795.00/7–153
The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Dear Mr. Robertson: Since your arrival here as President Eisenhower’s personal envoy and Secretary of State Dulles’ personal representative, we have earnestly endeavored to overcome many difficulties in order to comply with requests of Korea’s two best friends—the President and Secretary of State of US.
[Page 1293]Your friendly and frank discussions with us have cleared up a lot of doubts and misunderstandings. As a result of our discussion, we will not insist on Chinese evacuation preceding armistice, and are ready to make a partial basis of our overall agreement of your President’s generous offers of mutual defense treaty and of continued aid and assistance in increasing our defense strength and effection [?] our economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.
[Here follows a paragraph in which Rhee reminded Robertson of what he considered to be a joint agreement between the United States and Korea to walk out of the political conference if the question of Korean reunification was not resolved within 3 months. Rhee also stated that he expected the United States to join the Republic of Korea in a military campaign to reunify the peninsula after political means had been exhausted.]
Regarding the POW question, we are ready to compromise and cooperate with UNC in moving all POWs including several thousand anti-Communist Korean prisoners to a neutral zone between the opposing battle lines. This will obviate the occasion of bringing Indian or any other pro-Communist armed force into ROK and thus ward off a great potential international tragedy. Of course, they must go directly to their destination without landing in any part of South Korea. As to the disposition of the last-named prisoners, as I said before, those who refuse to be repatriated should be released in South Korea. At this point, I wish to state that, in accordance with justice and human rights, the anti-Communist Chinese POWs, too, should be released and sent to Formosa where they wish to go.
At our last meeting but one, I was reminded that the political conference will begin sometime within 90 days after the signing of the truce and sit another 90 days. How can we manage to detain so many thousands of anti-Communist Korean prisoners for 180 days, when public sentiment is so strong for their immediate release?
As I told you when we were alone by ourselves, that, if our major points are accepted, some minor details can be worked out somehow. We were so hopeful of success that we publicly said so. Indeed, a powerful hope bore me on that I brushed aside many objections raised by my Ministers. Let me repeat, that, if the chart of our common course is agreed on, I will do my best to overcome some minor difficulties.
Though our experience with the Communists little induces us to believe that Korea can be unified through political negotiations, we may yet take your suggestion, if only for the sake of cooperation, and attend the political conference. But we are naturally more interested to know what we will do afterwards.
[Here follow two paragraphs in which Rhee reiterated his request for support for unification of Korea after the failure of the political conference, but noted that if the United States chose not to join in the military [Page 1294] campaign, it should at least provide air and naval cover for the Republic of Korea effort.]
When President Truman decided to defend Korea on military means, we thought that the US had at last stood up for the survival of democracy even at risk of another world war. At that time, we heard it repeatedly declared that it was the common objective of US and UN to establish a united, independent, democratic Korea and to punish the Communist aggressors, to the lasting triumph of the principle of collective security. In those days, no one said that it was the intention of anybody to unify Korea by political means and we all, our Communist enemies included, believed that our set purpose was to fight on to accomplish it.
Since the Chinese Communists poured into Korea, however, the tone has changed. The UN now says that we never intended to unify Korea by war and that to drive the Communists above the three [thirty]-eighth parallel is sufficient punishment to the aggressor. In the eyes of the oriental peoples, this does not make for dignity of the UN.
We are not asking, though, our friendly nations who do not want to continue fighting to stay and bleed for us. They, nor must we be denied our one last desire to continue fighting by ourselves, if necessary, for our original goal.
The fundamental question at this critical juncture of world affairs is whether the US Government commits itself to a definite policy of defending world democracy against the world Communist aggression even at the risk of another global struggle. We are prepared not only to defend our own country but also to contribute our full share, if the US asks us to, to the defense of the free world as a whole, we welcome the idea of our army being expanded sufficiently for defense, accompanied by a commensurate build-up of both our navy and air arm. We hope, however, that the further strengthening of the ROK forces may be found desirable with a view to fitting the Korean military build-up into the American plan of global strategy. We have tasted the benefits of collective security, and we feel it our duty to subscribe to it not merely in words but in deeds.
Against this background, you can easily judge yourself how disappointed we are and now we are about to be disillusioned altogether. I want you to help us come to a correct conclusion as to whether US is prepared now to defend the American principles of democracy even at the risk of a world war or it will remain appeasing the Communists until it will be forced to fight its global enemy singlehanded with its back to the wall.
We are very near to an agreement not to obstruct the armistice, provided the US definitely pledges to resume fighting with us, in case of a failure of the political conference, until the unification of Korea is accomplished. If this cannot be done, I do not see how I can comply with [Page 1295] your request in the armistice, for I have no means to convince the Korean people who are definitely opposed to the truce terms as they are now.
Sincerely yours,