Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Department of the Army (Jenkins)

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, April 10, 1952—10:18 a.m.

C 66649. Urmsg DA 905740.¹

1. Screening and segregation plan for personnel at Koje-Do is known as Operation Scatter.²

A. For North Korean and Chinese Prisoners of War:

(1) Commanding General Army Eight was directed to conduct screening and segregation with a view to making maximum number of prisoners of war available for return to Communist control, reduced by those who, in his judgment, present reasonable evidence that they would forcibly resist return to Communist control.

(2) An orientation program was conducted 6, 7 Apr which covered mechanics of screening plan, importance of decision which individual was to make, and emphasized the many disadvantages and the uncertainty which would result from refusal to return to Communist control.

(3) Operation Scatter went into effect 8 Apr. Each individual is being asked a series of questions in personal interview designed to determine, insofar as possible, whether he would or would not forcibly resist repatriation. Those who indicate they would forcibly resist return to Communist control are being segregated immediately in new compounds constructed for this purpose.

(4) Finality of decision and fact that no reclama [reclaim] can be made is being stressed.

B. For South Korean Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees:

Prior orientation covers only manner in which screening will be conducted. In interview, these personnel are being asked only if they desire return to North Korea.

2. Re State Dept suggestion concerning ICRC observing screening procedure, do not consider it advisable to make special effort to inform local representatives. UNC is following policy of secrecy agreed upon for executive sessions in Item 4 throughout screening program. While leaks may develop through native Korean channels any overt action by UNC that might compromise security agreement with Communists would affect negotiations. Should ICRC delegates visit Koje-Do on their own volition for routine inspection we will not attempt to stop them, but, depending upon the amount of information they acquire during such visit, we may ask their cooperation in not publicizing the purpose or the procedures of the screening program.

1. Not printed.
2. On Apr. 4, the UNC Delegation informed its Communist counterpart at Panmunjom that it agreed to begin preparation of the revised prisoner of war lists in accordance with the Communist proposal of Apr. 2; see the editorial note, p. 135. The Communists then gave their tacit approval. A summary of the executive session in which this agreement occurred is in telegram C 66397, Ridgway to JCS, Apr. 4. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 124)