795.00/6–2653: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea1
top secret
Washington, June 26, 1953—9:51
a.m.
822. Personal from Secretary for Robertson and Briggs. I acquiesced in last night’s State–Defense message2 feeling that you on the spot were entitled to large discretion and that your unanimous judgment in favor reopening armistice negotiations must be given great weight. However, without in any wise qualifying the authority given you by joint message, I want to be sure you consider:
- (1)
- What becomes of President’s demand for immediate and unequivocal acceptance by Rhee of authority UNC to conduct and conclude hostilities? Presumably, you intend to renegotiate without Rhee having accepted that authority.
- (2)
- If so, does the negotiation constitute the “another arrangement”, contemplated by the President’s message, so that you are in effect negotiating a separate armistice on behalf of UNC not binding on ROKs?
- (3)
- Is there any reasonable chance that UNC can get a separate armistice which will not require it to withdraw wholly from Korea, a result which is excluded on highest authority from your discretion, as indicated State–Defense joint message.
- (4)
- If you are not negotiating a separate armistice but attempting to renegotiate the present agreed terms so as to make them acceptable to ROKs, (a) will you have firm agreement from Rhee that he would accept armistice on modified terms; (b) will you not get bogged down in interminable negotiations which we will have to break off, leaving situation as before except that Rhee will then be clearly in command of UNC situation, our allies will be alienated, U.S. morale weakened in support of Korean effort and enemy morale enhanced?
- (5)
- Have you estimated possibility that enemy may now feel their chance of military victory increased and risk of military defeat diminished and consequently any armistice changes may be used as pretext for them to drag on negotiations until they are in position to launch serious offensive?
No doubt you have thought of all these matters and I have confidence in your combined judgment.
Dulles