposals made in United States aide-mémoire dated July 2,1 it is thought to be necessary to go over said document item by item.
Item 1 of said aide-mémoire is acceptable except that promise of mutual defense treaty is not an assurance of complete and effective nature for simple reason that it is so dependent upon ratification of Senate to be effective at all. It may be desirable for President Eisenhower to consult with the Congressional leaders to find out the possibility of pushing it through Senate before end of present session which is said to be around end of July. This is simple matter whose urgency must be well known to all United States Senators. On assurance that Senate will enact treaty under consideration before present session expires, Korea may well consider it more acceptable.
If drawing up of new mutual defense treaty is too time-consuming to be readied in time for Senate ratification before present session closes, may I suggest that it be fashioned on ready-made pattern of security pact concluded between United States and Japan, including clause permitting US armed forces “in and around Japan”. This treaty has been signed and ratified with Japan and there seems to be no reason why it cannot be ratified in case of Korea. The US forces will remain there until Japanese Government has increased own forces sufficient for own defense. These US forces will be required for Korea. If this idea is adopted, all that is needed is to replace word “Japan” with word “Korea”.
Items 2 and 3 are in accordance with our previous understanding. In reference to building up of ROK Army to level of 20 divisions, which also accords with our previous understanding, however, it is felt necessary to permit target be more flexible so as to make further expansion of ROK forces possible, in view of reliable report that Red China is about to move its 32nd Army Corps into Korea from Manchuria. In [Page 1351] fact, the 20-division level has been almost accomplished and no further assurance is needed. The stronger the outposts become the safer it will be for US and at same time eliminate the necessity of depending on its own manpower for the defense of this peninsula.
Item 4 is perfectly acceptable as it is.
We are agreed, too, to what is stated in Item 5, viz., that if political conference scheduled to follow signing of armistice fails to adopt, in three months from its opening, concrete measures of evacuating Chinese Communists from Korea and effecting unification of Korea, only lending chances, as suggested in the American aide-mémoire, to the Communists to infiltrate, propagandize or otherwise embarrass Republic of Korea, the United States delegates will withdraw from conference along with the Republic of Korea delegates. As to remainder of Item 5, we suggest that United States and Republic of Korea will conjointly and immediately resume fighting against the Communist aggressors. However, if that is not agreeable, the United States will, at least, give us moral and material support in our fight for unification.
Another point worth your consideration is that, during period from signing of armistice to break-up of political conference, the Communists will reinforce their military installations, including airfields, UN [in] preparation for another all-out attack on us. The United States should help us in preparing ROK forces to counteract this extra enemy build-up.
In regard to measure A, we suggest that, with some deletions and emendations, it be rewritten as follows:
“The Government of the Republic of Korea will cooperate with the United Nations command in moving all the non-Communist Korean and Chinese prisoners of war from their present locations to the demilitarized zone, where they will be turned over to the Neutral Nation’s Repatriation Commission in order to obviate the necessity of bringing in pro-Communist foreign armed force to Korea. Those anti-Communist Korean prisoners of war who persist in desiring to reside in territory of Republic of Korea shall be released in South Korea immediately after the persuasion period. The anti-Communist Chinese prisoners of war should be sent to Formosa as they desire.”
We sincerely believe that this suggested rearrangement would bring results satisfactory to all parties concerned.
In reference to measure B, it is to be recalled that in 1950 this Government committed its armed forces to United Nations command for purpose of prosecuting war until attainment of our original objective, unification of Korea, not to stop short and leave Korea divided perpetually. It should like to reserve its sovereign right to pursue the original objective single-handed, if forced to.
So long as the United Nations command and the Republic of Korea pursue same common objective, they will remain in same relationship as hitherto. But suppose they do not, the existing relationship will automatically undergo a definite change.
End text.
Report of day’s discussion of this aide-mémoire with Rhee will follow by separate telegram.2