Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 8: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, March 17, 1952—8:22 p.m.

C 65430. Reference JCS 902159¹ and JCS 903687.² This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1.

A. Among the major issues growing out of our constant effort toward obtaining a just and honorable armistice agreement is that pertaining to POWs. There has never been the slightest deviation in the UNC delegation effort to seek adequate safeguards towards insuring the safe and speedy return of all UNC prisoners in enemy hands and this remains our first and paramount objective. Failure to obtain Communist agreement on the basis for exchange of POWs and the execution of the plan directed in JCS 902159 will, in my opinion, gravely jeopardize the safe return of those 11,559 UN prisoners reported by the Communists. It is, therefore, imperative that every effort be made to determine positively that the Communist stated position on forced repatriation is in fact unalterable. To this end, the UNC delegation must exhaust every possibility toward obtaining Communist agreement to an exchange that will not involve forced repatriation (See C [CX] 65424).³

B. In view of the above, I believe our present negotiatory plan should be continued for a period of time in a further effort toward reaching a status of 2 unresolved issues, airfields and voluntary repatriation. The removal of the USSR as an issue still remains a prerequisite to resolution of those 2 major issues.

Part 2. Specific comment regarding JCS 903687 as requested in para 5 of that msg follows:

A. I am strongly opposed to any meeting of field commanders, at least until the actual signing of an armistice agreement. To establish such a meeting infers authority on the part of Communist commanders which we believe does not exist. Furthermore, the introduction of the commanders unnecessarily complicates the problem by establishing another level of the negotiation with the inevitable attendant delays.

B. The basic structure for the approach outlined in JCS 903687 is reclassification of [and] segregation of POWs. As indicated in my C 64383,⁴ I feel we must exhaust all other possibilities in relation to this issue prior to taking such an irrevocable step which, in my opinion, may destroy all chances of securing the safe return of those prisoners reported by the Communists. Under the proposal suggested in JCS 903687, wherein 3 major unresolved issues are presented in 1 package, it is possible that we jeopardize an armistice agreement through requiring the Communists to give on 2 issues (USSR and voluntary repatriation) as against 1 (airfields) by the UNC.

C. I am extremely reluctant to reverse our previously irrevocable stand against the USSR as a member of any supervisory organ, and am equally reluctant from the practical viewpoint of our inability to control their activities should they be given freedom of movement in our area. I feel we should never concede on this point. In light of Communist reaction to Secretary Acheson’s public announcements last summer on issues of 38 parallel and the withdrawal of foreign troops, we feel a strong possibility exists that the Communists may concede this issue of the US position in that regard if made crystal clear by US govt public announcement as previously recommended.

D. As indicated in para 2 of JCS 903687, it is important that any proffered package agreement which states final and irrevocable positions must not become a new point of departure for negotiations on individual issues. In order to insure that it does not, it is essential that prior to proffering such a package agreement there be a US govt decision that, in event of Communist refusal to accept our position within a reasonable and stated period of time, the US govt will consider the Communists have terminated the negotiations and further, that the Communists be so informed when the “package” is tabled.

Part 3.

A. It is therefore my recommendation that the UNC delegation continue the present effort to bring negotiations to the point of 2 major unresolved issues.

B. In order to determine the Communist desire for an armistice, it is vital that every possible step be taken to remove the issue of the USSR. I, therefore, adhere to the recommendation contained in HNC 1033.⁵

1. Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.
2. Dated Mar. 15, p. 89.
3. Dated Mar. 17, supra.
4. Dated Feb. 27, p. 66.
5. Dated Mar. 11, p. 80.