Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram
The Commander in Chief Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1
top
secret
priority
priority
Tokyo
, June 10, 1953—3:22
p.m.
CX 62966. Ref: A. G 5812 KCG.2 B. GX 5817 KSG.3 C. CX 62890.4
- 1.
- Taylor conferred with Rhee yesterday and submitted to me a rept of his conversation, the details of which are contained in ref A. Subsequently Taylor discussed his meeting with Briggs, whose comments to me are in ref B.
- 2.
- I have nothing to add to either Taylor’s or Briggs’ obsrs other than to repeat that it is my conviction Rhee has been, and is still, convinced of the inevitability of an armistice agreement. There has been no material change in Rhee’s attitude as reptd in ref C.
- 3.
- Pub statements from ROK ofls and pressure groups continue to oppose an armistice, demand the release of Korean non-repatriate POWs and threaten the use of mil force against Communist elements and Indian armed forces who attempt to enter South Korea. Rhee is trying to balance the advantages of a mutual security treaty with all of its attendant benefits against the bitterness he feels personally and officially about the non-unification of Korea and the apparent transgressions against ROK sovereignty. The longer we delay an armistice agreement, the longer he is subject to doubts and apprehensions about his own psn, and it is for this reason that I feel we must push to an [Page 1164] agreement as quickly as possible to reduce the time Rhee is exposed to conflicting influences.
- 4.
- I feel that Rhee fully recognizes the cold facts of the situation and the reasonableness of the steps the US is willing to take in ROK behalf as set forth in Pres Eisenhower’s ltr of 6 Jun.5 In my opinion, Rhee sees the reality of an armistice coming closer and closer. Our hope is that his bluffing will begin to dissipate and, as we move to actual signing of the armistice, his true intentions will be more clearly revealed. We must wait and see. I will watch developments closely and keep you informed.