S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 154
Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National
Security Council1
top secret
NSC 154
Washington, June 15, 1953.
United States Tactics Immediately
Following an Armistice in Korea*
general considerations
1. An armistice in Korea would not indicate that Communist China had
abandoned its basic objectives or its willingness to seek these
objectives
[Page 1171]
by armed force.
The danger of aggression would continue, particularly in Southeast Asia,
while the Communists would attempt to exploit the armistice as a
tactical device to weaken and divide the free world.
2. After an armistice the major allies of the United States would be
increasingly unwilling to support the United States in maintaining
political and economic pressures against Communist China. As a result,
existing differences between the United States and its major allies over
policy toward China would be intensified, and this might lead to a
serious breach between the United States and its major allies over the
Far East.
3. It is important to our national security, as well as to the objective
of obtaining an acceptable settlement in Korea, that political and
economic pressures against Communist China be developed and maintained
during the immediate post-armistice period, and that the expected
opposition of our major allies to such pressures be overcome.
interim courses of action
(to be pursued during the political negotiations for a
peace and until a review of basic U.S. policies toward China and toward
Korea is completed)
Pressures Against Communist
China
4. Continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of China on
Formosa as the Government of all China, and as the sole representative
of China in the UN and all other international organs; continue to
extend economic and military aid to the Republic of China on
Formosa.
[Page 1172]
5. Use all feasible means to prevent seating of the Chinese Communist
regime in the UN and related bodies.
6. Continue the U.S. total embargo on trade with Communist China,
prohibition of U.S. shipping to Communist China, and current financial
controls with respect to Communist China.
7. Make every feasible effort to induce other free world countries,
pending a settlement regarding Korea: (a) to
maintain their current levels of controls and restrictions over trade
and shipping with Communist China and North Korea, and, where possible,
to extend their embargo lists to include the remaining items hitherto
proposed by the United States, either bilaterally or in multilateral
bodies; and (b) to tighten enforcement of such
restrictions.
8. Together with the other 15 co-signatories, issue the “greater
sanctions” statement† immediately after
an armistice is signed, in order to demonstrate that the 16 UN members
now participating in the Korean action will again be united and prompt
in resisting a renewal of armed attack, and to warn the aggressor that
in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities
within the frontiers of Korea if there is a renewal of armed attack.
9. Issue, with France, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, and as many
other co-signatories as possible, a supplemental statement to the effect
that any Communist aggression elsewhere in Asia, following the
armistice, would be considered inconsistent with its terms and
purposes.
10. Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist in the
achievement of U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Communist China and Korea.
UN Military Strength in Korea
11. Maintain UN military strength in Korea at a level consistent with
U.S. objectives and with the terms of the armistice.
12. Carry on a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from
other UN members for service in Korea, with a view to possible limited
redeployment of U.S. forces.
Security in UN Forces
13. Continue in effect all pertinent instructions to the UN Command
involving the maintenance of the security of UN forces in the Korean
area.
Aid to the Republic of Korea
14. On the assumption that the Republic of Korea will cooperate
satisfactorily with the UN in carrying out the terms of the armistice:
- a.
- Continue to develop and equip dependable ROK military forces in accordance
with the present program, with a view to the assumption by the
Republic of Korea of greater responsibility for the defense of
Korea.
- b.
- Conclude a treaty with the Republic of Korea guaranteeing its
political independence and territorial integrity. Such a treaty
should cover the territory now or hereafter brought peacefully
under the administration of the Republic of Korea.
- c.
- Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible,
continue to strengthen the government and democratic
institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to
contribute to the United Nations effort for economic recovery
and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea.
Political Conference
15. Endeavor in the UN to obtain agreement to the establishment of a UN
Delegaton to undertake negotiations looking toward an eventual political
settlement which would establish a united, independent and democratic
Korea.
16. Adhere firmly to the UN interpretation of the armistice agreement
that only Korean problems will be discussed at the political conference
to follow the armistice.
17. Develop as a matter of urgency the position which the United States
will take during the political negotiations with respect to the Republic
of Korea.2
Persuasion of Allies
18. Conduct a high-level diplomatic campaign to persuade our allies to
accept U.S. courses of action.
19. Make an inventory of economic measures we could take, if necessary,
to induce our allies to accept U.S. courses of action.
Review of Policy
20. Undertake, in the light of the post-armistice situation, a
fundamental review and reassessment of our basic policy toward Communist
China, as well as our position with respect to Korea.
Annex
Agreed “Greater Sanctions”
Statement
“We, the United Nations members whose military forces are
participating in the Korean action support the decision of the
Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command to conclude an armistice
agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully
to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other
parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its
terms.
“The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts of
the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea
based on the principles which have long been established by the
United Nations,
[Page 1174]
and
which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea. We will
support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of
Korea in repairing the ravages of war.
“We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the
United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities
in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement
of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace,
that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again
the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and
prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice
would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible
to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.”
[Attachment]
National Security Council Staff
Study
United States Tactics Immediately
Following an Armistice in Korea
- 1.
