Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
emergency

Tokyo, July 8, 1953—10:20 p.m.

CX 63548. Refs: A. HNU 7–1 (Z 37098).¹ B. JCS 941491.² C. CX 63109.³ D. CX 63162. E. C 63161. F. CX 63169.⁴ G. Eighth Army msg DTG 221100Z, sgd Clark for JCS, dated 22 June.⁵

1. I am directing Harrison to arrange for plenary meeting 10 July to be held in exec session for the purpose of contg with the negotiations as requested in ref A.

2. a. I will see Rhee tomorrow in company with Robertson for two purposes viz.:

(1) To dlvr a ltr to Rhee explaining the terms of ref in connection with disposition of Korean non-repatriates, in ans to ques raised by Rhee and Pyun during my last conversation with them.

(2) To discuss with Rhee the possibilities of moving the Chinese non-repatriates, as well as the Korean non-repatriates, to the demilitarized zone or an area immediately adjacent thereto.

b. With ref to para (2) above, Rhee again raised this ques with Robertson today. From my prey conversation with Rhee he is fully aware of the fact that mvmt of non-repatriates into the demilitarized zone will require Communist concurrence for I explained this to him as reptd in para 5d of ref G. I will also point out an alternate solution and its advantages of moving POWs into an area adjacent to the DZ; specifically into an area south of route 1 and west of the Imjim River, where there is presently no civ population, where all activities will be out of Rhee’s hair and also out of the DZ, in order to avoid raising the ques with the Commies. Of course I will also try to persuade him to permit the Chinese non-repatriate POWs to be turned over to the NNRC on Cheju-Do.

3. Obviously the move of these non-repatriate POWs to the DZ will require agreement by the Communists whereas the move to an area adjacent thereto will not require such an agreement. As I view it, the Communists can be approached for the nec agreement in one of three ways:

a. By acquainting them with the sit in plenary session and proposing an amendment to the present agreement which would be signed at the same time that the present armistice agreement is signed. The amendment would contain provisions which would permit a specific portion of the DZ to be utilized as one of the locations at which non-repatriates would be dlvrd to the cust of the NNRC and would prov for essential pers to have access to the specific area for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the terms of ref.

Comment: This method has the advantage if agreement is secured with the Communists of insuring that we are able to implement any understanding along this line which might be reached with Rhee. It has the disadvantage of possible delaying the signing of an armistice and thus being unable to face Rhee at the earliest possible date with the fait accompli.

b. Inform the Communists of the sit at a plenary session letting it be known to them that the UNC component of the MAC will present to the full MAC orgn the proposal contained in para 3a above to permit the admission of pers to DZ, in accordance with the auth delegated to the MAC in para 11 of draft armistice agreement.

Comment: The basic disadvantage of this approach lies in the fact that the Communists, for ulterior motives, may fail at meetings of MAC to approve admission to the DZ of the nec pers to permit implementation of possible understanding as pertains to nonrepatriates which we may reach with Rhee. It has the distinct advantage of facile signature of the armistice agreement with the resulting saving in cas of UNC pers.

c. The final approach is to avoid any mention of this to the Communists until after the armistice is signed and then raise the ques at an early meeting of the MAC.

Comment: This approach might result in an armistice being signed at the earliest possible date but involves considerable possibility of misunderstanding which I believe we should avoid and has the same disadvantages outlined in para 3b above.

4. If Rhee insists on utilizing the DZ I propose to have Harrison adopt the approach set forth in para 3b above and to secure in plenary sessions Communists assurances that they would be willing to give early favorable consideration to such an agreement at meetings of the MAC. If the Communists fail to give these assurances, I feel that we must then adopt the approach set forth in para 3a. In presenting the proposal to the Communists Harrison will point out how this arrangement for turning non-repatriates over to the NNRC in the southern portion of the DZ would simplify the implementation of the terms of ref, would make it easier for the Indian trps, easier for the explaining pers, and much easier for the ROKs, as there is far less opportunity for trouble. I can foresee no basic objection on the part of the Communists to acptg the prows of this proposal, other than ulterior ones possibly designed to cause UNC further embarrassment. Logistical difficulties and some opposition by the POWs themselves will be encountered in moving the non-repatriate POWs to the same gen locs concurrently with the mvmt of the POWs to be repatriated, but these can be overcome and I will meet the nec deadlines.

5. I will have Harrison ask the Commies concerning the time their nominees to the NNSC will be in a psn to function. If their response indicates that they can be in psn within a reasonable length of time as indicated in ref B, I will push for the effective date of the armistice to be the same as for the cease fire. If deemed aprop, Harrison would make the declaration indicated in para 3 of ref C.

6. I will also have Harrison make it plain to the Commies that my ltr of 29 June is the basis for contd negotiations and that the conditions as they curr exist must be acptd as a basis for the implementation of an armistice agreement. Harrison will give the Communists assurances, as we have in the past, that the UNC will make every effort to strictly carry out the terms of the armistice but that they must understand it is being done without specific assurances of cooperation from Rhee.

7. Sec State msg nr 35, July 3, 6 PM to Tokyo,⁶ indicated additional Swiss contingents to NNSC were being delayed pending further dev. In view of ref A, recm the mvt to FEC of both the Swiss and Swedes main bodies for the NNSC be expedited.

8. In view of instr from my govt to conclude an armistice at an early date I assume that I have the auth to sign the armistice as presently developed (draft armistice agreement revision of 29 Aug 52, as revised by refs E and F, and as may be further modified as indicated in para 3a above) under the existing conditions without dir assurances of Rhee’s cooperation, and with the full realization of Rhee’s capabilities not only to interfere with the UNC efforts to carry out the armistice terms but also to threaten the scty of my forces by various actions with which you are familiar.

9. I must be sure that these important and concluding steps in connection with the armistice, as outlined above, have full approval of my govt. I therefore rqst reply ASAP indicating such approval or any instr to the contrary.

10. Bob Murphy concurs in this msg except feels that para 3c offers our best course of act.

1. Telegram Z 37098, CINCUNC to JCS, July 8, transmitted the text of a letter from Marshal Kim Il Sung and Gen. Peng Teh-huai to Clark received through the UNC liaison officers at noon on July 8. The concluding paragraph of the letter read:

   “To sum up, although our side is not entirely satisfied with the reply of your side, yet in view of the indication of the desire of your side to strive for an early armistice and in view of the assurances given by your side, our side agrees that the delegations of both sides meet at an appointed time to discuss the question of implementation of the armistice agreement and the various preparations prior to the signing of the armistice agreement. The date for the meeting will be discussed and decided by the senior delegates of both sides through the liaison officers.” (JCS files)

2. In this telegram, dated June 16, the JCS pointed out to Clark the need to minimize the time lag between the signing of the armistice and the positioning of NNSC teams to not more than 20 days. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
3. In this telegram, dated June 16, Clark assured the JCS that he would press for functioning of the NNSC and NNITs as soon as possible after the signing of the armistice and the inception of the coincidental cease-fire. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
4. In these three telegrams Clark submitted to the JCS the final agreement reached at Panmunjom on wording of the draft armistice agreement as of June 19. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
5. Ante, p. 1231.
6. Not printed. (795.00/7–353)