Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/4–3522: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
priority

Tokyo, April 20, 1952—3:39 p.m.

CX 67235. Ref HNC 1118,² CX 66953,³ and CX 67067.⁴

1. It is difficult to anticipate the trend of negotiations henceforward, particularly the timing for introduction of a package proposal, assuming, of course, that such proposal becomes nec. Our future negotiatory steps, as outlined in CX 66953, and modified by CX 67067, must be undertaken with due consideration to Communist reaction to our proposals concerning the POW issue.⁵ Communist violent opposition to the 70,000 figure of persons to be repatriated may well initiate an inexorable and rapid progression of events which will force us to introduce the package proposal in the very near future in order to avoid Communist adoption of a psn difficult of recession.

2. Consequently, the UNC must be in readiness to present a package proposal at any time. In event of such proposal, I plan to issue a concurrent public statement from Tokyo as fols:

“The UNC has been negotiating with the Communist aggressors in Korea for more than 9 months in an endeavor to achieve an armistice, We have known that all the peace-loving nations of the world share our sincere desire to obtain a just and honorable cessation of hostilities in order to terminate the terrible toll of suffering, destruction, and bloodshed, and by lessening the risk of spreading the conflagration, to advance the cause of world peace. After many months of UNC efforts to cope with Communist intransigence, bravado, and illogic, it is apparent that negotiations are at a standstill and further progress is not now in sight.

“Three questions remain to be resolved. These are Afld restrictions, the Soviet Union as a member of the Neutral Nations Supv Com, and the basis of exchange of POWs. All 3 issues have been exhaustively explored in discussions with the Communists. The psns of both sides on these issues have been carefully and searchingly reviewed by the UNC.

“It is apparent that these issues cannot be solved separately. The UNC will not accept an indefinite continuation of negotiations without hope of the termination of hostilities within a reasonable pd of time.

“Therefore, in a final endeavor to bring about a cessation of hostilities by means of an hon armistice fair to both sides, the UNC del today presented to the Communist del a just and integral solution to all remaining issues.

“It is of the utmost importance to all the nations of the world that they realize with crystal clearness that this comp solution embodies the final and absolute psns acpt to the UNC. There will be no further compromise. Our proposal is equitable to both sides and must be acpt in whole without substantive change, or not at all. We shall have nothing further to offer and shall debate these issues no longer.

“The responsibility for peace or cont hostilities in Korea now rests squarely on the Communist leaders.”

3. To achieve max eff with a package proposal, its full import must be driven home to the Communists. I consider the psych impact of ofl pub announcements spt [supporting?] a final package would be of incalculable value in securing early Communist agreement.

4. Accordingly, I recm that any package proposal which we may present in accordance with existing authorizations be immediately supported by authoritative pub statements of the United States Government, and of as many other UN nations as possible.

1. A marginal notation on the source text indicated that this telegram was seen by the Secretary of State.
2. Dated Apr. 4, p. 136.
3. Dated Apr. 15, p. 153.
4. Dated Apr. 17, p. 159.
5. The Staff Officers meetings resumed at Panmunjom in executive session on Apr. 19 and the UNC representative informed his Communist counterpart that approximately 70,000 captured persons would be repatriated. The Communist Staff Officer, Colonel Tsai, asked for an hour recess, after which he read a prepared statement which stated that the UNC figure could not be considered as a basis for further discussion. The next day Tsai mounted a full-scale attack on the 70,000 figure in the Staff Officers meetings. The substance of the record of these two meetings is in telegrams C 67190 and C 67242, Ridgway to JCS, Apr. 19 and 20, 1952 in FE files, lot 55 D 128, tabs 14 and 17, respectively.