Office of the Historian

795.00/6–1553

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretaries of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State1

secret
Washington, June 15, 1953.

Subject:

  • UN Action Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea.

Discussion:

While our position at the proposed political conference is being studied, we believe it important to reach decisions on steps prior to the convocation of the conference. Our key allies have been pressing us for a firm view of our position on a number of questions. Ambassador Lodge has also reported active interest on the part of other delegations, and there is danger that if other delegations are not informed of the views of the United States, ideas and plans may develop which we would consider undesirable.

Recommendations:

We recommend that the following positions be approved:

1.
There should be a meeting of the Security Council as soon as practicable after the armistice is signed.
2.
The General Assembly should reconvene two to three weeks after the armistice is signed. This should take place regardless of the timing of the Bermuda conference.2
3.

The General Assembly should designate a UN Delegation to the conference, chosen from among the members with troops in Korea. A number of our key allies have indicated that they would agree to a delegation consisting of Australia, Colombia, France, Thailand (or Philippines), Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. (The ROK would be a party to the conference in its own right. The Communist side would presumably be composed of representatives of the North Korean and Chinese Communist regimes).

If the Soviet Government wishes to participate in the conference, arrangements should be made for them to do so but not as a representative of the UN.

4.
The General Assembly should instruct its delegation to discuss Korea only. If it appears impossible to get the General Assembly to limit the scope of the conference, the scope of the agenda of the conference should be left to the UN Delegation to be negotiated at the conference. The General Assembly should designate as the objective of the conference the achievement of a unified, independent and democratic Korea.
5.
Immediately following an armistice there should be an approach to the Soviet government either by the United States or by the United Kingdom to inform them of the proposed procedures in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, and to determine its attitude concerning Soviet participation in the Political Conference.

  1. This memorandum, drafted by Henkin and concurred in by Allen, was sent through Matthews.↩

  2. Marginal notation initialed by Dulles indicated that the first two recommendations were “O.K.”; the next three were crossed out. A note by O’Connor to S/S, dated June 17, confirmed that the Secretary of State had approved paragraphs 1 and 2, but not 3, 4, and 5 on the basis that the ROK had to be consulted. The Secretary stressed, according to O’Connor’s note, the need to impress the ROK that the United States would strongly and directly support South Korean peaceful efforts to seek a unified Korea; therefore prior consultation was most important. (795.00/6–1553)

    For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.

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