- If an armistice is reached in Korea, a change in the
international situation may be expected to take place of such
magnitude as to justify a fundamental review and reassessment of
U.S. policy and courses of action with respect to Communist
China. This change will arise from the reaction of our allies to
an armistice rather than from any change in Chinese Communist
policy or objectives. We believe, in fact, that conclusion of an
armistice in Korea by the Communists on terms acceptable to the
UN would not represent a basic change in Chinese Communist
policy, but would merely represent a tactical shift designed to
create “an atmosphere in which resistance to Communism and
Soviet imperialism will be weakened”.‡ An armistice in
Korea would signify merely that the Communists have found it
unprofitable to continue the war there, but the danger of
renewed aggression would be unrelieved, particularly in
Southeast Asia, where Chinese Communist-backed military
operations against duly constituted authority continues in
Indochina and Malaya. Cessation of hostilities in Korea, while
encouraging, would not in itself constitute sufficient evidence
that Communist China has abandoned its basic objectives nor,
even more importantly, its willingness to seek these objectives
by armed force.
- 2.
- The change anticipated in the international situation will be
in the nature of an intensification of differences between the
United States and its major allies over policy toward China. It
is our estimate that only the continuation of hostilities by the
Communists against the UN in Korea has prevented a serious
breach between the United States and its
[Page 1175]
allies over this issue. After
the cessation of hostilities in Korea the major allies of the
United States will be increasingly unwilling to support the
United States in maintaining political and economic pressures
against Communist China. As a result, the United States will be
confronted with a new international situation.
- 3.
- Thus it must be estimated that there is a real danger that the
United States will find itself diplomatically isolated in its
posture towards Communist China, in the event there is an
armistice in Korea. Chinese Communist intervention in Korea and
the continuing hostilities there have assisted us in developing
and maintaining political and economic isolation of the Chinese
Communists, and have provided in the eyes of many of our allies
justification for the United States policies of protection for
Formosa, economic and military assistance to the Chinese
Nationalists, and continued insistence on Chinese Nationalist
representation in international organizations. The termination
of hostilities in Korea will undoubtedly bring increased
pressure from many of our allies for relaxation of restrictions
on trade with Communist China, for further development of
political relations with Communist China, and for admission of
Communist China into the UN or other international
organizations. Under these circumstances, we must estimate that
there will be increasing opposition on the part of our allies to
United States insistence on continued representation for the
Nationalists in the UN, and in particular to any Chinese
Nationalists interference with the China trade or any type of
Chinese Nationalist military action against the mainland.
- 4.
- But the United States must find ways and means of overcoming
this expected opposition to its policies. In the face of our
current estimate that Chinese Communist agreement to an
armistice would be calculated to weaken resistance to Communism
and Soviet imperialism, the United States must make every effort
to see that such resistance is not weakened. In the absence of
further evidence that the Peiping regime has changed its
standards of international conduct, any relaxation of pressures
against it would only serve as an encouragement for further
aggression, while restoration of full trade with the Chinese
Communists would serve to increase their capabilities for
further military activities. For the immediate post-armistice
period, therefore, the United States faces the problem of
devising tactics toward Communist China that will maintain and
develop political and economic pressures against Communist China
without creating too serious a breach between the United States
and its major allies.
- 5.
- While the maintenance and development of political and
economic pressures against Communist China will undoubtedly
encounter serious opposition from our allies, we believe that
for the short run at least this line of action can be adhered to
without permanent damage to relations with our major allies, and
must be adhered to if we are not to play into
[Page 1176]
Communist hands. In order to do
this, a major effort should be made at the highest levels to
convince our allies that to relax our guard against Communist
aggression in the Far East, merely because the Communists have
agreed to stop killing UN soldiers, would display weakness on
the part of the free world which the Communists could be
expected to exploit to the utmost. It should be emphasized to
our allies that while we believe it would be folly to relax our
defenses against the Communists, neither do we have any
intention of renewing hostilities with the Communists so long as
they respect the terms of the armistice and refrain from all
other aggression. We should explain to our allies that our
continued support of the Chinese National Government does not
have the objective of building on that Government’s military
strength for a reconquest of the mainland, but is based upon the
strategic necessity of keeping Formosa out of Communist hands,
as well as the need for maintaining a rallying point for
non-Communist Chinese essential for the political struggle
against Communism in the Far East, which we believe will
continue indefinitely regardless of the armistice. We should
point out to our allies that while we do not desire the
indefinite perpetuation of the “cold war” struggle with the
Communists, there is no safe or honorable alternative so long as
they are dedicated to its perpetuation. All of the evidence
which we are able to obtain demonstrates beyond doubt that they
are so dedicated, and that they will unhesitatingly resort to
force whenever and wherever they estimate their objectives can
best be obtained at feasible cost and risk. Under these
circumstances, we should explain, we now see no tenable basis
for an over-all peace settlement in the Far East. On the other
hand, we intend to maintain a posture of willingness to call off
the cold war if adequate bases are provided for a sound belief
that the Communists are ready to do so.
- 6.
- One of these bases would be a satisfactory peace settlement in
Korea. It is our intention, therefore, to seek a political
settlement in Korea in the political conference provided for by
the armistice terms. This conference must be confined
exclusively to Korean matters. Chinese Communist agreement to
get out of Korea and allow the Koreans freely to choose their
Government must not be bought at the price of concessions
elsewhere. It must be made a test of the willingness of the
Chinese Communists to abandon aggression and respect the rights
of their neighbors. Failure of the Communists to meet this test
would in our opinion demonstrate that they have not yet given up
the policies which led to their aggression in Korea, and confirm
the necessity of maintaining pressures against them designed to
weaken their ability to break out in renewed aggression.
- 7.
- A high-level United States diplomatic campaign along the
foregoing lines would seem to afford the best chance of
maintaining essential free world pressure against the Chinese
Communist regime in the immediate post-armistice period.
