795.00/4–352: Telegram
The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief United Nations Command (Ridgway)
top secret
operational immediate
operational immediate
Washington, April 3, 1952—5:57
p.m.
JCS 905427. From JCS. Re Para 5 C 656501 and part 2 HNC 1118.2
- 1.
- Alternative position on Soviet Union as mbr Supervisory Commission, if “neutral” designation eliminated and United States is also mbr, as set forth para 2D (1) (b) (1) JCS 903687,3 is in no way considered here as any concession whatever to Commie position on this point. As Soviet Union can introduce Soviet natls into mbrship teams from satellite countries, only real value to Soviets’ overt mbrship on teams is propaganda value of ability to pose in role of “neutral” in Korean hostilities. Suggested alternative, if used, would, of course, be presented in negots by UNC Del as compromise. It might well be so interpreted by international opinion to our consequent advantage. By placing Soviets openly on side of Commie aggressors only real advantage to Soviets of mbrship on inspection commission is destroyed and chances of their acceptance this alternative would appear to be very slight. Thus, it appears here that this alternative offers very advantageous negotiating and propaganda possibilities with minimum of potential disadvantages.
- 2.
- If, in spite of foregoing considerations, you continue to feel that this alternative proposal should not be presented, you are authorized to proceed according to your best judgment as indicated in para lb part 2 HNC 1118. Under these conditions part 2 is approved.