Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Department of the Army¹

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, April 19, 1952—3:50 p.m.

C 67178. Re DA 906549. This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1.

1. Opn Scatter was developed in order to conduct screening and segregation of North Korean and Chinese POWs with a view to making the max nbr aval for return to Communist control, reduced by those who present reasonable evidence that they would forcibly oppose return to Communist control. For South Korean POWs and civilian internees, Opn Scatter segregated only those who elect to return to Communist control.

2. Opn Scatter, Koje Do: On 6 Apr orientation of POWs and CIs started at UN POW camp Nbr 1 including conferences with compound leaders, announcements over PA systems and posting of written contents of announcements in all compounds, as fol: “All POWs will be individually interviewed by impartial UNC pers within the next few days. This interview is being conducted for the purpose of determining which POWs desire to be repatriated to the Korean People’s Army or to the Chinese People’s Volunteers and which ones have compelling reasons which they feel would make it impossible for them to return to their own side. This determination will speed up the rate of repatriation at the time POWs are exchanged.

“At this time I must caution you that the decision you make is a most important one, probably the most vital one you will ever be called upon to make. You must carefully consider each aspect of the matter. You must make your own decision. For your own safety it is essential you not discuss this matter with others, and above all that you let no other person, even your best friends, know what your decision will be, until you are asked for it at the interview.

“To those POWs who will not violently oppose repatriation, the UNC will guarantee return to your authorities at the time POWs are exchanged. Your decision in this matter will be considered final. The UNC can make no guarantees whatever as to the ultimate fate of those who refuse to go back to their own people.

“Before any of you, for any reason which you think may be compelling, decides irrevocably to reject repatriation, you must consider the effect of your decision on your family. The fact that you are a POW has been reported to your authorities and they know that you are alive and well. If you fail to return, the Communists will undoubtedly consider your family suspect. You may well never see your family again. You must consider this matter from every angle.

“If your final decision is that you are violently opposed to repatriation, you may be held in custody here on Koje Do for many long months. However, the UNC cannot house and feed you forever. The UNC can make no promises regarding your future. In particular, the UNC cannot and will not guarantee to send you to any certain place. This is a matter which you should consider most carefully.

“Interviews will be conducted in each compound to prepare rolls of the POWs to be repatriated.

“Rosters by bn have already been prepared.

“Within a few days interview points will be established near the sally port in each compound.

“At the appointed hour POWs will be formed by bn according to roster. Unarmed UNC clerks and US MPs will enter the compound to supervise the interviews. POWs will move to the interview points when called by the clerks, where they will be asked to express their decision. They will carry their equip and do with them.

“Depending upon each individual’s decision, he will remain in present compound or be removed immediately.

“After individual interview, POWs who are to be repatriated will be housed in compounds separate from those POWs who strongly oppose repatriation.

“You are reminded that quiet and good order must be maintained within the compound during the conduct of these interviews.”

In addition, the fol announcement of a msg received from the Communists and broadcast over radio Pyongyang was given wide publicity: “The spokesman of the Korean People’s Army and the Command Hq of the Chinese People’s Volunteers has been auth on Apr 6, 1952 to make the fol statement concerning the release and repatriation of all prisoners of war following an armistice in Korea.

“The Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers have always held that, fol the cessation of active hostilities, both belligerents should speedily release and repatriate all the prisoners of war in their respective custody. This reasonable position of ours definitely will not undergo any change on account of the fact that a nbr of our captured pers, during the period of captivity, have had their arms tattooed or have written certain documents or committed other similar acts. We are deeply aware that such acts have certainly not been done out of their own volition and that they should not be held responsible for these acts.

“We wholeheartedly welcome the return of all of our captured pers to the arms of the Motherland; we have further guaranteed, in an agreement reached with the other side, that all captured pers shall, after their repatriation, rejoin their families to participate in peaceful construction and live a peaceful life.”

3. The fol questions were asked those who were screened: “Will you voluntarily be repatriated to North Korea or China?” “Would you forcibly resist repatriation?” “Have you carefully considered the impact of such action on your family?” “Do you realize that you may remain here at Koje Do long after those electing repatriation have been returned home?” “Do you realize that the UNC cannot promise that you will be sent to any certain place?” “Are you still determined that you would violently resist repatriation?” “What would you do if you were repatriated in spite of this decision?”

