Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

[Washington,] April 14, 1952—1:30 p.m.

Korean POWs

General Bradley: What I have been wondering about is how many of these POW’s really want to return but like the life they are leading in the prison camps.

Mr. Bohlen: That is really the first question we had. We wonder what General Ridgway’s judgment is as to the reliability of the poll. How much confidence does he have in it? The second question we had in mind related to the 44,000 POW’s who, according to General Ridgway’s telegram² do not want to be screened at all. We thought that it might be possible to say to these prisoners that if they resist screening we will regard that as an indication that they want to return.

General Vandenberg: Supposing we take this position, what if a large number of them commit suicide on the way back?

Mr. Bohlen: We felt that the position I outlined would be one which we could explain and stand on.

General Bradley: The trouble is that it does not cover the individuals in the camps who might desire to remain.

Mr. Bohlen: I recognize that that is a problem and that we have only the word of the camp authorities at present concerning the desires of the men in the camps.

Mr. Johnson: We do know, however, that these camps contain the most intransigent communist groups.

General Collins: As regards the general problem of the very large number of POW’s who desire to remain, this is a problem that I have been afraid of all along.

Mr. Nitze: Do we have any estimate at all of how many of the 44,000 might desire to return?

General Collins: Personally, I won’t worry much about them. The thing that is worrisome to me is the 75,000 who say that they would Forcibly resist repatriation. I wonder if there is any way to reduce that number.

Mr. Bohlen: Of course this just indicates what the size of the problem is and has been from the start. It underlines the fact that we had a very big problem on our hands because there always has been a large number who would forcibly resist repatriation.

General Bradley: Just imagine what a problem it would have been to have pushed four out of five of our POWs back into communist hands against their will! There just isn’t any way to force that high a proportion back. I am inclined to ask General Ridgway for his recommendation on the 44,000 who have refused to be screened.

General Bolte: Why not tell the communists to come and get them?

General Bradley: It is a hell of a job to handle POW’s who do not want to cooperate. This isn’t like the situation we had in North Africa. I can remember when the Italians were surrendering in large numbers there and all we had to do was to post MP’s to direct the flow to the prison camps. All we really needed was a sign reading “This way to the POW camps”. We don’t have that kind of a problem now.

Mr. Bohlen: Assuming for the moment that we can not sizably reduce the number who would forcibly resist repatriation and assuming that most of the 44,000 will desire to return, we might consider what negotiating position to take vis-à-vis the communists. There are two possibilities, it seems to me. We might stand on our original position and insist on the principle of voluntary repatriation. This would be our present formal position including the use of the International Red Cross for screening purposes. Secondly, we might tell the communists what we have done and that we have done it as honestly as we know how. We would inform them that 75,000 POW’s desire to return and can be returned immediately on an all-for-all exchange for our own prisoners in their hands. As for the 74,000 who do not want to return, we might say that we would be prepared to let any appropriate neutral body screen them again after the armistice has been completed in order to determine whether any of them have changed their minds.

These are the parts of the problem as we see it. I think it is clearly established now that we really never could have agreed to an all-for-all exchange.

Admiral Fechteler: What will we do if most of the 44,000 want to remain also? It seems to me that we ought not to say anything about the 44,000 at all. If we do say anything we are likely to find ourselves in trouble, for many of them may opt for staying with us. I think we ought to retain flexibility in this matter and play it the way circumstances indicate that it is desirable to play it.

Mr. Nitze: Then we might find ourselves caught in a trap. We might have lost our moral position and be compelled to forcibly repatriate many POW’s.

Admiral Fechteler: However, as Mr. Bohlen says, we would have a defensible position.

Mr. Bohlen: We would have a defensible position only if we had given them a chance to choose whether or not to be screened in light of the warning that we would regard a refusal to be screened as an indication that they wanted to be repatriated.

Mr. Johnson: Furthermore, as matters now stand, our negotiators have got to put in a round number soon. We have got to indicate in round numbers how many POW’s are to repatriated.

General Collins: The Army has prepared a draft message³ on this problem. It has not been seen by anyone here but perhaps I might circulate it as a basis for our discussion.

Mr. Nitze: (Referring to the draft message) You state here that the North Korean figure appears particularly high and out of line with the previous estimate. Is not the number of Chinese Communist POW’s who would forcibly resist repatriation out of line with our previous estimate also?

Mr. Johnson: Not as far out of line as the North Korean figure. General Bradley: Personally, I thought it would be about a 50–50 split.

Mr. Nitze: At any rate the Chinese Communists present our most difficult problem.

General Vandenberg: Of course this may all be a deep-dyed plot on the part of the Chinese Communists to get a lot of their people into Formosa and into a position to really subvert a lot of the Chinese Nationalists.

General Bradley: I think we can be confident that the Chinese Nationalists are fully capable of taking care of that problem if it is a problem.

General Ruffner: It seems to me that the Chinese Communists will not be too anxious to continue the war if they get a lot of publicity to the effect that 100 out of every 120 prisoners do not want to return to China. It seems to me that the Chinese Communists might not be averse to a solution which would avoid a lot of publicity.

