Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, June 9, 1953—2:03 p.m.

CX 62926. Refs: A. CX 62856 NOTAL.² B. CX 62727 NOTAL.³ C. CX 62890 NOTAL.⁴ D. DA 940816 NOTAL.⁵ E. C 62910 NOTAL.⁶

1. In ref A I indicated the strong desirability of having neutral agencies in place upon the eff date of the armistice and I trust all steps are being taken to accomplish this. The resolution of the POW issue will now make signing of the armistice agreement possible in the near future and possibly as early as 18 June. In order to prevent needless loss of lives I intend to press for early signing, and acpt the risks involved in not having the neutral agencies ready to move into place at the time of cease fire. The actual signing of the armistice will place a moral responsibility (for whatever that is worth) upon the Communists to carry out their responsibilities under the terms of the armistice without having the inspection teams in place. I further propose to seek Communist agreement to making the eff date and time of the armistice coincide with the time of cease fire in order to deny the enemy the possible advantages pointed out in para 2 of ref A insofar as practicable. However, nothing in the foregoing alters my belief that under no circumstances should we sign the armistice until all NNRC members have officially acceded to the terms of ref and publicly announced their intention to serve as indicated in ref D, since to do so would amount to creating a cease fire condition without a firm resolution of the non-repatriate issue. In this connection I am having informal conversations with the Swiss, Swedes and Indian representatives here and providing them with complete info on the terms of ref.

2. To the possible obstacles to carrying out an armistice set forth in ref B, must now be added Rhee’s specific threat that he will not permit the entry of Indian trps as reptd in para 8 of ref C. Rhee could greatly increase the reluctance of the neutral states to undertake armistice functions by a simple notification of ROK non-acceptance of their services, and a ROK intention to forcibly oppose their entry or stay in Korea.

3. As you are fully aware, there is no question that should we face active ROK phys opposition it will be impossible to implement fully all the terms of the armistice as presently agreed and doubtful that we would be able to fulfill a guarantee of neutral security. The attitude publicly displayed by the ROK Government may cause India, Switzerland and Sweden to delay their accession to the terms of ref and their acceptance of our invitation to participate in the neutral nations repatriation com. Consequently, I believe that we should conclude the final agreement with max speed in order to limit the actions which Rhee can take to increase neutral apprehensions in an effort to forestall the armistice. The most important result I look for in presenting Rhee with the armistice as a fait accompli will be to trigger any action he may have planned, and thereby force him to reveal his true intentions. In this connection I will cont to the best of my ability to reconcile Rhee to the idea of acptg the armistice, once accomplished, as the wisest course for him and the Republic of Korea. In the event that my efforts prove unsuccessful and Rhee actually initiates any of the more desperate courses of action he has threatened, I will be prepared to take action along the lines outlined in ref E.

1. This telegram was repeated to Briggs and Taylor for their exclusive information.
2. Not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
3. Dated May 29, p. 1112.
4. Dated June 7, p. 1149.
5. This telegram, June 7, not printed, dealt with the mechanics of signing the POW terms of reference and notification and accession of the individual neutral nations on the Repatriation Commission. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
6. Dated June 8, p. 1152.