795.00/4–2452
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Sargeant)1
Subject:
- Military Build-up by the Communists in Korea
Participants:
- General Walter Bedell Smith
- The Secretary Mr. Sargeant
- Mr. Matthews
I took part only in the last few minutes of the conversation between the Secretary and General Smith. Mr. Matthews was there for the same period of time. General Smith repeated to us what he had apparently been telling the Secretary—namely, that the extent of the military build-up by the Communists in Korea was not appreciated by the American people, nor were the American people prepared for the potential launching of a major offensive and the renewal of large-scale hostilities. He summarized certain kinds of intelligence which indicated the possibility of the launching of an offensive, but stated that in his personal opinion, there would not be any immediate Communist offensive, even if the negotiations did break down.
I summarized the steps that had been taken to secure a statement from General Ridgway’s headquarters in the near future that would call attention again to the extent of the Communist military build-up. I stated that I had talked with Clayton Fritchey of the Department of Defense within the past hour and that Mr. Fritchey was in the process of preparing a draft message which, if agreed to by the interested parties, would be sent at once to General Ridgway. I outlined some of the possible methods of supporting statements emanating from General Ridgway’s headquarters by appropriate people here in the United States.
General Smith said that he had not been aware that this action was already under way and he expressed his pleasure that this was being done. He thought the urgency was such that a statement should, in fact, be issued within a matter of hours. Although he was not pressing to have one issued that same evening, he hoped that it might be made the following day. (He indicated also that nothing should be allowed to create the public impression that once again United States intelligence had been at fault and had been unaware of the extent of the military build-up, or of the possibility of the launching of a sudden and largescale Communist offensive.)
I also reported that I had met with Mr. Short, Admiral Dennison, Mr. Tubby and Mr. Fritchey yesterday at the White House, and the whole problem of preparing public opinion with respect to possible events in Korea had been reviewed. I said that I had not yet had the opportunity to brief the Secretary personally on these most recent developments.
The Secretary asked me to be responsible for seeing that the message to General Ridgway and the following action was kept in channels and moved along rapidly. General Smith, in taking his leave, again emphasized [Page 170] the great importance he attached to having this information reach the American people widely and promptly, and said that it indicated a certain unhappy lack of adequate liaison when the Under Secretary of State, the Under [Deputy] Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Psychological Strategy Board, and the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board were all so uninformed about actions and decisions of primary concern to the conduct of psychological warfare. The General added that the State Department had two good men on the Psychological Strategy Board staff (naming George Morgan specifically) and that he hoped we would take adequate steps in the Department to see that they were kept thoroughly briefed and filled in on matters of this kind.
- A note attached to the source text indicated that Sargeant did not feel he should dictate this memorandum in the first person for the Secretary because Sargeant was present for such a short time during the conversation.↩