Mr. Bohlen: It seems to me, General Collins, that this message might be misconstrued. It is possible to read it as though we are determined to reduce the number of POW’s who would forcibly resist repatriation. The problem rather is to determine on the best basis we can which of the POW’s really would forcibly resist repatriation.

Mr. Johnson: I think the whole message might be put more into the form of a query.

Mr. Bohlen: The whole point of this from the beginning has been that we do not want to hog-tie a lot of POW’s and throw them back into communist hands. The message could be read to mean that we are determined to keep down the number who would forcibly resist and that we are not too concerned about how many get shot once they have been returned. In a sense we are in a paradoxical situation. As I remarked to our Secretary this morning, we seem to have won an important skirmish in the battle for men’s minds and now we are alarmed at the victory we have won.

(At this point Admiral Wooldridge entered the meeting.)

General Collins: If we query General Ridgway on the accuracy of the screening I think he can only reply that the men in his command were given certain orders and that they are accustomed to following out their orders and that he assumes the results are a correct reflection of the situation.

Mr. Bohlen: I think I would delete the first sentence which indicates that we are concerned by the number who would forcibly resist repatriation. I think we might say instead that the estimate appears out of line with previous estimates—particularly as regards the North Koreans—and ask General Ridgway whether he thinks that a recheck would lower the number.

General Collins: (Referring to the original instruction to General Ridgway) The directive under which General Ridgway was operating called for the return of the maximum number of communist POW’s subject to the elimination of those who gave reasonable evidence that they would forcibly resist repatriation.

General Bradley: I would be surprised if General Ridgway himself is not somewhat surprised by the results and if he had not therefore initiated inquiries concerning the satisfactoriness of the screening.

General Collins: In the screening process our people were supposed to point out the importance of the decision and the fact that this decision by each POW was a final one. Our people were also supposed to point out the disadvantages and uncertainties for each POW which would result from his refusal to be repatriated. Our people stressed the finality of the decision and the impossibility of changing it.

Mr. Bohlen: I think it is apparent that the procedures followed were such that it is unlikely that we can expect much change as a result of a recheck.

Mr. Johnson: But it is true, is it not, that we have no knowledge of the exact procedures followed?

General Collins: That is right.

Mr. Bohlen: We do not know, I take it, whether the Formosan Chinese did the actual interrogation? I recall that we sent one message recommending that these Formosan Chinese be removed from the camp areas. Do we know whether that was done?

Admiral Lalor: How long ago was this message?

Mr. Bohlen: It was about at the time when the negotiators went into secret sessions in the tents and the Chinese Communists raised the point that the Formosan Chinese were being employed by us.

General Bradley: I wonder whether our message should not take the form of an expression of some surprise at the results and of a query on two points: First, whether he is satisfied that the interrogations were carried out in accordance with his instructions, and second, whether it is necessary to screen the 44,000 or whether we can safely assume that these people want to be repatriated. We might perhaps add one more point. We might query him as to whether there was anything in our instruction to him which affected the result by leading the POW’s to expect too much.

Mr. Johnson: I think we ought also to query him about the implications in his judgment of the results for the negotiations.

Mr. Bohlen: I think we should ask him what his views would be as to the handling of the matter in the negotiations—in the event that the results are an accurate reflection of the desires of the POW’s. We are very lucky that this process and the results thereof have so far been kept out of the press. Now that the results are in, it is probable that there will be leaks in the near future.

General Bradley: If this does leak it could create a very serious problem.

Mr. Bohlen: There must be a good many people, including a lot of South Koreans, who know the results. Furthermore, I assume that the prisoners who would forcibly resist repatriation are being segregated in special camps.

General Bradley: His message states, I believe, that they were to be segregated immediately.

Mr. Bohlen: In light of all this I think we have to assume that there will probably be leaks before long. We have got to decide how to deal with this matter with the communists and we ought to do it as soon as possible so our negotiators can explain it to the communists before the matter is aired in the press.

General Bradley: We have found that message that you were referring to, Mr. Bohlen. The incoming message is from Admiral Joy and is dated March 31.⁴ Joy recommended the removal of Formosan Chinese from the camp areas.

Mr. Bohlen: I have wondered whether the Chinese Communist broadcast regarding an amnesty for all those who elected to return was used in the screening. I suppose it was for I think that we in effect suggested that the communists take this measure.

General Collins: I have scribbled down here a brief revision of this draft message. (General Collins then read his draft the main points of which were about as follows: The results of the screening show a much higher percentage of POW’s who would forcibly resist repatriation than we had anticipated. We request your reaction to the acceptability of the screening process and to the effect of the results on the armistice negotiations. We also request your recommendations concerning the desirability of screening those POW’s whose camp leaders refuse screening.)

General Cabell: Is any point served by showing surprise at the results?

Mr. Allison: Do we not also want to suggest a way of proceeding with the 44,000?

General Vandenberg: Why do we announce anything concerning these 44,000? Why don’t we preserve some flexibility on this score. We may not get an armistice and in that event we might want to keep these people.

Mr. Nitze: We have got to get a round number for negotiating purposes.

General Vandenberg: Well, I would give them a round number.

