Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 154/1

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council¹

top secret
NSC 154/1

Washington, July 7, 1953.

United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea^*

general considerations

1. An armistice in Korea would not indicate that Communist China had abandoned its basic objectives or its willingness to seek these objectives by armed force. The danger of aggression would continue, particularly in Southeast Asia, while the Communists would attempt to exploit the armistice as a tactical device to weaken and divide the free world.

2. After an armistice the major allies of the United States would be increasingly unwilling to support the United States in maintaining political and economic pressures against Communist China. As a result, existing differences between the United States and its major allies over policy toward China would be intensified, and this might lead to a serious breach between the United States and its major allies over the Far East.

3. It is important to our national security, as well as to the objective of obtaining an acceptable settlement in Korea, that political and economic pressures against Communist China be developed and maintained during the immediate post-armistice period, and that the expected opposition of our major allies to such pressures be overcome.

interim courses of action

(To be pursued during the political negotiations for a peace and until a review of basic U.S. policies toward China and toward Korea is completed.)

Pressures Against Communist China

4. Continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of China on Formosa as the Government of all China, and as the sole representative of China in the UN and all other international organs; continue to extend economic and military aid to the Republic of China on Formosa.

5. Use all feasible means to prevent seating of the Chinese Communist regime in the UN and related bodies.

6. Continue the U.S. total embargo on trade with Communist China, prohibition of U.S. shipping to Communist China, and current financial controls with respect to Communist China.

7. Continue intensified efforts to persuade our allies to refrain from relaxing their controls on trade with Communist China in the event of a Korean armistice.

8. Together with the other 15 co-signatories, issue the “greater sanctions” statement^† immediately after an armistice is signed, in order to demonstrate that the 16 UN members now participating in the Korean action will again be united and prompt in resisting a renewal of armed attack, and to warn the aggressor that in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea if there is a renewal of armed attack.

9. Issue, with France, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, and as many other co-signatories as possible, a supplemental statement to the effect that any communist aggression elsewhere in Asia, following the armistice, would be considered inconsistent with its terms and purposes.

10. Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Communist China and Korea.

UN Military Strength in Korea

11. Maintain UN military strength in Korea at a level consistent with U.S. objectives and with the terms of the armistice.

12. Carry on a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for service in Korea, with a view to possible limited redeployment of U.S. forces.

Security of UN Forces

13. Continue in effect all pertinent instructions to the UN Command involving the maintenance of the security of UN forces in the Korean area.

Aid to the Republic of Korea

14. On the assumption that the Republic of Korea will cooperate satisfactorily with the UN in carrying out the terms of the armistice:

a. Continue to develop and equip dependable ROK military forces in accordance with the present program, with a view to the assumption by the Republic of Korea of greater responsibility for the defense of Korea.

b. Undertake with respect to the security of Korea, commitments (with or without reciprocal undertakings on the part of the ROK) similar to those undertaken by the U.S. under the treaties with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

c. Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea and continue to contribute to the economic recovery and rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea.

Political Conference

15. Assure ROK representation at the political conference, and full consultation with the ROK before and during the conference; and endeavor in the UN to obtain agreement to the establishment of a UN Delegation so composed as to give adequate recognition to the predominant U.S. and ROK interests.

16. Adhere firmly to the UN interpretation of the armistice agreement that only Korean problems will be discussed at the political conference to follow the armistice.

Persuasion of Allies

17. Conduct a high-level diplomatic campaign to persuade our allies to accept U.S. courses of action.

18. Make an inventory of economic measures we could take, if necessary, to induce our allies to accept U.S. courses of action.

Review of Policy

19. Undertake, in the light of the post-armistice situation, a fundamental review and reassessment of our basic policy toward Communist China, as well as Our position with respect to Korea.

1. In a covering memorandum to the NSC, July 7, Gleason explained that the NSC; the Secretary of the Treasury; and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, approved this paper at the 152d meeting of the NSC, July 2, 1953. The President approved it on July 3 and directed implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.
2. This statement of policy is based on the assumption that the Republic of Korea will cooperate satisfactorily with the UN in carrying out the terms of the armistice. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. For text of statement, see Annex. [Footnote in the source text. The text in the Annex is identical to that in the Annex to NSC 154, June 15, p. 1173.]