Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, April 23, 1952—8:22 p.m.

CX 67399. Urmsg JCS 906923.¹

1. In order to explore Communists reaction to the conditions stipulated in the package proposal in a less formal and more favorable setting, I have authorized my delegation to submit the following suggestion in Staff Officers Executive Session on item 4:

“As the Staff Officers responsible for Agenda Item 3 have stated many times our side can never accept the USSR as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The achievement at any time of an armistice is dependent upon your side withdrawing this artificial barrier to an armistice which your side has needlessly erected. Aside from this, only two major differences stand between our two sides and our common objective, the attainment of an early armistice. One is in Item 4, the other in Item 3. It is the feeling of the Staff Officers of our side that agreement on Agenda Item 4 would open the way to early resolution of the only difference of substance in Item 3.”

2. If the Communists indicate an interest in this exploratory suggestion, the continuation of the discussion will be suggested at level desired by them. If plenary session is selected, it will be suggested that the discussion be conducted in executive session under this condition. I believe best interests UNC dictate avoidance of publicity that might provide unfavorable Communists reaction.

3. If the Communists indicate no interest in the suggestion, or categorically reject it, there is no advantage in keeping our proposal secret. Hence, we should propose open plenary session, present package proposal, and concurrent therewith issue a statement essentially as suggested by you in reference message.²

1. Supra.
2. The JCS in telegram JCS 907037 on Apr. 23 informed CINCFE: “We approve action suggested in Para 3 ur CX 67399. View here is that exec sessions of full dels offer considerable advantages as indicated in ur Para 2, and should be held if acceptable to Communists unless Communists display unqualified hostility to approach mentioned in ur Para 1.” (795.00/4–352)