795.00/6–2653: Telegram
The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State
niact
28. Repeated information niact Pusan 24, niact Tokyo 24 for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark. For the Secretary from Robertson.
I called on President Rhee with Briggs this morning, finding President accompanied by Prime Minister Paik, Foreign Minister Pyun, Defense Minister Shin and Admiral Sohn, Chief of Staff ROK Navy. Although Briggs had arranged for private conversation, after formal introductions, it seemed advisable to take advantage of this opportunity of presenting American views in general not only to Rhee but also to members of his official family present.
Following opening statement in which I conveyed personal greetings from President and Secretary of State and described background and objectives my mission, I delivered Secretary’s letter2 which President Rhee slowly read aloud. After I had described unfortunate impressions created in Washington and throughout free world by unilateral ROK action releasing POWs, there ensued nearly two hours of discussion during which Rhee reiterated already familiar views concerning his opposition to armistice terms especially in connection with (1) prisoners, (2) the fact that armistice instrument would not require withdrawal Chinese Communists from North Korea, and (3) political conference would involve period of endless discussions providing Communists with unlimited opportunities for concentrated infiltration and covert subversive propaganda in Southern Korea. I in turn presented American views emphasizing advantages accruing to ROK from American assurances already indicated, Allied unwillingness to continue fighting to unify Korea by force and the Secretary of State’s intention of collaborating particularly with ROK in political conference to attain the objective of a free, united, independent Korea.
Feeling that purposes of large meeting had been served I then suggested to Rhee that he and I might withdraw for private conversation. President agreed and we therefore continued conversation alone in his office for approximately 50 minutes. During this time his mood was strikingly different than that exhibited in larger meeting. He agreed that division at this time was unthinkable and that we should make every effort for continued cooperation. Without repudiating his fears of the situation which would develop following proposed armistice, he finally indicated his acceptance of the truce with following modifications, already referred to in aide-mémoire to General Clark:3 [Page 1277]
- (1)
- Moving remaining 8600 Korean anti-Communist POWs to demilitarized zone for take-over by NNRC, allowing Chinese POWs to remain in Chejudo under NNRC as now contemplated;
- (2)
- Placing time limit of say 90 days on political conference discussions. I stated I thought this impossible condition but would present it to you;
- (3)
- Economic aid and build-up of ROK Army to approximately 20 divisions as previously promised;
- (4)
- Immediate guarantee of mutual defense pact which I indicated would follow general lines of pact with Philippines.
Following meeting I telephoned General Clark who advised me of reply to CX 63325.4 He is flying to Seoul tomorrow and we have arranged meeting with President at 2:30 p.m.
Consider it inadvisable to publish your letter at this time. It also appears unnecessary to send contemplated envoy at this stage.