Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/6–853

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretaries of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

[ Washington ,] June 8, 1953.

Subject:

• U.S. Position Regarding a Political Conference on Korea Following an Armistice.

In order to make possible effective planning for a post-armistice conference on Korea, and consultation with our allies, it is desirable to determine as soon as possible the position which the United States should take on a number of questions. We recommend that the following positions be approved:

1. Composition of Conference—The General Assembly should designate a United Nations Delegation to the Conference, constituted from among the 15 UN Members with forces in Korea. (In addition to the United States the Delegation might consist of Australia, Colombia, France, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom). The ROK would be a party to the conference in its own right. The Communist side would presumably be composed of representatives of the North Korean and Chinese Communist regimes.

Several of our allies, including the United Kingdom and Canada, feel that the Soviet Government should be sounded out in advance of the General Assembly meeting as to whether the U.S.S.R. wishes to participate in the political conference. We agreed that this should be done by the U.S. or the U.K. and if the Soviet Government wishes to attend the conference, arrangements should be made for them to do so but not as a representative of the United Nations.

2. Scope of Conference—The conference should deal only with questions related to a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. It should not deal with other Far Eastern questions.

3. Objectives of the Conference—The objective of the conference should be to obtain agreement to a plan for a unified, independent and democratic Korea to be carried out under UN auspices and supervision.

In the event that no such agreement is reached, it would be our objective to leave the onus for failure of the conference upon the Communists, and to leave the ROK in as strong a defensive posture as possible.

4. Substantive Positions to be Taken at the Conference:

(a) Plan for Unification—We should develop a plan for unification of Korea which is designed to bring about a free and independent Korea as secure as possible against external aggression or internal subversion. The plan we insist on should go as far as possible to meet the point of view of the Government of the ROK and be reasonable and acceptable to the UN and to world opinion. We will not agree to any plan which involves dissolution of the ROK and will continue to insist on its integrity and sovereignty.

(b) Withdrawal of Troops—While it will not be possible to reach firm decisions on this complicated question except in the light of then-prevailing circumstances, the following general considerations should control:

(1) The issue of withdrawal of troops should be decided in such a manner as to assure maximum security for a unified, independent Korea, or for the ROK if Korea remains divided.

(2) While it is desirable that we retain the right to continue our forces in Korea under the UN aegis, we should avoid any commitment to do so.

(3) In the first instance we should not agree to the withdrawal of US and UN forces except as an aspect of the implementation of an acceptable unification plan.

(4) If efforts at unification fail we might nevertheless consider agreement on phased withdrawal of non-Korean forces on both sides.

(c) Neutralization and Security of Korea—As part of a plan for unification, we might include a provision for a neutral buffer zone along the Yalu perhaps supervised by the UN Commission.

If Korea remains divided and the armistice continues in effect indefinitely, the security of the ROK would be guaranteed by the Greater Sanctions Statement, and the continuing responsibility of the UN.

5. Approval of Results of the Conference—Any agreement reached at the conference would be transmitted to the GA for approval, and for any necessary UN implementation. Insofar as the agreement might include provisions binding the ROK and the Communist regimes represented, such agreement would of course have to be approved by them.

6. It is important that at least a tentative decision be reached as to the Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the conference so that a working group could be established under his leadership to develop the details of a position along the lines approved.

1. This memorandum, drafted by Johnson and Henkin, was also addressed to Matthews. A note by O’Connor indicated that the Secretary of State approved this memorandum “in general” on June 10.