4. Questions were asked one at a time and reply was awaited before next question. If at any time POW expressed a decision to accept repatriation the questions ceased. If at any time the POW mentioned suicide, fight to death, escape, braving death or similar information, the POW was segregated with those who would resist repatriation. The above briefing and questions applied only to NKs and CCF POWs. CIs and SKs were asked only, “Do you desire to return to North Korea?”

5. a. Results to date—Koje Do:

	A	B	C
	“Screened to Date”	“To Return to Communist Custody”	“To Remain in UNC Custody”
NKPOWs	51,861	21,248	30,613
SK POWS	14,723	3,622	11,101
CCF POWs	17,593	3,467	14,126
Cls	22,199	2,907	19,292
Totals	106,376	31,244	75,132

b. Seven North Korean compounds containing 37,628 POWs have thus far refused screening. One predominantly hard-core Communist civilian internee compound contains 5,700 persons who have refused screening.

6. In order to reduce the population per compound and screen those who thus far have resisted, movement of non-repatriates from Koje Do to newly established compounds in South Korea began today. Chinese and North Korean POWs who have been segregated on the basis they will not be returned to Communist control will be given one more opportunity to consider their decision prior to departure from the island. The fol statement will be made: “You are now to be shipped to a new camp. This is your final opportunity to return to control of auth representing Chinese Volunteer Army (or NKPA as applicable) at the time POWs are exchanged. If you elect to return you will be moved to a new compound immediately, where you will be protected and housed only with those who make the same decision.”

a. POW will then be asked: “Do you wish to return?”

b. Those who desire to return to CCF or NKPA control will then be immediately diverted to a holding compound for eventual return to the enemy.

7. After relocation of non-repatriates has been completed, those who previously refused screening will be broken into smaller groups, separated by compounds and screened.

Part 2. Opn Scatter—Hospital Compound, Pusan: Similar procedures are being used in screening of POWs and CIs now in custody at the Hosp Compound, Pusan. Opns there started 16 Apr and results to date are as fol:

	A	B	C
	“Screened to Date”	“To Return to Communist Custody”	“To Remain in UNC Custody”
NK POWs	3,158	2,793	365
SK POWs	732	437	295
CCF POWs	1,832	1,306	526
CIs	790	238	552
Totals	6,512	4,774	1,738

Part 3.

1. The fol additional info is considered pertinent, especially for State Dept use, as outlined in ref msg:

a. Opn Scatter was conducted on the soundest, most objective basis possible within our capabilities.

b. Pers used in interrogation were carefully selected and highly qual pers, the majority of them being US Mil.

c. No Taiwanese were used as interrogators of Chinese POWs.

d. Actual questioning was conducted indiv and in reasonable privacy with as many distracting factors as possible removed during screening procedures.

e. Among North Korean and Chinese POWs, every effort is being made to determine and segregate for retention in UNC custody only those persons who would actually forcibly oppose return to the Communist auth. Those of doubtful mind are being included in the group to be returned to Communist control.

2. Re Para 2, C 66649,² no special effort was made to invite ICRC representatives to witness Opn Scatter, although the POW camp was not barred to them. Since this screening is so closely related to the secrecy agreed upon by both sides while in Staff Off Executive sessions of Item 4 negotiations, it is necessary to reduce publicity insofar as possible. Local ICRC Delegates have been told only that relocation is taking place to reduce incidents of violence, lessen the administrative and logistical burden of so large an installation, and permit additional space for the pro-Communist element of the POW and civ internee population at Koje Do. They have not been informed of Opn Scatter, although unofficial press speculation and their knowledge of the POW situation has probably provided them with an accurate estimate of our intent. Camp auth have been specifically directed to show ICRC representatives customary courtesies and not to prohibit them from visiting compounds.

3. a. I understand that one of the purposes of your request for these data is to provide US Govt agencies with info which they can use in answering inquiries by foreign govts and individuals. All info so furn can be expected quickly to be public knowledge.

b. In view of the intimate relationship of Opn Scatter to Item 4 and hence to the armistice negotiations, it is essential that the same measure of security be exercised for both if we are not to compromise our agreement with the Communists.

4. I will report developments.

1. This telegram was for G–3. It was in response to DA 906549 to Ridgway, Apr. 17, 1952 asking for details on Operation Scatter for briefing purposes and to counter false accusations; DA 906549 is not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 157.
2. Dated Apr. 10, p. 142.