General Collins: (Referring to a second message from General Ridgway) General Ridgway estimates that only 800 of the North Korean POW’s (these account for 37,800 of the 44,000) would forcibly resist repatriation. The leaders refused screening on the ground that everyone in their camp wanted to return.

Even if this estimate is correct, we have still got 56,000 POW’s who do not want to be returned.

Mr. Bohlen: Although this number is larger than we anticipated, it does conform with the whole pattern of the Korean war. The whole movement of refugees has been in our direction from the very beginning; in fact, substantial numbers of North Koreans fled to South Korea even before the Korean war began.

General Bradley: Perhaps we should not be too surprised by this.

Mr. Bohlen: I don’t believe we are going to reduce the number much by any recheck we might do. Furthermore, there is some disadvantage in going into this process at all unless it is going to get a substantially different result. A difference of three or four thousand will not be of great importance in the armistice negotiations. I think the sooner we can get our negotiating position fixed and presented to the communists the better off we will be.

General Bradley: How do they propose to return the POW’s who desire to return?

Mr. Johnson: I think the plan is to take them by landing craft to Inchon and then to take them to the Panmunjom area.

General Bradley: I think we ought to take them to North Korea so that they will be out of our hands as soon as we put them ashore.

Admiral Fechteler: Suppose General Ridgway replies to our message by saying that he does have doubts about the accuracy of the screening. What are we going to tell him to do then?

General Collins: I don’t think he would say that unless he also made recommendations as to what he ought to do about it.

Admiral Fechteler: Why don’t we just query him regarding the effect of these results on the negotiations?

Mr. Nitze: We may be in an unsound position regarding the 37,000. Perhaps some of them will want to stay. We might get into some trouble if a substantial number of them did want to stay and we had promised to return 37,000.

General Vandenberg: I still think the main point is that we ought to get our own prisoners back. I have always thought so and still do, but of course I go along with the policy.

Mr. Bohlen: Of course the screening merely shows the problem we would have faced if we had tried to return all of these POW’s.

General Bradley: I have written out a redraft of this message now which tries to get away from the point that we did not expect these results and which merely notes the large number who would forcibly resist repatriation and requests his recommendations regarding procedure. I think I will have this typed so that we can look at it.

Mr. Bohlen: Well, we all know that the effect of this on the armistice negotiations is going to be punk. The real problem is what position ought to be taken in the negotiations.

General Bradley: There is only one position to take, isn’t there?

Mr. Bohlen: Well, there are two possibilities. We could stand pat on the principle of voluntary repatriation, or we could give them a round number as we have promised and offer to permit the International Red Cross or perhaps the armistice supervisory commission to interrogate the ones who have elected to stay some time after the armistice.

General Collins: I think we would have to suggest these two possibilities to him. They would not necessarily occur to him.

Mr. Nitze: I don’t think we would want to recommend the first. I think we are well past that.

General Bradley: I agree.

Mr. Nitze: So we really have only one suggestion to make and that concerns those who have elected to stay behind.

Mr. Bohlen: Should we offer to let them be interviewed before or after the armistice?

Mr. Johnson: After, I think.

Mr. Bohlen: I think afterwards is better. Of course this will still have a poor effect on the armistice even though the communists will get about four prisoners to every one of ours they will return. They will surely charge duress.

General Bradley: We can even let them have observers present if they want it. I would be willing to let them do almost anything they want within reason to check on the accuracy of the screening.

Mr. Bohlen: We have kicked around one other idea a little bit. Since we are faced with the situation we have wondered whether there might be some value in going to the Russians—not to negotiate with them but simply to present the facts to them and get the record straight. The importance of this might be that the Russians, who are the boss people in all this, might get a distorted view from Panmunjom. They may think this whole thing has been rigged. All we could do would be to tell them that we cannot and will not forcibly return POW’s and that the results are the results of as honest a screening as we could take. We would not ask them to do anything but it might be useful if they know the truth. Then if they want the armistice they might on their own account try to use their good offices to prevent this thing from blocking an armistice.

General Bradley: I think we would have to take this up first at Panmunjom. We have agreed with the communists to take this up in executive session with them.

Mr. Bohlen: If it were to be taken up with the Russians I think it ought to be taken up simultaneously with the Panmunjom session and certainly not before.

(At this point General Bradley’s redraft was circulated and read by the conferees. Mr. Bohlen drafted some additional language concerning the proposal for a possible post-armistice rescreening by the International Red Cross. After some brief further discussion it was agreed that Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews would prepare a revised draft for clearance in State and Defense later in the day.)⁵

1. A note on the title page read: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants.”

   Of the JCS, Generals Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler attended. Nitze headed the Department of State contingent and General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense. Altogether 18 persons were present.

2. Telegram C 66832, Apr. 12, p. 143.
3. After revisions, this draft was sent as JCS 906314 to Ridgway, Apr. 15, infra.
4. Presumably a reference to CINCFE telegram C 66197 to the JCS dated Mar. 31, not printed, which furnished the substance of the transcript of executive sessions of staff officers on Mar. 31 in Korea. (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45))
5. Transmitted as JCS 906314 to Ridgway, Apr. 15, infra.