Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
emergency

Munsan, April 4, 1952—1 a.m.¹

HNC 1118. This message in two parts. Part 1 requests immediate decision.

Part 1.

1. Discussions with the Communists on the POW question have reached the point where we are convinced that no further progress is possible unless and until we can give them a reasonably accurate estimate of how many POWs would be returned to them under our proposal. The Communists understand that the development of such a figure requires screening of UNC held prisoners of war and civilian internees. Their insistence upon a round figure for use in further discussion and their proposal of a recess to develop such a figure implies their tacit acquiescence in the screening process. In view of this and the fact that the question of the numbers and nationalities of the POWs to be returned rather than the principles involved appears to be the controlling issue, I believe that the screening and segregation of all POWs and civilian internees should begin at the earliest possible date which we estimate to be within five days.

2. Approval of this plan requires prior US Government understanding and approval of the following features:

a. Screening and segregation once accomplished are final. Prisoners having once chosen to identify themselves with one group or another, thereafter cannot be permitted to change their minds, or to remingle. Therefore it must be accepted that forced repatriation might be unavoidable in some cases.

b. Once a figure has been given to the Communists the UNC must be prepared to deliver substantially the number reported. Major downward revisions of this figure could not be made.

c. The US must accept responsibility for continued custody and support of POWs who are not to be returned at least until such time as the UN, through the US as its executive agent, reaches a decision as to their ultimate disposition.

3. Screening and segregation are inevitable under any solution except unconditional repatriation of all POWs. The longer we wait, the longer we delay the return of our own POWs, the more we risk armistice failure and the greater is the danger of serious outbreaks on Koje-Do. A potentially explosive atmosphere now exists there which is capable of developing to such a point it might result in heavy loss of life and great discredit to the US and the UNC. Measures to reduce this danger such as breaking the camp into small units and dispersing them over a wide area or removing them from Korean territory are beyond the capabilities of the UNC.

4. Request authority as a matter of urgency to proceed immediately as indicated in para one, since Item Four meetings are now of necessity being recessed from day to day pending receipt of this authority.

Part 2.

1. It is clear that the armistice conference is at a stage requiring decisive action. In our judgment we have explored and developed the enemy attitude on POW exchange as far as is possible without the information we will obtain from the action outlined above. Subsequent to this action we intend to proceed as follows:

a. Present our figure of POWs to be repatriated to the enemy and receive their corresponding figure. The UNC revised list will exclude (a) POWs and civilian internees of ROK residence who do not desire to go to the other side and (b) other POWs whose repatriation would require the application of force. The excluded personnel will previously have been assigned a status other than POW. The UNC will insist on the enemy list being substantially the 11,559 UNC POWs previously submitted.

b. Seek agreement on the figures in (a) above. If successful, we would have disposed of Item Four of the agenda, and would then be in a position to trade airfield restrictions for withdrawal of the USSR issue, thus completing the armistice.

c. If unsuccessful, present a package proposal including the following points: (1) Deletion of airfield restrictions from the armistice agreement. (2) Withdrawal of USSR and Norway from the lists of nominees for the neutral nations supervisory commission, thus establishing a 4-nation neutral commission composed of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. (3) Agreement upon all-for-all exchange of POWs based on revised lists.

2. This course of action requires that at the time the UNC delegation presents the above proposal, it inform the Communists that the proposal must be accepted or rejected in toto; that debate on these subjects is unnecessary since all have been exhaustively explored by both sides; and that therefore the UNC will not debate them further. The delegation will represent its proposal as an equitable compromise solution which is the final stand of the UNC on the unresolved issues. The UNC delegation will, of course, make plain its willingness to continue meeting with the enemy delegation for the purpose of discussing non-substantive changes in its proposal and will avoid any appearance of terminating negotiations. Thus if the enemy breaks off negotiations rather than accept the UNC proposal, the breakoff will involve enemy rejection of a patently fair solution and will conform with your desire that such a breakoff be over a multiplicity of issues. Contingent upon your approval of Part One, I request your further approval of the action outlined in Part Two herein.

1. Because of the international dateline, this telegram was sent from Korea at 1 a.m. local time, Apr. 4, yet was received in Washington on the afternoon of Apr. 3, Eastern Standard Time.