Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/6–953: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices¹

secret

Washington, June 9, 1953—7:29 p.m.

1183. Korean Briefing Meeting, June 9.

Hickerson described plenary meetings June 6–9. At June 6 meeting UNC informed Communists prepared accept their June 4 proposal as basis PW solution. Agreement subsequently worked out that number explaining representatives should be seven per 1,000 PWs with minimum of five. Further agreed explaining representatives would be allowed bring two communications teams if all PWs in one area, and if PWs separately accommodated, one communications team each location, team to consist six men with necessary facilities. UNC and Communists agreed staff officers should draw up final text PW agreement and revise draft armistice agreement to meet changed operational situation. PW agreement signed June 8 and made public.²

At June 8 meeting UNC noted only remaining issue is line of demarcation and proposed previously agreed line be accepted despite minor changes in troops positions since November 1951. At June 9 meeting Communists noted prior agreement that demarcation line should be line of contact at time of armistice and said line should be determined anew; saw no justification for altering agreement. However, in order expedite armistice and permit work of revising line be carried out in “stable situation”, Communists proposed it be undertaken after armistice goes into effect. UNC disagreed and said if Communists desired renegotiate line, UNC prepared for staff group immediately do so.

At June 8 meeting UNC referred to provision in PW agreement providing for accession by both sides and by five powers named to Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. UNC considered accession by five would be accomplished when after publication text, governments concerned issued formal statements announcing willingness participate. At meeting June 9 Communist spokesman said formal procedure should be adopted to ask consent of five neutral states. His side had already transmitted text to diplomatic representatives of five in Peiping. He asked whether UNC prepared do same or already had done so. Hickerson said USG drafting formal communications to five governments asking if prepared accept.

Group was given text Greater Sanctions Statement and mechanics for issuance (Deptcirtel 1016 June 6, 1952 then classified Top Secret).³ Hickerson explained in light imminence of armistice necessary alert participating countries to be prepared act promptly this matter. Subject to time armistice signed, he suggested appropriate arrangement would be to set perhaps 2–hour period when respective Ambassadors would come individually to sign statement. No ceremony planned. SecState would sign first. Statement would be released shortly thereafter. Hickerson recalled understanding each signatory who so desired would transmit text to UNSYG for his information.

Dulles

1. This telegram, drafted by Brown and cleared by Johnson, was a summary of the briefing held in Washington on June 9 for the 15 nations with fighting troops on the U.N. side in Korea. A complete report on the briefing can be found in the memorandum of conversation, by Brown, June 9, 1953, not printed. (795.00/6–953) This telegram was sent to London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, USUN at New York, Luxembourg, The Hague, Wellington, Bogota, Addis Ababa, Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Brussels, Canberra, Manila, Ottawa, and Pretoria.
2. Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 1151.
3. Not printed. (795.00/6–652)